



Daily Report

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Karpov, Chervov, Pasko Discuss Arms Cuts

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[Editorial report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1230 GMT on 30 November carries a 30-minute program entitled: "From the Strategy of Deterrence to the Strategy of Restraint." Taking part in the conversation are Viktor Pavlovich Karpov, deputy USSR minister of foreign affairs; Nikolay Fedorovich Chervov, chief of directorate of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces; and Vladimir Georgiyevich Pasko, All-Union Radio commentator.

Pasko opens the discussion: "Hello, comrades. Tomorrow marks 18 months since the Soviet-U.S. treaty on elimination of medium and shorter range missiles came into force. Journalists have registered this moment with minute precision. The treaty was rightly described as historic, since it was the first agreement heralding a real reduction in nuclear weapons in the two countries' arsenals. Tomorrow, the 18 months which were allotted by the sides for elimination of one of these classes of missiles, shorter-range missiles, will be up. Nikolay Fedorovich, how is the agreement being implemented?"

[Chervov] "The Soviet Union and the United States are fully observing the obligations undertaken under the intermediate missile treaty. Up to date, shorter range missiles have been completely eliminated, 100 per cent, and a substantial part of medium range missiles have been. The Soviet Union, in particular, has, up to date, destroyed 55 percent of its medium range missiles, 487 missiles, numerically speaking; while the United States has destroyed approximately 46 percent of its medium-range missiles, 385 missiles."

Karpov then cites Shevardnadze at the USSR Supreme Soviet on increased security, thanks to the destruction of U.S. and USSR missiles in Europe.

Chervov then remarks: "Together with short-range missiles, about 1,800-1,900 missiles have already been eliminated. The military danger has diminished somewhat. These are mainly missiles with a short target approach time of a maximum of only 8 to 12 minutes. What can be done in those 8 or 12 minutes? These missiles are in effect ones which provoke the possibility of a nuclear war. Their elimination, therefore, undoubtedly enhances both security and stability on the European continent."

[Karpov] "This is undoubtedly a joyous fact. But one cannot but see something else. It is nearly 2 years since the treaty has been signed: it has been in effect for 18 months. Contrary to expectations, however, there have been no fresh break-throughs, either in the sphere of nuclear disarmament, or in other aspects of arms control. We can speak of a certain slowing down of the rate at which military expenditure is growing. The United States, for instance, set \$4 billion less than the current year for the 1990 financial year. We can speak of a slowing down in the implementation of a number of military programs. For instance, the huge allocations for

the SDI and the B-2 strategic bomber have been cut. But these programs still remain, just as do those which are designed to compensate for the missiles currently being eliminated by the United States. The main thing is that the philosophy which fosters the arms race remains unaltered, the philosophy of deterrence in regard to the East."

Karpov says that the cold war is on its way out. Disarmament negotiations of all kinds are of great importance here, because arms race does nothing to strengthen peaceful trends. The tendency that existed earlier of permanently building-up the military potential of NATO and the Warsaw Pact must be changed. Karpov states that a breakthrough has already occurred here—short and medium range missiles have been eliminated: "Talks on conventional arms forces are underway in Vienna. There, trends which I would term very promising have also emerged, giving one grounds to hope that it will by the end of the next year have been possible to reach an accord on genuinely deep cuts in the armed forces and armaments belonging to NATO and the Warsaw Pact. This would be tantamount to being an altogether new factor within the European security framework. No such factor existed in the course of the postwar history so far. If, in addition to that, we succeed in ensuring, by the end of the next year, or in 1991, a breakthrough also in the working out of a convention banning chemical weapons and eliminating its stockpiles, then these three directions: nuclear arms, conventional arms and chemical weapons then [as heard], a completely new atmosphere will then appear, a healthier one, one that will make it possible to take a fresh look at the problem of European security and at the problem of security in the world in general and to pay more attention to other aspects of security, such as ecological security, economic security and other questions connected with the development of relations between peoples, with humanitarian problems and so forth."

Karpov says that the Malta summit is important both for bilateral relations and East-West relations. He says people should not expect any agreements from the summit—this is just to lay the groundwork for making decisions during the next, official summit. Mutual understanding on various issues should turn into interaction on a broad range of international and bilateral problems.

Both Chervov and Karpov are pleased with the U.S. defense cuts. Karpov outlines Soviet arms cutting proposals and says that: "If our initiatives really do meet in the United States with the kind of response Minister Cheney is now talking about, then this can only be welcomed."

Chervov says that it is indeed true that there is a tendency to cut U.S. military budget. But all military programs remain unaltered, in the main. There are certain changes: SDI spending has been cut, but only as far as what the Pentagon is allowed to spend on it. But other agencies make up the shortfall and the total figure

remains as it was. Other military programs, including the one concerning strategic arms, are also retained. There is a trend to cut military spending and this must be welcomed; "The Pentagon is even working on steps envisaging cuts in military spending to the tune of \$140-150 billion and, yes, even as high as \$180 billion. If this takes place, it will not be a revision of military programmes alone that will be needed—but also of the structure of the armed forces and this will, undoubtedly, require the USSR to take action in response."

Thatcher's utterances on the cold war, opposing reductions in military spending, will hardly meet with support on the part of other NATO member states.

Chervov continues: "Viktor Pavlovich has already mentioned the talks currently underway in Vienna and Geneva and the fact that things there are not going as speedily and as smoothly as one would have wanted. Moreover, the United States shows, let's say, a tendency toward dragging out the Geneva talks, referring to the special position of West Europeans. On their part, they state that nuclear arms represent a response to the Soviet military superiority in conventional arms. We, for our part, are of the view that it is up to the West to make its response in the nuclear and conventional arms fields alike." Karpov adds that the new U.S. Administration took six months to analyze the strategic situation in the world, working out its course and this has been defined quite recently. The Wyoming meeting in September has shown that the U.S. Administration is already beginning to define its course in the nuclear arms area. Baker's statements made at the time of the Wyoming meeting make it possible to move faster in Geneva at the talks on nuclear and space arms. No serious progress has so far been noted since then. But there is movement, documents are being worked out, obsolete views are being revised. "But as far as some major issues are concerned, such as, say, the observance of the ABM Treaty, one must say that even though we have had Wyoming, we have had new accords, [as heard] the U.S. delegation seems not to have heard of these at all. As far as other issues are concerned, such as mobile missiles, the preparation of experimental inspection measures as part of elaborating a system of verification [kontrol] of the future treaty and as far as some other issues are concerned there is movement here."

Karpov then continues, saying that there is progress on peripheral matters, but not on central issues, as set out in Gorbachev's message to Bush and by Shevardnadze to Baker. The U.S. delegation at the Geneva talks says that it has allegedly received no instructions from Washington. But, surely, it is possible to work through in two months the proposals of the Soviet leadership to then issue instructions to your delegation. More attention is being paid to the Vienna talks, but these can proceed faster if we reach a consensus on fixed levels down to which NATO and Warsaw Pact forces would be reduced. It is good that on 16 January delegations will assemble in Vienna to discuss military doctrines. The goal is to make these doctrines defensive in nature. Tactical nuclear

weapons in Europe will, along conventional arms, have to be taken into account here. Equal arms levels and armed forces levels will have to be established in Vienna and this does take care of the NATO argument that we have conventional superiority—even if it were the case, equal levels would take care of that. The NATO session in Brussels evidently took this into account, stating that nuclear weapons would have to be discussed once conventional levels have been agreed upon.

Chervov reviews this idea, recalling Warsaw Pact initiatives in recent past. The seminar in Vienna will be held between 16 January and 5 February and it will represent a very serious political measure. Army General Moiseyev, chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, will head the Soviet delegation: "I think that the main aim will be to compare military doctrines, to analyze their nature and the directions in which they will evolve in the future, with the aim of removing the mutual suspiciousness and mistrust that have been piling up for years and years, of reaching a better understanding of each other's intentions, of facilitating the military concepts and doctrines of the two alliances and their members being based upon defensive principles. If we start reproaching each other at this seminar, if we start abusing each other along the lines that your doctrine is an aggressive one and mine is defensive, then nothing will come out of this."

Karpov agrees, saying the seminar will be of great importance for the future talks in Vienna: "From this point of view, it is indeed important to understand precisely the philosophy, as it were, of military doctrines—what are they targeted at with NATO and the Warsaw Pact—can it indeed be said that the goals of creating nonoffensive, or nonprovoking defense coincide as far as the two alliances are concerned? If these goals do coincide, can military-technical solutions be arrived at, solutions that would lead to a change, such an irreversible change in military structures of both alliances as would in future guarantee an altogether new level of security for all European states? Well, this, I reckon, represents a very important aspect of the future discussions at the seminar on military doctrines. That is to say the tone ought to be really businesslike, devoid of unnecessary polemics and, of course, propaganda, that goes without saying."

Pasko now sums up: Self restraint must replace deterrence.

Continued Semipalatinsk Tests in Question

90UM0140A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian
26 Nov 89 p 2

[Article by TASS correspondent A. Vodolazov: "Test Range: In Search of a Resolution"]

[Text] Alma-Ata—On instructions of the CPSU Central Committee and the Government of the USSR, a group of top-level officials of union ministries and departments headed by I.S. Belousov, deputy chairman of the USSR

Council of Ministers, visited Semipalatinsk Oblast on 22-23 November. Together with U.K. Karamanov, chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Kazakh SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic]; Ye.M. Asanbayev, secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan; M.S. Mendybayev, deputy chairman of the Kazakh SSR Council of Ministers, the managers of local party and soviet organs studied in detail questions relating to the cessation of nuclear weapons tests on the Semipalatinsk test range.

In an interview with the TASS correspondent, I.S. Belousov said that a special draft decree of the Government of the USSR is being prepared that provides for the satisfaction of the desires and just demands of the residents of cities and villages of an extensive region of Kazakhstan.

We are aware, he said, that the continued operation of the nuclear test range arouses great concern among the local population. At the same time, it is also not possible to ignore the fact that the tests being conducted here are extremely important for ensuring the security of our country. We visited the test range, carefully familiarized ourselves with the state of affairs, and looked into a

number of complicated questions of a civilian and military nature. We talked with people and tried to understand more thoroughly the complex psychological situation that has developed with respect to underground explosions, with an eye toward sweeping away various kinds of rumors and conjectures. Incidentally, all of the explosions checked by representatives of the public did not cause any deviations in the radiation background, which is the same as that, let us say, in Moscow, Leningrad, and Alma-Ata. What I can report now is that no explosions will be conducted in the Semipalatinsk area in December of this year and in January of next year.

As is known, according to the Soviet-U.S. agreement, the yield of underground tests has been reduced by a factor of two. In addition, we also reduced the number of tests by a factor of two. The Soviet Union has already declared a unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions. Unfortunately, the United States did not meet us half way. It is clear that it moved ahead in this respect during this time. Therefore, it is necessary to strive even more persistently for a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons tests, I.S. Belousov said in conclusion.

Past 'Strong-arm' Policies Toward Allies Assailed

PM0612170389 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 6 Dec 89 pp 2-3

[Interview with Doctor of Philosophical Sciences Yu.S. Novopashin, deputy director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Slavic and Balkan Studies Institute, by correspondent A. Novikov under the rubric "Lessons of History": "Farewell to Arms!"; date, place not given; first paragraph is KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA introduction]

[Text] Meeting in Moscow 4 December, the leaders of Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland, and the Soviet Union declared that the sending of their states' troops into the CSSR, undertaken in 1968, was interference in the internal affairs of sovereign Czechoslovakia and must be condemned. This statement gives grounds for pondering on the way relations between the Soviet Union and other socialist countries were organized for many years. Our correspondent talks with Doctor of Philosophical Sciences Yu.S. Novopashin, deputy director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Slavic and Balkan Studies Institute.

[Novikov] It was stated back at the 19th All-Union Party Conference that "administrative edict methods did not bypass the foreign policy sphere" and that the Soviet leadership's decisions which one way or another affected the interests of other socialist countries were frequently "adopted by a narrow circle of people, without collective, comprehensive examination or analysis, and sometimes even without proper counsel with friends." This thought has also been aired subsequently in statements by our state's leaders. However, having shed light on much of what used to be in the shadow, the beams of glasnost are only beginning to penetrate the sphere of the Soviet Union's relations with fraternal countries.

[Novopashin] Yes, a large number of important pages in the history of the formation and development of the world socialist system are little known to the majority of the reading public—there was a taboo on them, and for many years they were hidden beneath various kinds of restrictive stamps: "For official use," "secret," "top secret." Incidentally, the guardians of science and political practice still cultivate these stamps widely and still endeavor to "keep out" of the open press works that make a realistic analysis of the state of affairs in the sphere of international socialist relations. Such a practice is one of the chief reasons why, to use M.S. Gorbachev's words, negative accretions in these relations have not been highlighted with a sufficient degree of frankness and, thus, all the "braking devices" holding up their development and emergence onto a new, modern stage have not been ascertained.

It has been publicly stated that sentiments of smugness and total license and the desire to embellish the real state of affairs spread in the USSR's internal life during the preceding decades, and if we point to the lack of democratism, glasnost, criticism, self-criticism, and

effective control and if we note that the political system created as a result of the victory of the October revolution was subjected to serious deformations, then it is naive and methodologically wrong to confine ourselves just to the sphere of relations within society. The atmosphere of pomposity and infallibility, authoritarianism in decisionmaking, and intolerance of any criticism inevitably led to great-power manners in relations with the communists and peoples of fraternal states and to a desire to impose one's own rules and one's own will.

[Novikov] You have now mentioned a very neglected "disease" of Soviet foreign policy, whose treatment in earnest really began comparatively recently.

[Novopashin] Yes, the desire to be the final arbiter, the sole "custodian of the purity" of Marxist-Leninist teaching is a chronic disease whose roots go back to Comintern times. The Third, or Communist, International with its headquarters in Moscow was a centralized international organization which had its own statutes and 21 conditions of admission to it. Point 15 of the conditions drawn up by Lenin and adopted by the second Comintern Congress in 1920 obliged every party that wished to belong to this organization to "give wholehearted support to every Soviet republic in its struggle against counterrevolutionary forces."

Since our country was the sole victorious Soviet federal republic, this condition was quite quickly transformed into a requirement for foreign communists to display solidarity with all decisions and actions of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) [VKP(B)] and the Soviet state and wholeheartedly support them. Precisely this was perceived as the chief criterion of revolutionariness and internationalism. I.V. Stalin said at a combined plenum of the VKP(B) Central Committee and Central Control Commission 1 August 1927 that a **revolutionary** is someone who is ready without reserve, unconditionally, openly and honestly, without secret military conferences to protect and defend the USSR, for the USSR is the world's first proletarian revolutionary state building socialism. An **internationalist** is someone who is ready unreservedly, without hesitation, and unconditionally to defend the USSR because the USSR is the base of the world revolutionary movement, and it is impossible to protect and advance this revolutionary movement without protecting the USSR. That statement reveals even to the naked eye the patina of dogmatization of point 15 of the Comintern conditions and the sectarian desire to protect the activities of the VKP(B) and the Soviet state from all criticism by foreign Communists.

In addition to the thesis of solidarity with the Soviet Union, another thesis was advanced on the special, leading role in the revolutionary movement of the world's first socialist state and its ruling party, which "directs the Comintern—which is an open secret," as L.B. Kamenev, who at that time headed the work of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) [RKP(B)] Central Committee Politburo, emphasized in one of his

reports in 1924. Thus, the directing role of the RKP(B)—which was renamed the VKP(B) by the 14th congress (1925) and the CPSU by the 19th congress (1952)—was regarded by its leaders as something that went without saying, and they had no objection whatever to the assertion of the de facto unconditional recognition of this role by foreign communists as one more obligatory Comintern condition, albeit an unwritten one.

I certainly do not intend to belittle the role played by the Comintern. Its services in restoring, strengthening, and expanding ties among working people in different countries, which had been disrupted as a result of the collapse of the Second International at the beginning of World War I, were beyond doubt.

However, the Stalinist dogmatization of Marxism-Leninism, the direct deviations from it, and the tangible manifestations of left-wing sectarian and hegemonist trends in the policy of the prewar leadership of the VKP(B) and the Soviet state deformed the activity of the Comintern, which, moreover, had been seriously weakened by the mass, unsubstantiated repression of Comintern cadres being carried out by the State Political Administration-People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs.

On 15 May 1943 the Comintern was disbanded by decision of the Communist International Executive Committee Presidium, but the Stalinist leadership's pretensions to playing the directing role in the world revolutionary movement and to controlling communist parties certainly did not recede into the past. They made themselves felt with new force during the first postwar years in the activity of the Communist and Workers Parties Information Bureau (Cominf, in Western terminology), which was created at the end of September 1947 and existed through April 1956.

It is still not customary for us to speak about the Communist Information Bureau's work out loud because, of the three conferences of representatives of the central committees of the parties which belonged to it, the last two to be held (in 1948 and 1949) were connected with the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict which arose through the fault of Stalin, Beriya, Zhdanov, Molotov, Suslov, and other Soviet leaders at the time and which they sought to internationalize, that is, to draw other parties and socialist countries into it and thus impose total isolation on the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and cut them off from international communism and the world socialist system.

[Novikov] But does it not seem to you that the very position of being the pioneers in creating a new society dictated for the Land of the Soviets and its party the role of leader in the international communist and workers movement?

[Novopashin] Of course, the Bolsheviks' party was considered and was in fact the most experienced. However, there is a very fine line here, which must not be overstepped.

It was necessary to exclude from our policy any hegemonist impulses. Incidentally, when Lenin was alive, he saw this danger and always sought to emphasize his equality with the leaders of other parties and the equality of the party which he represented with the parties of other countries. This is a very important principle, for the essence of truly socialist interethnic and international relations, including interparty relations, is inseparable from democratism. However, we could not keep ourselves at that level—the level of an equal among equals.

[Novikov] You have already mentioned one characteristic instance of such diktat and unsubstantiated accusations—Yugoslavia, which the Stalinist leadership cut off from the world socialist system. The Soviet-Yugoslav interstate and interparty conflict was settled by N.S. Khrushchev, who traveled to Belgrade in 1955 and virtually begged forgiveness for the "master," who by then was dead. Let us come closer to our own times, however. If we take foreign political science, not just bourgeois political science but also that of a number of socialist countries, much is being said and written about the crisis of Soviet-Czechoslovak relations in 1968.

[Novopashin] Yes, this is considered a very negative episode in the development of the world socialist system, which is inadmissible in relations between our parties and states. Indeed, if we turn to the prolix article published in Soviet newspapers 21 years ago and later as a separate brochure entitled "Defense of Socialism—the Highest International Duty," which substantiated the decision to send troops into Czechoslovakia 21 August 1968, and look at it from the viewpoint of the new thinking, we cannot fail to see that the way many of the reasons for that action were formulated appears clumsy, hasty, and unconvincing. For example, the said article states: "Our party cannot overlook the campaign to discredit the Soviet Union's socialist national economy which was mounted in the Czechoslovak press." Well, if we do not like criticism, must we send the troops in because of this? Or, the same article expresses displeasure at the discussion in the pages of a number of Czechoslovak publications at the time of the affair of General Sejna, who fled to the West, and of the circumstances of the death of Jan Masaryk in the fifties—which is described as a desire to "pour oil on the flames of anti-Soviet sentiments." The repeated appeals by certain Czechoslovak Communist Party [CPCZ] leaders to "end the Communists' monopoly on power," to "separate the party from the state," and to establish "the CPCZ's equality with other political parties" were also regarded as blatant sedition. But now the separation of the functions of power between party and state organs and the transfer of the power usurped by the executive, party, and state apparatus to the soviets are being spoken of

quite openly both in our country and in the majority of other East European socialist countries.

Much in Czechoslovakia's foreign policy was also intolerable. Thus, the following words expressed, for example, displeasure at the then border arrangements in a fraternal country: "How do things stand in this respect with Czechoslovakia's borders in the west? The borders are practically open on the Czechoslovak side." The crux of the matter is that at that time the border arrangements with Austria and the FRG were far more liberal in Czechoslovakia than the Soviet arrangements. The criterion for the compilers of the cited document was our own regime, which represented the height of bureaucratic chicanery and sluggishness.

These, consequently, were the reasons cited, and they were considered sufficient to send in the troops. That editorial article and also S.M. Kovalev's article "The Socialist Countries' Sovereignty and International Duties," published in PRAVDA 26 September 1968, enabled many of our opponents to speak of the proclamation of the Brezhnev-Suslov doctrine of "limited sovereignty," whose linchpin is the thesis that our community's common interests naturally limit the rights of its member states to realize their own interests and run counter to the principle of respect for these sovereign rights as one of the basic principles of the UN Charter. Western scientists and propagandists still like to cite that article's words that "no one interferes in specific measures to improve the socialist system in the various socialist countries. But the matter changes fundamentally when a danger to socialism itself arises in a particular country." Citing this statement, our ideological rivals add—not without valid sarcasm, it seems to me—that this means it turns out as follows: No one interferes for the time being, but then "the matter changes fundamentally." If you adhere to the reasoning of S.M. Kovalev or the aforesaid editorial article, it is hard to take issue with Western opponents.

[Novikov] Most of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA's readers cannot remember the events of 20 years ago. Could you briefly remind us how they developed?

[Novopashin] A CPCZ Central Committee plenum was held in January 1968 and it elected Alexander Dubcek first secretary of the CPCZ Central Committee in place of Antonin Novotny. The new leader somewhat reorganized the party's top leadership, which put forward an action program which, in particular, proclaimed the course of democratization, plurality of opinions, the removal of press censorship, freedom to organize various associations and unions, and so forth. On the whole, Dubcek's policy was described by Czechoslovakia's movement toward "socialism with a human face" [litso]. This formula contained criticism of the former Czechoslovak party and state leadership's political line of Stalinism and following in the footsteps of our left-wing, sectarian, dogmatic course which led to illegality and repression. Of course, the "Gulag Archipelago" in Czechoslovakia was not so wide-ranging and full of

political prisoners as in the Soviet Union, but it existed nonetheless, and executions based on trumped-up charges also took place. Clearly, by using the term "socialism with a human face," the Dubcek leadership wanted to emphasize that the policy of repression, forced collectivization, high national economic growth rates at all costs, ideological unification, and intolerance of dissent was inhuman, and socialism is not based on inhuman methods.

However, as a result of the fact that many restrictions on the organization of political associations and clubs and on the activities of different social forces were lifted, the situation in Czechoslovakia became more complex as it leaned toward a review of the socialist course within the country in general.

I do not know how accurately the information available to our then leaders reflected the actual events in the CSSR, but from spring 1968 the official Soviet press was talking about a drift to the right, toward revisionism, on the part of the CPCZ leaders themselves—such as, for instance, Central Committee Presidium members Frantisek Kriegel and Zdenek Mlynar; Cestimir Cisar, Central Committee secretary for propaganda; and certain others. Top-level conferences of the socialist community countries—to which the full CPCZ Central Committee Presidium headed by A. Dubcek was invited—were held several times on the situation in Czechoslovakia. One conference was in Dresden, and bilateral meetings between our Politburo and the CPCZ Central Committee Presidium were held in Bratislava and Cierna-nad-Tisou. The last multilateral conference on the question was held in Warsaw, but the Czechoslovak leadership refused to attend. This refusal was the final straw: They had allegedly all given in to right-wing forces, the Dubcek-led leadership had become right-wing, opportunist, and revisionist, and political contacts with it were no longer possible. After this the troops went in.

The administrative edict methods of running our country at the time, and the methods of pressure, diktat, and total license were reflected in our foreign policy methods—we tried to retain the last word and indicate to fraternal countries that they had best do what the Kremlin advised. These methods played their part in this case, too. I think that not all the opportunities for political contacts with the CPCZ Central Committee leadership had been exhausted. If the leadership had refused to come to Warsaw, we should have traveled to Prague. But nobody went to Prague, tanks were sent there instead. It is well known that five socialist countries—Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland, and the USSR—took part in this extraordinary strong-arm action.

[Novikov] Just what conclusions, in your view, should be drawn from these events of more than 20 years ago?

[Novopashin] This raises the very major question of just what should be considered the essence of socialist international relations. I think that this essence is incompatible with the practice of threats and pressure directed by

states singly or severally against any of their socialist partners; much less is it compatible with the use of force.

But, returning to that time, we should ask the question: To what extent could our relations at that time have been called socialist? After all, we now recognize that we had an administrative edict system—a system that was antidemocratic, alien to the people, and not under their control. It was this system that fully implemented international—or, more accurately, interstate—relations, not least with the socialist countries. This system, not the people's masses. The decision to send the troops into Czechoslovakia was made by that system without any consultation with the people. In this case everything falls into place since, as we now know from our country's history, the use of repressive methods is the essence of an administrative edict system. When this antidemocratic system cannot solve a question by other means, it quite naturally—from the standpoint of the internal logic of its functioning and development—uses repressive methods. Today we face the task of cleansing our domestic and foreign policy of the legacy of past decades in the form of strong-arm methods, authoritarianism, and lack of consideration for or the complete overlooking of the national state interests of our allies, friends, and all other countries and peoples. We want to make our diplomacy open and public, whereby the people's masses can influence foreign policy decisionmaking in one way or another. To that end, it is vitally necessary for us to start an open and impartial discussion of acute questions such as the events of 1968.

I realize that the discussion of these events will not be pleasant, since it will reveal, apart from anything else, the intolerance of the then Soviet (and, obviously, not only Soviet) party and state leadership with regard to alternative "models" of socialist development; it will reveal the administrative edict system's fear of slogans about liberalization, the democratization of the system, or the imparting of a humane and human complexion [oblik] to socialism; and it will resurrect the persistent attempts to discredit such slogans, not least by using disinformation, which, in the words of A. Didusenko, political observer for NOVOYE VREMYA, were "also part of the rules of the game."

Addressing the events of 1968 in Czechoslovakia, Didusenko in his article published in issue No. 33 of the magazine in 1988, recalls: "I remember that friends phoned asking with alarm if American tanks had appeared near Prague. Was the Bundeswehr really preparing to enter the CSSR? Were we in general living in the midst of armed counterrevolutionaries? I will never forget the psychological shock felt by boys the same age as my eldest son when, arriving in Czechoslovakia to provide international aid in August 1968, they found neither U.S. tanks, nor Bundeswehr soldiers, nor armed counterrevolutionary gangs. Today we are 20 difficult years smarter. We already realize that silence, disinformation, and rumor ultimately can only be harmful." I can only join in that conclusion.

[Novikov] Don't you think that the decision to site our intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles in Czechoslovakia and the GDR in response to the arrival of the U.S. Pershings and Tomahawks in West Europe was another in this series of strong-arm actions? Not to mention the illogical nature of this step (in trying to oppose the United States, we targeted our missiles on the West Europeans) it was taken without coordination with the peoples of these countries. Yet their proximity to our missiles made them hostages and potentially prime targets in a possible nuclear conflict. We ourselves were reporting almost daily at the time on how the West Europeans were rebelling and were reluctant to become hostage to the U.S. missiles. Yet here....

[Novopashin] To a certain extent this example is part of the same thing. At the time the situation was complex, siting of the cruise missiles and Pershings had begun, and it seemed to us that we needed to counter them with something convincing in terms of force. This was a strong-arm policy on both sides. But, of course, this major act too—the siting of additional missiles—was not discussed with anyone, it was purely a willful decision. Of course, we should not think that we did not get leadership agreement for this step. The "go-ahead" was given by the then leaders of the CSSR and the GDR, but as far as the peoples were concerned this question was not discussed in any form either in Czechoslovakia or in the GDR.

But we are again returning to the fact that there are different methods of implementing foreign policy. There are purely interstate methods, whereby decisions are made at state level and this is considered entirely sufficient. It is another matter if a state consults with society—then foreign policy actions can be called international with a greater degree of justification. That is why it is very important to find solutions which would be approved by all society. After all, this, I think, should be the main conclusion to be drawn from our conversation today: The population should definitely be consulted in some form on the most important foreign policy decisions concerning the people's interests—by discussing these matters at representative organs (such as the Supreme Soviet, for instance), by holding a referendum, or by using other democratic procedures, of which there is a clear lack in our country at the moment.

[Novikov] Only then, clearly, will we be able to bid farewell once and for all to voluntarism and lack of control in such a highly important field as foreign policy. To bid farewell to incompetence, suspicion, and, naturally, to weapons as the most weighty "argument" in the dispute.

Foreign Affairs Expert Cited on Pact's Future
PM0612100489 London ITV Television Network
in English 1900 GMT 4 Dec 89

[Interview with Viktor Kremenjuk of Moscow's United States of America and Canada Institute by correspondent David Smith in Moscow, monitored in progress

during a Channel 4 "News" report on the meeting of Warsaw Pact leaders—no date given; recorded]

[Text] [Smith] Everyone was here: A testament to Mr Gorbachev's revolution—or to the chaos his reforms have unleashed, depending on which way you looked at it. And the Soviet leader had a blunt message for all of them: After Malta, the cold war was over; they were free to go their own way. The Kremlin, astonishingly, was even ready to condemn its own invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. And those close to his thinking say this is the beginning of a radically different alliance.

[Kremenyuk] The first thing is that it should be more political and less military: That's evident, I know; and we hope that we shall manage to do that within a more or

less brief period of time. And the second is that it has to be a kind of a structure for the Eastern Europe. Eastern Europe is becoming the source of a potential destabilization in Europe, so it needs some political structure.

[Smith] But do you think you will be able to keep the Czechoslovakias, the Hungaries, even the East Germans within the Warsaw Pact?

[Kremenyuk] Well, I'm not sure about all of these countries. Some of them have already indicated their willingness to leave, and I'm sure that they will be free to make their choice. But some of these countries, they will prefer to stay: like Poland, for example, and even Czechoslovakia.

TASS Reports Gerasimov Press Briefing 6 Dec

Malta Impetus to Economic Ties

LD0612153589 Moscow TASS in English 1525 GMT
6 Dec 89

[Text] Moscow December 6 TASS—The meeting of Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and U.S. President George Bush off Malta gave the needed political impetus to the interaction of U.S. business and Soviet economy, Soviet Foreign Ministry Spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov told a briefing today.

He said, specifically, that the idea that the U.S. President expressed at the meeting about the need to start negotiations to conclude a new Soviet-American commercial agreement was positively received in the Soviet Union.

The sides decided to prepare the draft agreement for the forthcoming summit to be held in the United States in the second half of June 1990. A working group in the joint United States-Soviet commercial commission was formed for the purpose.

Gerasimov emphasised that the normalisation of commercial and economic relations between the Soviet Union and the United States requires the lifting of the operation of the Jackson-Vanik and Stevenson Amendments.

The first of them attached political conditions to the granting to the Soviet Union of the most favoured nation treatment in commerce and crediting guarantees of the U.S. Export-Import Bank. The second one limits such guarantees to 300 million dollars.

The spokesman said the U.S. Administration had expressed the intention to help remove these obstacles to the development of Soviet-American trade.

The Soviet Union also welcomes a favourable change in the U.S. stand with regard to the granting to the Soviet Union of the status of an observer at the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [GATT].

The Soviet Union is interested in such a status and has already expressed a wish to participate in 1986 in the Uruguay round of commercial negotiations in the GATT framework, he said.

Quayle's 'Dissonant' Remarks

LD0612155989 Moscow TASS in English 1546 GMT
6 Dec 89

[Text] Moscow December 6 TASS—U.S. Vice-President Dan Quayle's opinion about the results of the Soviet-American summit near Malta has a dissonant ring amid the positive reaction of international political circles on the Malta meeting, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov said at a briefing here today.

In one of his recent statements, the U.S. vice-president warned against overestimating the Malta summit and

said that it would be wrong to interpret its results as a sign of change in the Soviet Union is still a totalitarian state that seeks to create instability in different parts of the world, including Central America.

"Quayle's position is not a surprise to us. Sticking to his convictions, he is expressing his opinion about the nature and prospects of Soviet-American relations," Gerasimov said.

"However, in a rapidly changing world, a strong politician should promptly assess the changes, feel the realities and new challenges of the time and revise his views and actions," Gerasimov said.

The leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States have done a great deal of work recently to improve bilateral relations and the international situation. This enabled them to conclude at the end of the Malta summit that the USSR and the U.S. were standing on the threshold of a new era in Soviet-American relations.

Armenian Earthquake Anniversary

LD0612170189 Moscow TASS in English 1626 GMT
6 Dec 89

[Text] Moscow December 6 TASS—In connection with the first anniversary of the Armenian earthquake, observed on December 7, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov told journalists here today that the aggregate foreign aid to Armenia amounted to 586.5 million U.S. dollars by mid-October.

The figure includes funds allocated specifically for reconstruction in the disaster areas.

The list of the top donors is headed by Italy with 95 million dollars. West Germany is second with 84.5 million. The next are the United States (42 million), Great Britain (38 million), Czechoslovakia (34.5 million), the German Democratic Republic (30 million) and France (28 million).

113 states, seven inter-governmental organisations, a great number of public and religious associations, firms, corporations and tens of thousands of private individuals extended a helping hand to Armenia.

4,000 foreign experts worked in the quake-hit areas, including 1,500 rescue workers from 26 countries and 500 physicians and other specialists from many countries.

At present, the French are assisting in the construction of 11 bakeries in Armenia and an animal-feed factory.

A delegation of Dutch businessmen has arrived in Yerevan to sign an agreement on building a new town in Armenia, Europolis, on money raised by the Western business community.

"The Soviet people regard the continuing flow of large-scale assistance as a manifestation of human solidarity and universal human values, as a genuine example of the

way life of Earth should be—marked by peace, mutual assistance and solidarity,” Gerasimov said.

Pakistani President's Statement

*LD0612171489 Moscow TASS in English 1702 GMT
6 Dec 89*

[Text] Moscow December 6 TASS—The confrontational-style and unfoundedly-sharp tone of Pakistani President Ghulam Ishaq Khan's statement about the Soviet role in the Afghan settlement caused surprise in the Soviet Union, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov told reporters today.

“It seems that current changes in the world and the Soviet efforts to promote a peaceful solution to the Afghan problem are beyond the ken of the Pakistan leader,” he said.

“The Soviet Union and Afghanistan have set forth specific proposals for normalising the situation in Afghanistan. These proposals are widely known.

“But, to all appearances, the president still hopes for a military solution of the conflict. By giving their ‘full support’ to the armed opposition, Pakistan authorities encourage the continuation of the military conflict in Afghanistan, which has already taken thousands upon thousands of lives,” Gerasimov said.

Indian Prime Minister's Statements

*LD0612175389 Moscow TASS in English 1732 GMT
6 Dec 89*

[Text] Moscow December 6 TASS—The Soviet Union welcomes Indian Prime Minister Vishwanath Pratap Singh's foreign policy statements, made in the past few days, a Soviet foreign ministry spokesman said today.

Gennadiy Gerasimov told reporters that these statements “demonstrate continuity in India's foreign policy and the new government's adherence to the consistent and principled policy of peace, good-neighbourly relations and equitable and mutually advantageous cooperation.

“This invariable policy has won India universal recognition and high prestige on the international scene.”

The spokesman said the Soviet Union hopes to continue its active dialogue and interaction with the Indian government “in the spirit of the principles of new political thinking, proclaimed in the historic Delhi Declaration, on the basis of the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation between the Soviet Union and India, and in the interests and for the benefit of our great nations and the entire international community.”

Central America, Israel, Poland

*LD0612184889 Moscow TASS in English 1830 GMT
6 Dec 89*

[Text] Moscow December 6 TASS—The meeting between Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and U.S. President George Bush off Malta gave a long-awaited political impulse to the interaction between the American business community and the Soviet economy, Soviet Foreign Ministry Spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov told a briefing here today.

The spokesman noted, among other things, that the Soviet Union favoured the idea, voiced by the U.S. President at the meeting, that time was ripe for the conclusion of a new Soviet-American trade agreement.

The sides agreed to draft the agreement in time for the forthcoming summit in the United States scheduled for June 1990. The Soviet-American Trade Commission has set up a special working group for the purpose.

Gerasimov said that the Soviet Union also welcomed the favourable change in the United States' stance towards granting the Soviet Union the status of observer in the General Agreement on Trade Tariffs (GATT).

The Soviet spokesman told the journalists that on the Soviet initiative consultations have been held between representatives of the Soviet Foreign Ministry and the foreign ministries of Central American countries aiming to promote political settlement in the region.

With this aim in mind, special Soviet Foreign Ministry envoy Yan Burliyay visited Nicaragua, Honduras, Costa Rica and Guatemala. Gerasimov noted that on the whole, according to the Soviet side, these consultations were productive and were held in a business-like, positive atmosphere.

Responding to the request from journalists to confirm reports that at the Malta meeting President Bush asked the Soviet Union to reconsider its attitude towards Israel, the Soviet spokesman said that the U.S. President voiced an opinion that the restoration of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Israel might facilitate the Middle East settlement.

The U.S. President was told, in turn, that the Soviet Union does not object in principle to the restoration of relations with Israel, but it must take place within the framework of Middle East settlement.

Thus, Gerasimov summed up, there are two differing viewpoints on the matter. The United States is urging the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Israel prior to a peaceful settlement in the Middle East. The Soviet Union is urging the beginning of the process of a peaceful settlement and promising Soviet readiness to consider in practical terms the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Israel within this context.

Gerasimov noted that the Polish mass information media have lately raised the issue of the need to create conditions to return Soviet citizens of Polish extraction to Poland. He said that under Soviet legislation there are no practical obstacles for Soviet citizens to leave the country for permanent resident in any country, including Poland.

The Soviet spokesman said that of the 288 applications requesting to exit to Poland in 1988, 287 were granted. In the first ten months of this year, all those wishing to leave for Poland were granted the right. Thus, Gerasimov noted, the issue of repatriating Soviet citizens to Poland is a non-issue.

Bush's NATO Council Briefing Reported

PM0612122789 Moscow TRUD in Russian
6 Dec 89 p 3

[Own correspondent V. Boykov dispatch: "In Brussels After Malta"]

[Text] Brussels, 5 Dec—A special session of the NATO council at the level of heads of state and government of the alliance countries was held at NATO Headquarters in Brussels yesterday. At the session U.S. President G. Bush briefed his allies on the results of his meeting with M.S. Gorbachev. There was then an exchange of opinions on the Soviet-U.S. meeting, the changes taking place in East Europe, and NATO's position on a number of topical problems.

The NATO Council participants, NATO Secretary General M. Woerner stated at a press conference, assessed the Malta meeting as "very important" and providing an "excellent opportunity to develop East-West relations." Against this background they view the prospects for the disarmament talks as "very good." The Brussels session participants, M. Woerner noted, "unanimously support Soviet perestroika and the reforms in East Europe."

A journalist asked if the changes in East Europe would be reflected in NATO's role and if it would become a political alliance first and a military alliance only second. "NATO," M. Woerner replied, "is the core of our security, and with the changes taking place in the world we need it more than ever." NATO's political role, in the opinion of its secretary general, will increase, but "without diminishing the attention to military aspects."

President G. Bush assessed highly the results of the Soviet-U.S. talks. He described them as "exceedingly friendly." "We are standing," the President stated at the Brussels press conference, "on the threshold of a new era," which is giving rise to "great hopes." The U.S. President is pinning one of these hopes on the successful completion of the disarmament talks currently under way. Talking about conventional arms cuts in Europe, he advocated the speediest achievement of a treaty on the subject, promising to "kick our bureaucrats to make them work as fast as possible."

At the same time, G. Bush stated: "The United States will maintain considerable armed forces in Europe as long as the allies want us there.... The United States will remain a European power."

Answering a question about whether he agreed with the statement by his ambassador to the FRG, V. Walters, who had said that German unification is "inevitable" and that, judging by everything, it would happen within the next 5 years, G. Bush replied that he is against setting any timetable. The U.S. President formulated the principles, agreed with the allies, which the NATO alliance intends to follow. German unification, G. Bush said, should take place on the basis of self-determination—that is, the free choice of the Germans themselves.

'Deideologization' of Western Views Deplored

PM0412133589 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
26 Nov 89 Second Edition p 5

[Letter from reader A. Shubin under the "Dialogue" rubric: "At Whose Expense?"]

[Text] To be frank, although I wanted to write, there was something holding me back. I was beset by doubts: Would my faint voice be heard amid the mighty noise of the free market choristers and those who favor a lack of ideological commitment, now known as deideologization? No, I am not a supporter of Nina Andreyeva reluctant to abandon the principles of equality in poverty, but no one has the right to abolish the ideological struggle. But here, judging by the media in some quarters, in the conditions of the current pluralism, the only ones who have a voice are those who gasp with delight when they see the store windows of present-day capitalism. They would have you believe that the fat cats in the West go around in shabby jackets while the proletarians have long since ceased to be proletarians and are now wallowing in luxury and vote, to a man, for a society of universal prosperity.

Come on, is it really like that? So the economic laws of private appropriation of surplus value, discovered by the writers of the classics of Marxism-Leninism, have ceased to operate? Or maybe someone knows a lathe operator who has millions and billions in the bank, earned as a result of honest labor on his lathe? Why doesn't anyone cite an example of one or the other. In fact, no one can cite any because they simply do not exist in reality!

But, at the same time, in our press one will not encounter any argument or fact to demonstrate that the exploitation of hired labor in conditions of the scientific-technical revolution in the so-called developed countries is increasing, that the gulf between the incomes of private owners and working people is steadily widening, and that the expansion of modern neocolonialism is continuing. One wants to shout out loud: PRAVDA, you at least should say something, after all, unlike some newspapers and journals, you do not intend to remove from your front page the immortal (I do believe that) slogan "Proletarians of all countries, unite!" Give those

who have not yet lost faith in the ideas of social justice concrete examples and facts and figures so that they can counteract all the little defenders of people's interests not only by means of emotions and abstractions.

I would be grateful if I were to find in PRAVDA's pages data, using a transnational corporation as an example, on the number of hired workers, their wages, and where the money goes. Using concrete facts, please show at whose expense the corporation is flourishing, whether it pays workers and employees the same in developed and developing countries, if it has branches in them, and what the mechanism is for acquiring revenue.

EFTA-EEC Ties, Call on COCOM Noted

*PM0412153289 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
3 Dec 89 Second Edition p 4*

[Own correspondent V. Bolshakov report: "Following the Path of Integration"]

[Text] Paris—Integration processes in Europe are now marked by a clear intensification. This is connected with the creation of a single market of the EEC countries in 1992. It is already obvious to everyone that this unification in itself cannot fail also to affect those countries in both Western and Eastern Europe that are not members of the Common Market.

There has recently been a series of meetings and talks between the states belonging to the European Free Trade Association (EFTA)—Austria, Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, Sweden, and Finland—and the EEC leadership. Early in November, in Reykjavik, Icelandic Foreign Minister J. Hannibalsson, who is also currently the EFTA chairman, met with French President F. Mitterrand, who is currently chairing the European Community. In the course of this meeting an accord was reached on the de facto affiliation of EFTA with a united Europe in 1992. To this end, five preparatory commissions have been set up within the framework of EFTA and the EEC, to deal with questions of the movement of capital, currency circulation, and problems of citizens' rights and freedoms in a future "united Europe."

In an interview for the INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, J. Hannibalsson noted that at the meeting with F. Mitterrand the question of cooperation with East European countries and the prospects for their affiliation to a "united Europe" was also discussed. It was decided, in particular, that until the final integration of the EEC and EFTA to form a single economic zone, the question of the entry of any of the countries now belonging to CEMA into these economic groupings will not be decided, despite the fact that Hungary and Poland are showing interest in joining EFTA. The Icelandic foreign minister noted that the economic unification of Europe

is impossible without the elimination of the existing military blocs in its territory.

There are, of course, still many obstacles to the de facto unification of EFTA and the Common Market, especially since EFTA, unlike the EEC, has nothing analogous to the European Parliament or the Brussels Common Market headquarters. A significant role in the unification of the two biggest economic groupings of capitalist Europe is now played by the EC Commission, headed by J. Delors, which, by all appearances, is becoming a kind of strategic center from which integration processes in Europe are managed, along with the coordination of the economic policy of the continent's capitalist countries in relation to the socialist countries.

Within the framework of decisions adopted at the recent Paris conference of Common Market heads of state and government, a draft agreement on trade and economic cooperation between the EEC and the Soviet Union was agreed in Brussels. In accordance with the draft, from 1990 through 1995 the EEC will gradually eliminate quantitative restrictions on deliveries of Soviet industrial goods. The document, which still has to undergo ratification in the EEC Council of Ministers and the Europarlament, makes provision for cooperation with the USSR in the sphere of industry, standardization, the development of science and technology, banking, insurance, tourism, cadre training, production sharing, and the development of the power industry, including nuclear power.

The changes taking place in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union have also made the Western European Union [WEU] depart from its former inflexible position as regards cooperation with the socialist countries. In a recent report the WEU put forward a recommendation for the revision of the principles guiding the notorious COCOM—the organ set up by the United States to control exports to socialist countries. The WEU report contains a direct call for the liberalization of the COCOM lists in connection with the current changes in the socialist countries. It notes that in the light of recent events this NATO institution seems to be fossilized, and appears to many people to be an "instrument of Western 'cold war' policy." The WEU report does not call for COCOM's abolition. But there is a recommendation that its leaders meet with representatives of the USSR and hold direct talks with them on the conditions for the export of Western goods and technology to the Soviet Union taking into account both the present level of science and technology in the USSR and the changes that have taken place in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

Integration in the West of Europe and changes in the East, as F. Mitterrand noted, are organically interconnected. It is reasonable to regard this relationship as a kind of compound, cementing the foundations of the future common European home.

United States & Canada

More Official, Media Reaction to Malta Meeting

U.S. Ambassador Assesses Talks

LD0712133989 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1143 GMT 7 Dec 89

[Text] Moscow, 7 December (TASS)—TASS correspondent Konstantin Voytsekhovich writes:

The unofficial meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev and George Bush off the shores of Malta, which ended last Sunday, has become a good preparatory step for a full-scale Soviet-U.S. summit in Washington scheduled for late June next year, Jack Matlock, U.S. ambassador in the USSR, believes.

Each meeting between Soviet and U.S. leaders is unique, he remarked in a conversation with the TASS correspondent. The fact that Mikhail Gorbachev and George Bush did not try to hold talks on specific problems off the shores of Malta invested this meeting with a more philosophical quality. At the present moment, when radical changes are taking place both in Europe and in the world, such a dialogue was highly necessary. "It seemed to me that our leaders' views on many issues were very similar, Jack Matlock said. And this is ... a hope-inspiring fact."

The discussions off Malta, the U.S. diplomat went on, revealed a marked proximity of views of both states' leaders on such issues as arms reduction, protection of human rights, the expansion of contacts between members of the public, cooperation in environmental protection, and in the struggle against drug-addiction and terrorism. There was less consensus between the sides in discussing regional conflicts. He expressed the hope that in the future it will prove possible to bring closer the approaches of the sides to this serious problem. It is essential to find a method of resolving regional conflicts peacefully, Jack Matlock stressed.

Concerning the matter of reducing chemical weapons, the U.S. diplomat said that the United States and the USSR can by joint efforts inaugurate the process of destroying chemical arsenals. The United States is ready to embark on mutual cuts in chemical levels to a level of one fifth of the U.S. side's present stocks, he said. An agreement between the United States and the USSR on this issue would provide an impetus for talks on a global level for a total ban on chemical weapons, he stressed. Jack Matlock advocated the development of cooperation between the sides in the sphere of elaborating ecologically safe methods of destroying military toxic substances.

Concerning preparation of an agreement on cutting strategic offensive weapons, noting the existence of several "very important" matters on which there is no agreement, the ambassador expressed the hope that it

will prove possible to agree, in order to conclude the relevant treaty before the end of 1990.

CPSU Official's Views Noted

PM0612125489 Milan L'UNITA in Italian
3 Dec 89 p 5

[Interview with Andrey Grachev, identified as deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee International Department, by Sergio Sergi and Marcello Villari; date, place not given]

[Excerpt] La Valletta (Malta)—"The Americans realized that they had to come into line with the changes taking place in the world. Otherwise they would have been left behind and their European allies would have played a greater role. This is why Bush eventually suggested the idea of the summit..." He is one of the few party leaders to have come to Malta with Gorbachev. He is Andrey Gorbachev, deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee International Department, who also accompanied the general secretary on his visit to Italy and the Vatican as a member of the Soviet delegation. Grachev summarized for L'UNITA the first stage of the naval meeting between Gorbachev and Bush.

[Interviewer] So the proposal to hold the summit came from the United States. But you agreed immediately.

[Grachev] Yes, indeed, it was President Bush who suggested holding the meeting, because our proposal to resume the dialogue was still there on the table. We never relinquished our willingness. The lull in close relations between the two powers cannot be blamed on the Soviet Union. It was influenced by events connected with the new American administration—events that imposed a deceleration. I believe that the developments of the situation in the political field in Eastern Europe—and especially in perestroika—prompted the West to adapt its viewpoint to these new developments and to accelerate this process. The result was that the Americans proposed a meeting between Bush and Gorbachev, because otherwise they knew that they would be overwhelmed by the development of events. They realized that they would be left on the sidelines by the international impact of perestroika and by Mikhail Gorbachev's initiative. For instance, the Europeans are distinguishing themselves by being more active than the United States, which is in danger of being left behind. The White House perceived this danger and, if I may be permitted to say so, came into line with the historic events of late 1989—the year that marks the end of the "cold war" in Europe.

[Interviewer] Of course the German issue was one of the central issues in yesterday's talks...

[Grachev] I believe this was so. It is an issue that concerns and worries everyone, because it does not affect the Germans alone. Its origin lies in World War II and it is in fact one of its tragic consequences. It is natural and

right for all peoples—and first and foremost, all Europeans—to display anxiety and to discuss this issue and its current developments. The German issue is connected with the strategic situation that emerged after the war, because the two German states are not just two parts of a single nation but belong to different military alliances. All modifications of the situation must be discussed by the political leaders.

[Interviewer] Are there different stances on this point between the United States and the USSR?

[Grachev] Obviously, and it is not surprising. But there are also points of agreement. I believe, I hope, that that it will be possible to reach agreement on the fact that the developments of the situation do not threaten the balances that have guaranteed peace in Europe. In fact I would add that the new situation that has come about in Germany is the result of two different processes—the first, linked to the Helsinki accords, which enabled the two sides of Europe to move closer together and to understand one another better; and the second, linked to perestroika in the Soviet Union and the other Eastern European countries. This is what concerns us: The new developments in the German situation must not jeopardize either the positive process begun in Helsinki or perestroika. [passage omitted]

PRAVDA's Vasilyev Lauds Talks

PM0612192589 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
7 Dec 89 First Edition p 4

[Article by political observer Gennadiy Vasilyev: "Where the Roads From Malta Lead"]

[Text] Every major political event has its own stage, its own actors, and its own inner drama. In this sense the informal [neofitsialnaya] Soviet-American top-level meeting off the coast of Malta was spectacular. The sudden storm, the strongest for the past 50 years, hit the island on Saturday and Sunday when the meeting was taking place and the modern missile cruisers were powerless to carry out their peaceful task. The Soviet passenger liner—yes, passenger!—was moored to the jetty, which, in the circumstances, was the most convenient place for the thoughtful, philosophical conversations between the two countries' leaders about the future of the world. The first ever joint press conference between the Soviet and U.S. leaders was a good sign of a general improvement of Soviet-American relations.

The preliminary summing up has been done. In the statements by M.S. Gorbachev and G. Bush, in their replies at the press conference, in the communique on the information meeting in Moscow of the leaders of the Warsaw Pact states, and in the constant flow of press commentaries throughout the world. The gist of them is that there has been an extremely detailed, substantive, and constructive dialogue on a wide range of major present-day issues and an exchange of opinions that benefits not only the two countries, but the world as a whole. It is noted that there was a thorough analysis of

questions of disarmament, bilateral relations, including trade and economic links, changes in the world and in Europe, and the situation in the world's "hot spots."

These are the direct results of the meeting. But there is a natural desire to look more closely at the informal Soviet-American summit [vstrecha v verkkhakh] and see what ground has been covered and what the prospects are. The times demand it.

The eastern part of the "old continent," and not only it, is in a state of dynamic change. Profound integrational processes are developing in Western Europe, the Americans are trying to resolve complex economic problems, and the peoples of developing countries are trying hard to find a way to escape from the clutches of poverty and deprivation. Global problems—economic, food, energy, ecological, demographic—have become pulled into a tight knot. And the overarching threat of nuclear annihilation is like the final scene in the drama of mankind's vital concerns. The world has reached a watershed, where the scale of the dangers lying in mankind's path is overshadowed by the emerging opportunities. But these opportunities must be exploited. And this requires statesmanship, the ability to abandon past stereotypes, the ability to rise to the occasion and accomplish the tasks with which history, without waiting to be asked, is confronting us.

The Soviet Union's approach to the dynamic processes in Eastern Europe is based on sound principles: freedom of choice for the peoples and their right to decide their own destiny. It is our belief that the changes in the socialist countries are the objective outcome of the very course of historical development, that they are for the better, and are part and parcel of the process of democratic renewal, started by Soviet perestroika. All this is producing reciprocal activity and is opening up new opportunities for East-West cooperation, for the entry into a prolonged period of peaceful development. It looks like the U.S. leadership—and this is confirmed by G. Bush's replies at the press conference the day the meeting ended—is aware of the need for circumspection and realism, and also recognizes the principles of the inviolability of postwar borders in Europe.

The cold war icebergs are thawing and the enemy image both sides have been projecting toward one another is crumbling to dust. This, too, was clearly demonstrated by the meetings between the Soviet and U.S. leaders on board the "Maksim Gorkiy." The courtesy and respect that was so apparent in the relationship between M.S. Gorbachev and G. Bush during the joint press conference reflected the changes in Soviet-American relations and in the world as a whole and the growing awareness of the fact that the balance of power must be replaced by a balance of interests. All this creates a new social and political climate in the world and changes the roles of the actors on the political stage. Who could have thought that Richard Cheney, U.S. secretary of defense, who used to specialize in calls to "keep the powder dry," would for a time play the "dove's" part? But it was he

who announced on the eve of the Soviet-American meeting that he had instructed the Pentagon to cut planned expenditure for the 5-year period by \$180 billion. It is said that President G. Bush has been following his favorite tactics: giving the most conservative members of the cabinet the job of announcing the decisions which will provoke the wrath of the Republican Party's right wing.

Even while the Soviet-U.S. meeting was under way, noteworthy debates flared up at the Brussels conference of NATO defense ministers. That selfsame Cheney clashed with Britain's Defense Secretary King. The argument centered on the reductions of conventional armed forces the West should embark on following the reaching of agreement in Vienna, an agreement which will actually envisage major reductions of combat arsenals and military strength. The U.S. [defense] secretary spoke of the United States' desire to swiftly agree on additional reductions of U.S. and Soviet forces. The Englishman tried to prove that this should not be done.

Explaining the metamorphoses which have taken place, the U.S. press cites economic realities in the United States: The \$110 billion federal budget deficit which, unless the Pentagon's appetites are curbed, will necessitate either tax increases or cutbacks in social programs. But pressure by economic factors was also present in the past. I think that a decisive role in these changes is played by positive developments in the world and the general thaw of the international climate which occurred mainly as a result of the successfully developing Soviet-U.S. dialogue. Now, following the Malta meeting, it can be said with sufficient confidence that we are on the way toward the conclusion, as early as next year, of two major disarmament agreements—a treaty on a 50-percent reduction of strategic offensive arms and a treaty on significant reductions of conventional arms and armed forces in Europe. All this, together with the implementation of the progress which has begun to appear on the elimination of chemical weapons, offers major opportunities along one of the main avenues for mankind's movement toward a nuclear-free world. In this context, the interim meeting played a useful role in the preparation of a full-scale Soviet-U.S. summit meeting, the date for which has now been set more definitely—the second half of June 1990.

No, peace and good will to all men do not yet reign on earth. Differences remain between the two countries as regards approaches to individual specific questions, like disarmament and regional questions. The dynamics of change also creates its own problems. But I do not think I would be wrong in saying that the world is slowly making its way toward greater freedom, democracy, and reason in international affairs.

"How will mankind enter the 21st century? Thoughts about this no longer distant future captivate the mind. We look into this future with expectation for better things, and simultaneously with alarm." It is exactly a year since these words were spoken at the UN General

Assembly. In his broad conceptual speech, M.S. Gorbachev spoke of our changing world, motley and contradictory, but also integral and interconnected. He spoke of the global problems hanging over us all and he emphasized that force and the threat of force cannot any longer and must not be an instrument of foreign policy. "Further world progress," he said, "is now possible only through the quest for universal human consensus in the movement toward a new order."

The majority of delegates with whom I had an opportunity to speak in the world organization's lobbies at that time highly appraised the philosophical and humanistic charge contained in the Soviet leader's statement. But some expressed certain doubts, claiming that this was romanticism, idealism, a striving to engage in wishful thinking. I think that even the 1 year that has passed since then has boosted the realization that the ideas of new political thinking are not high-flown words, not expressions of wonderful dreams, but an accurate and profound statement of reality.

And so, the informal Soviet-U.S. meeting in Marsaxlokk Bay is over. It designated Malta once more as a crossroads, this time of the roads leading into the future. It seems as if this important junction has been successfully negotiated. A vivid poster—a slogan reading "Give peace a chance!"—against the background of a multicolored rainbow—was hanging from one of Valletta's buildings during the meeting. I think that the leaders of the two great powers did not remain deaf to this appeal.

'Wholesome Outcome' Praised

OW0612142889 Moscow in Mandarin to Southeast Asia 1100 GMT 6 Dec 89

[Commentary by station observer Alekseyev: "The Outcome of the Malta Summit"]

[Text] The mass media in almost all countries in the world have commented on the meeting between President Gorbachev of the USSR Supreme Soviet and U.S. President Bush, which took place in Malta from 2 to 3 December. On this, our station observer Alekseyev writes the following commentary:

First of all, I would like to point out that both Gorbachev and Bush have expressed their satisfaction with the meeting. In statements made to the press, they pointed out that a foundation has been laid for achieving progress in solving a wide range of issues, including the talks on reducing 50 percent of the Soviet and U.S. strategic weapons. The two leaders believed that it is entirely possible to draft a relevant treaty before next summer, which may be signed at the Soviet-U.S. summit to be held in the second half of June. It seems that progress will also be made in the Vienna talks on reducing conventional arms in Europe, and that a possibility for a total ban of chemical weapons has emerged. Progress has also been made in other areas.

All of these do not indicate that the Soviet Union and the United States shared identical views on all issues discussed during the Malta summit, and that there were no contradictions between the two countries. This is by no means true. Differences and contradictions still exist, and their manifestations are even very sharp. This is only natural because the Soviet and U.S. social systems are, after all, different. So are the interests and focuses of their foreign policies. These are indisputable facts.

However, both the Soviet Union and the United States do not want to follow the spirit of the past cold war in taking their differences as the reasons for propaganda and confrontation. They are seeking a path leading to mutual understanding and cooperation. It should be made known that only such a path can become a genuine foundation for constructive cooperation.

It is precisely in this spirit that Gorbachev and Bush conducted their Malta summit. Needless to say, its wholesome outcome involves not only Soviet-U.S. relations alone. Newspapers in China and many other Asian countries have repeatedly pointed out that peace in the Asian-Pacific region and the world depends, to a large extent, on the state of Soviet-U.S. relations. New Delhi's *TIMES OF INDIA* wrote: The Malta summit has signified another important step leading to the road guaranteeing the peaceful future for all mankind. In my view, it is difficult to reject such a view.

Youth Paper Views Results

PM0512151189 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 5 Dec 89 pp 1, 3

["Our special correspondent" A. Drozdov dispatch: "To Be Continued"]

[Text] Valletta—Despite the trouble with the weather the Malta meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev and George Bush was very successful. Incidentally, the weather was probably the only problem which both leaders proved powerless to cope with. But the storm and the torrential rain added symbolism to the summit meeting: There were 8 hours of one on one talks and personal conversations on board the civilian ship the "Maksim Gorkiy."

On the eve of the meeting there was a great deal of talk about how it might not produce any concrete political results. Both leaders did indeed leave Malta without having signed any documents, as was the case, for instance, 10 years ago in Soviet-U.S. relations. Nevertheless the progress made in Soviet-U.S. relations in Valletta is so substantial that journalists who visited Malta as part of the White House press group are calling it as "three Reykjaviks."

We were waiting for but did not at the same time have very great expectations of surprises. Nevertheless there were surprises. I am referring above all, I repeat, to the strengthening of mutual understanding between the Soviet and U.S. leaders on a personal level. At the same

time they succeeded in working in earnest on political problems. The submission of a whole package of serious proposals on various questions of bilateral and international relations was somewhat unexpected and ran counter to the idea that prevailed before Malta that George Bush was going to the meeting "empty-handed."

Of these proposals (according to international press calculations, there were approximately 17 of these proposals in total) the idea of holding the next full-scale summit in Washington in June 1990 with a view to securing concrete accords is of the greatest significance. Mikhail Gorbachev accepted Bush's proposal, whereupon the sides also agreed on the need to hold a working meeting next January involving Foreign Minister E. Shevardnadze and Secretary of State J. Baker. In January we may expect the substance of the June summit to be determined and agreement reached on which documents could be signed in the course of this summit.

The prospects for developing Soviet-U.S. relations in the trade and economic sphere constituted another major set of problems to which the U.S. side drew attention. Readers are well aware that the development of these relations was blocked for many years by the so-called Jackson-Vanik amendment. Successive U.S. administrations continued to link an expansion in the scope of bilateral trade with the question of emigration from the Soviet Union. The incumbent U.S. leadership has, of course, preserved continuity in this policy, but it is prepared to lift the trade barriers provided that the Soviet Union adopts a Law on the Procedure for Exit from the USSR—which was already on the agenda for the second Supreme Soviet session—in the near future. Participation in GATT, where we have been offered observer status, would be of great significance for us. It is not impossible that as a market mechanism is set up in the Soviet Union and the private sector acquires the right to exist, Western countries may ease the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls regulations, which restrict the export to the Soviet Union and other socialist countries of progressive technology and equipment.

Let us think soberly about George Bush's proposals. They contain nothing offensive. The point is that we are not only dealing with an experienced political partner but also with the world's leading businessman (I am not, of course, referring to the U.S. President). It is natural that while having some proposals for us, the U.S. side would like to be certain that it is investing money in a reliable venture.

From this viewpoint the Soviet-U.S. meeting in Malta was an undoubted success since everything indicates that George Bush's administration chose in favor of "sympathy with the reform processes in the Soviet Union."

Disarmament problems were of course touched on during the talks. Gorbachev and Bush agreed that they would make the necessary efforts to prepare an agreement on a 50-percent reduction in strategic offensive

arms by June 1990. The idea of continuing to discuss each country's military programs and military budgets is also of interest. The problems of reducing the number of air- and sea-launched cruise missiles and eliminating chemical and binary weapons will probably be put on the agenda for subsequent meetings between the Soviet and U.S. leaders.

Whatever questions were discussed at the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting, we, the inhabitants of East Europe would at any rate be primarily interested in what was said about the processes taking place in socialist countries.

The situation in Europe per se suggested what must be the key question on the agenda at the Malta meeting. The agenda was also amended by Gorbachev's visit to Italy, where the Soviet leader highly assessed the processes of democratization taking place, as he put it, in some countries.

What is happening to us, what will we be like, how will the changes in East Europe, which are swelling with the speed of an avalanche, affect East-West relations? Only quite recently we were probably indignant about any Western assessments of the situation in the Eastern bloc. Today we seem to be beginning to put into effect—in the East European context—the idea of the indivisibility of the world with its common human values. The Soviet Union supported in principle Bush's idea about holding the Olympic Games in Berlin in 2004. In the course of his visit to Rome and the Vatican and on Malta Mikhail Gorbachev once again stressed the importance of freedom to choose one's own destiny and the prospects for the development of each socialist country. Special attention was devoted to the development of the Helsinki process. George Bush spoke frankly about this while M.S. Gorbachev proposed holding the next conference on questions of security and cooperation in Europe, which he calls "Helsinki-2," as early as next year.

Certain regional problems, in particular the situation in Central and Latin America and the Near East, were also examined at the talks.

On leaving Malta, both leaders expressed the hope that they would succeed at their meeting in the near future in securing the kind of agreements that would enable the whole world to talk about the Soviet Union and the United States moving on from declarations to practical actions.

Benefits of USSR-U.S. Cooperation Viewed

PM0512122589

[Editorial Report] Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian on 30 November 1989 carries in its First Edition on page 3 under the rubric "International Observer Answers Readers' Questions" and the headline "From Mutual Understanding to Cooperation" a 1,500-word article by international observer Manki Ponomarev in response to a letter from reader V. Kolodchenkov from

Kharkov expressing doubt that U.S.-Soviet relations have gone beyond dialogue and entered the sphere of cooperation. Ponomarev lists numerous recent examples of Soviet-U.S. contacts and cooperation to support his argument that there have been improvements in relations since the 1985 summit meeting in Geneva, and continues:

"But the point is not just the number of cases, although their growing number is important in itself. The point is the objective need for both sides to expand cooperation.

"For the Soviet Union, such cooperation is necessary because it will mean overcoming military confrontation once and for all, reducing the threat of war, and opening up the possibility of concentrating resources not on prolonging the arms race but on resolving urgent economic tasks and speeding up perestroika. At the same time, cooperation with the United States can help us to overcome many difficulties which we come up against at every turn—for example by having access to the latest achievements in scientific and technical progress, borrowing useful experience, and so on.

"And what does cooperation with the USSR give the United States? It also gives them the possibility of easing the military burden which is making life increasingly difficult in the United States. Nor must we forget the fact that influential business circles across the ocean are very worried that in a situation where the USSR is entering the world economic arena they may miss the boat and get pushed aside by West European, Japanese, and other competitors when big and profitable contracts are being made. The United States can also use some of our promising scientific ideas and research.

"And so, USSR-U.S. cooperation is aimed primarily at eliminating the threat of war. But it is no longer restricted to this. Let us not disregard the possibility that cooperation between the two countries can enable them to solve global problems by joint efforts—environmental problems, for example, with which no country can now cope on its own. And these considerations motivate both sides to take joint actions—actions which are unthinkable without mutual respect and trust.

"However, it would be incorrect to say that all the paths are already open here. There are still a great many difficulties. There is pressure from past attitudes and active opposition from U.S. right-wing circles, particularly those directly connected with the military-industrial complex, and other factors. I started by speaking about the Soviet-U.S. draft resolution jointly drawn up at the United Nations, and its unanimous adoption. But I must also mention the fact that the U.S. representative on the General Assembly First Committee has just voted against a resolution on preventing an arms race in space. A total of 182 states voted in favor of this draft, and only the United States said 'No,' as it was evidently worried that it would become a new obstacle to the Strategic Defense Initiative.

"But it seems that these are just throwbacks to a past that, although persistent, is receding nonetheless. There is every reason to hope that the meeting off the Maltese coast will clarify a great deal in this respect and will provide new options for large-scale fundamental decisions."

TASS Notes UPI Poll on Gorbachev, Bush

*LD0512032789 Moscow TASS in English 2126 GMT
4 Dec 89*

[Text] Washington December 5 TASS—The Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and U.S. President George Bush have been named the world's leading political news-makers of 1989 by editors of American newspapers, radio and television broadcasting companies using the UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL agency as their source of news.

This was made clear by the publication here on Monday of data of the annual survey in which UPI polls those whom it supplies with information.

The UPI poll aims to determine what its subscribers consider the event of the year and whom they view as the politicians and public figures of the year, whose activity was in the focus of media attention.

UPI stressed that the Soviet leader's winning score reflected the world pervading atmosphere of hope for a radical improvement of East-West relations.

The survey involved a total of 140 editors of U.S. newspapers, radio and television corporations.

Maltese Premier on Bush-Gorbachev, USSR Ties

*PM0612153989 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 6 Dec 89 Second Edition p 5*

[Prime Minister E. Fenech Adami of Malta interview to SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA special correspondent Yu. Subbotin: "We Will Develop Contacts"—date of interview not given, first paragraph is SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA introduction]

[Excerpts] Malta—For 2 days the attention of the whole world was focused on Malta, the small island state at the very heart of the Mediterranean. Many people believe that the choice of venue for the meeting between M.S. Gorbachev and G. Bush was not fortuitous. The Mediterranean area still represents a tight knot of regional conflicts and world problems. As for Malta itself, its interest is not confined to the role of a hospitable host. There is its active neutrality, its participation in European processes, and its impressive economic achievements. I talked about this with Edward Fenech Adami, the country's prime minister.

[Subbotin] Mr Prime Minister, how do you assess the results of the Soviet-U.S. meeting?

[Fenech Adami] The fact that the two presidents chose the Mediterranean as the venue for their meeting means,

in my opinion, that they attach great importance to this region. This is quite understandable. Stability in Europe, and indeed throughout the world, depends to a considerable extent on the situation in the Mediterranean.

As was noted at the joint press conference, M.S. Gorbachev and G. Bush discussed the region's problems, and in the future, I hope, they will examine specific measures to transform the Mediterranean into a zone of peace. Malta, it goes without saying, is very interested in this.

At the same press conference the question of the presence of foreign naval fleets in the Mediterranean was touched upon. Judging by appearances, it is not yet possible to withdraw them. However, I hope that this question will be discussed during the summit scheduled for the end of June next year. We are also hoping for a swift solution of the question of the removal of nuclear weapons from the Mediterranean area.

We did not expect any immediate, specific, and tangible results from the meeting between the Soviet and the U.S. leader. In this case the psychological aspect, changes in the way of thinking, and strengthening of mutual understanding are much more important. And in this sense the meeting has brought us closer to the era of peace for the peoples of the Mediterranean and the planet as a whole. [passage omitted]

[Subbotin] Mr Prime Minister, to end with a few words about the state of Soviet-Maltese bilateral relations.

[Fenech Adami] They are very good. At this very moment we are discussing the latest trade protocol. We have exchanged trade delegations which have defined the range of goods which are of interest to the sides. A contract has been signed for building eight timber-carrier ships for the USSR in Malta. We are very pleased about this order because it is the first order for our new shipyard.

A protocol on cultural exchanges between our countries has been signed. They are particularly important because people get to know each other through their cultures.

We also have good contacts at state level. Therefore, in conclusion, I would like to say again that we are pleased that the meeting between the two presidents was held here and that it has been successful.

Eagleburger To Coordinate U.S. AID Program

*LD0712102389 Moscow TASS in English 1005 GMT
7 Dec 89*

[Text] Washington December 7 TASS—By TASS correspondent Igor Borisenko:

United States Undersecretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger has been appointed the coordinator of U.S. programmes of aid to Eastern Europe, White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater told a briefing on Wednesday.

Eagleburger and his deputies—chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors Michael Boskin and undersecretary of the treasury John Robson—will supervise all programmes of aid to Poland and Hungary.

The Congress has allocated a total of 938 million dollars to be used within three years for food aid, the expansion of trade and insurance of U.S. investments in the countries.

Fitzwater said the United States are ready to closely cooperate with Western partners in rendering assistance to other East European states, which are making notable progress in economic reforms and democratic changes.

Soviet-U.S. Joint Statement on Grain Talks

LD0612224389 Moscow TASS in English 2226 GMT
6 Dec 89

[Text] Moscow December 7 TASS—The Soviet Union and U.S. delegations to talks on a long-term grain pact that began here on Wednesday, adopted a joint statement.

The statement said that the goal of the talks is to understand one another's positions and lay the groundwork for further negotiations.

The Soviet delegation is led by Yuriy Chumakov, deputy minister for foreign economic relations. The U.S. side is led by deputy trade representative Julius Katz.

During the first day of talks, the sides specified their positions and issues to be discussed.

The statement pointed out that the complexity of the talks on a new pact predetermined the beginning of preliminary consultations long before the current pact expires on December 31, 1990.

It was noted that the Soviet Union's recent grain purchases from several common market countries will in no way affect the Soviet-U.S. grain talks.

The sides expressed conviction that the recent Malta summit will considerably facilitate the task of concluding a new pact.

Eagleburger Hints Cocom Controls May Be Eased

PM0412110589 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
2 Dec 89 Second Edition p 5

[Unattributed report under the rubric "Foreign Agencies Report": "United States: Changes in Cocom Policy Possible"]

[Text] Western countries intend to ease controls on exports of advanced technology to socialist countries in response to the changes taking place there. This conclusion follows from a statement by U.S. Deputy Secretary of State L. Eagleburger. Restrictions are imposed on technology deliveries within the framework of the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls

[Cocom], which unites 17 Western countries. Although L. Eagleburger pointed out that his statement should not be regarded as a proclamation of a new policy, according to him the changes in East Europe are obliging Cocom to revise its position.

Soviet-U.S. Commercial Space Deal Detailed

PM0712105789 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
27 Nov 89 Morning Edition p 1

[Article by B. Kononov, IZVESTIYA scientific observer: "Commercial Launches Into Space"]

[Text] A contract has been concluded to launch U.S. space vehicles atop Soviet rockets.

As already reported, a contract has been concluded between the Soviet-U.S. joint enterprise Space Commerce Corporation and the private firm Energetic Satellite Corporation to launch U.S. satellites from the Baykonur Cosmodrome atop Soviet rockets. If this contract is realized, it will be the most important step in drawing together Soviet and U.S. astronautics since 1975, when the Soyuz-Apollo project was carried out. D.Yu. Poletayev, chief of department in the USSR Main Administration for the Creation and Utilization of Space Technology [Glavkosmos], just back from the United States, where he was head of the Soviet side at the talks, was asked by the IZVESTIYA editorial office to give a more detailed account of the new space contract.

"Our joint enterprise," Dmitriy Yuryevich said, "has officially been in operation since summer of this year. It has been organized by Glavkosmos and the U.S. firm Space Commerce Corporation, headed by Arthur Dyul [name as published]. The joint enterprise is responsible for advertising and marketing activity and for giving assistance in arranging business contacts between U.S. firms and our own aerospace industry.

"The first contract has now been concluded. In general outline it looks like this: The satellites themselves are designed and manufactured by Energetic Satellite Corp. They will form part of the system to locate and determine the latitude and longitude coordinates of various moving objects—motor vehicles, ships, and even individual people. Thanks to radio communication via the satellite, their location will be established with an accuracy of up to 20 meters. The functioning of the system is ensured via a ground communications center in Denver, Colorado.

"The satellites are cylindrical in form: approximately 1 meter in diameter and 1.2 meters high. Their mass is approximately 200 kg. The satellites are equipped with the inflatable panels of a solar battery and with an antenna reflector. It is planned to use Soviet Proton rockets to place the satellites in geostationary orbit as associated freight. With the aid of a special adapter the U.S. craft will be installed between the main satellite and the rocket's final stage. The technical realization of the project on the Soviet side has been entrusted to our

well-known space firm—the Lavochkin Science and Production Association of the USSR Ministry of General Machine Building, which created the legendary lunokhod 'moonwalkers' and is responsible for the vast majority of Soviet automated space stations. A group of specialists from this science and production association led by V.A. Asyushkin has spent 2 months working on the technical aspects of organizing the launch.

"The launch of the first two satellites is going to cost the U.S. firm \$13 million. The total cost of the contract is \$54 million.

"The contract is very advantageous to the U.S. firm. But there are obstacles—in the shape of the notorious Cocom [Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls restrictions] which prohibit the import of U.S. satellites onto Soviet territory. The Energetic Satellite Corporation intends to publish all the data on the satellites, which will show that they are exclusively peaceful and commercial in nature and do not use prohibited technology. U.S. businessmen hope to succeed in obtaining an export license within 6-8 months. Clearly, this would be an enormous contribution to improving relations between the Soviet Union and the United States."

Soviet-U.S. Space Cooperation Obstacles Viewed

PM0412125389 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 29 Nov 89 Single Edition p 6

[Interview with A. Dunayev, chief of the USSR Main Administration for the Creation and Utilization of Space Technology (Glavkosmos), especially for SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA by TASS correspondent A. Filippov: "Satellites Waiting To Be Launched; Obstacles on the Path of Soviet-U.S. Cooperation in Space"—first two paragraphs are an introduction; place and date of interview not given]

[Text] As already reported, recently in the city of Houston (Texas) the first agreement in history was concluded to put into orbit, using "Proton" launchers, U.S. "Sat Trak" satellites belonging to the Energetic Satellite Corporation. If the U.S. State Department does not ban this deal, the company will pay \$54 million under the contract.

It should be noted that the two countries' specialists fully realize that such cooperation is supremely mutually advantageous. But prevailing U.S. legislation on controlling the export of complex technology is still impeding dialogue between Soviet and U.S. specialists. Engineers and business people believe that this U.S. embargo is equally detrimental for U.S. and Soviet space colleagues.

[Dunayev] The thesis that Soviet space facilities are allegedly dependent on foreign technology is fundamentally inaccurate. Statements have often been made on this score, right up to the highest level. I can only repeat: This is clearly wishful thinking on the part of those who wish us ill. Soviet space rocket technology is in no way

inferior to the best world models. The space age is 30 years old, and all this time the Soviet Union has been at the forefront of space exploration. Our latest achievement—the unique "Energiya" launcher—is being offered for commercial use. This rocket has proved itself, placing in orbit the "Buran" space vehicle which then completed an automatic landing.

[Filippov] The USSR Glavkosmos has already been in existence as a commercial organization for several years and, in spite of idle accusations about squandering national resources, brings in large sums in foreign currency for Soviet space exploration. What deals have been concluded "beyond the reach of" the U.S. Government and what have they given the sides participating in them?

[Dunayev] We are currently working with 35 countries. Within the framework of agreements on joint manned flights, each of them will bring in the region of \$10 million to the Soviet side. In particular, the Soviet-Austrian space mission is coming soon, and the British "Juno" project. The news about the contract for a Japanese journalist to fly on board the "Mir" station produced a great response. Contracts are also expected with France and the FRG, and there have been preliminary talks with other countries...

What gains do the countries participating in manned flight as partners of the Soviet side expect? They would hardly start getting involved if it were unprofitable. Quite recently, for example, the Soviet-West German "Kozima-2" project ended successfully. A capsule from a "Resurs-F" spacecraft brought back to earth a unique consignment—more than 1,000 crystals of various substances to be used for pharmacological needs. Cooperation with FRG firms will continue: Four flights are planned for 1990, which will also bring considerable profit to both sides. In addition, we have found foreign firms which are ready to produce satellites with us without using U.S. technology—an embargo here will be pointless.

[Filippov] Can you give an approximate assessment of the losses incurred by the sides on account of the U.S. "embargo?"

[Dunayev] I am afraid this would take up a lot of space in the newspaper. Here are just a few examples. Last year the U.S. Congress did not give its consent to the launch from the Baykonur cosmodrome of two U.S. satellites made by the very large and well-known aerospace firm "Hughes" for international communications. If we had placed them in geostationary orbit, we would have had about \$35 million for each launch. Alas...

Earlier a ban was placed on the launch of the "Inmarsat" satellite (maritime communications) by the firm "British Aerospace." Now it turns out that the satellites, whose price exceeds \$100 million, are still lying in warehouses waiting their turn to be launched by "Ariane" or another launcher.

We are, of course, looking for ways to combat this hard line. It is proposed to build in the equatorial zone ranges where spacecraft will be launched into space using Soviet systems, including "Zenit" launchers—today one of the most sophisticated and ecologically clean rockets. Space means progress and the growth of peoples' well-being. And I cannot understand the U.S. Congress' position. Nor, incidentally, can U.S. business representatives with whom I happened to talk. In this connection I would like to recall that in 1987 N.I. Ryzhkov said that Soviet state organs would give their customers the necessary guarantees of safekeeping for their space devices. We are ready to exempt from customs inspection apparatus that is going to be launched and allow it to be transported through USSR territory to the cosmodrome in sealed containers—if this would be more convenient for the customer. Foreign specialists can accompany their equipment. They can be present during its transportation and its installation on the launcher, and be nearby right up to the launch itself.

Military Communications Links To Be Tested

LD0412143789 Moscow TASS in English 1225 GMT
4 Dec 89

[Text] Moscow December 4 TASS—Soviet-American communications channels, including air-to-air and air-to-surface in the Bering Sea area and the air-to-ship channel in the Mediterranean, will be tested later this month, Major General Anatoliy Bolyatko, deputy head of a department of the USSR Armed Forces' General Staff, told TASS.

An agreement between the Soviet and the American Governments on the prevention of dangerous military activity was signed in June 1989, Bolyatko recalled.

It is intended to prevent dangerous military incidents between personnel (hardware) of the Soviet and U.S. Armed Forces during their actions in direct proximity to each other.

With a view to prepare the agreement for implementation, the military delegations of the two countries considered the question of establishing communications between units of the sides' armed forces, Bolyatko said.

The tests of the communications channels should confirm the ability of Soviet and American radio operators to contact one another and to carry out the established radio exchange procedures, he said.

"Successful tests should make it possible to prevent or quickly settle dangerous military incidents," General Bolyatko said.

Seminar on Soviet-U.S. SLCM Verification

PM0712140589 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 6 Dec 89 First Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Verification Possible"]

[Text] Washington, 5 Dec—A scientific seminar discussing the results of the Soviet-U.S. joint experiment into remote and contact [kontaktnyy] verification of the presence of nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles [SLCM's] on ships ended here Monday. The experiment was held in summer aboard the Soviet missile cruiser *Slava* in the Black Sea under an accord between the USSR Academy of Sciences and the U.S. Council for the Protection of Natural Resources. During the experiment the presence of a nuclear charge on board the cruiser was clearly registered.

At the end of the seminar a joint statement was adopted and signed by Dr T. Cochran, head of the U.S. delegation, and Academician V.L. Barsukov, head of the Soviet delegation.

The experiment in the Black Sea aboard the missile cruiser *Slava* in July 1989, the document says, was intended to ascertain the feasibility of using passive radioactivity detectors to verify nuclear SLCM's.

It provided useful results in the development of verification equipment acceptable to both our countries. Several detection systems were examined which could play a useful role in the verification of nuclear SLCM's.

The seminar participants discussed proposals for future experiments.

U.S.-Soviet Human Rights Seminar Held

PM0412161189 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
30 Nov 89 Second Edition p 4

[Own correspondent V. Gan dispatch: "Constructive Dialogue"]

[Text] Washington, 29 Nov—It would be no exaggeration to say that you could measure the temperature of the present state of Soviet-U.S. relations by this meeting on Capitol Hill. Summing up the results later, its participants on both sides agreed that this temperature is now approaching normal.

The first-ever Soviet-U.S. interparliamentary seminar on humanitarian cooperation and human rights was held today in one of the Senate buildings. If you remember what a "red rag" or cold shower these questions were until quite recently and what negative emotions they aroused in our bilateral contacts, the changes can be described as nothing short of amazing. The legislators had a civilized dialogue free from mutual accusations and recriminations and a frank, amicable exchange of opinions which could not but symbolize the newly acquired mutual respect.

There is not really any point in arguing over who is mainly to thank for this. But the fact is that our progress away from a closed society toward an open, democratic society and a rule-of-law state is sweeping away the stereotypes that have been long established here.

I would not be wrong in saying that this could be seen in the reaction of the U.S. legislators, who listened with the greatest possible attention to the speech by F. Burlatskiy, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet International Affairs Committee Subcommittee for Humanitarian, Scientific, and Cultural Ties.

The Americans listened with unconcealed interest to what he had to say about the democratic transformations in our country, about glasnost and pluralism, about freedom of speech and personal freedom, about establishing the priority of common human values, and about bringing Soviet legislation into line with international norms and pledges. F. Burlatskiy's explanations concerning the draft Law on the Procedure for Soviet Citizens' Exit From and Entry Into the USSR and also the draft Law on Freedom of Conscience and Activity by Religious Organizations and the draft Law on the Press and Mass Media Activity, both of which are now being prepared, met with a very positive reception.

After the seminar I talked with its main participants. Senator D. DeConcini, chairman of the U.S. Congress Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and its Cochairman Representative S. Hoyer were unanimous that the meeting was unique and another historic step on the way to further improving relations between the new Soviet parliament and the U.S. Congress. There have been big changes in the working methods of the Supreme Soviet and in the Soviet Union as a whole, DeConcini said, which have brought about the new style in our relations. If everything that is being said is enshrined in law—and I believe that this will indeed happen—it will change the whole situation. Real dialogue, in which there can be differences of opinion but also recognition of the possible existence of human rights problems in both the United States and the Soviet Union, also creates a real basis for agreements in the economic, trade, and security spheres. Americans believe that an open society which safeguards human rights is a less hostile, less dangerous society.

In the opinion of Congressman Hoyer, "the prospects for developing a constructive dialogue between the two countries' parliaments are not only good but realistic." "It goes without saying that the human rights problem is a two-way street and, in this sense, the change in the Soviet Union's previous stance, whereby any Western interest in the situation in this sphere was interpreted as interference in internal affairs, must be recognized as important. We are inspired by the work of the Supreme Soviet, the advancement of various proposals on safeguarding human rights and observing international norms, and the intention to incorporate the provisions of international declarations in laws now being drafted," he said. The congressman expressed the wish that exchanges like the present one will become a regular event.

"From the nature of the questions," F. Burlatskiy said, "we could sense not only interest but good will. A new era has begun: The chapter in our relations when we

engaged in mutual recriminations is now past. Now we can not only say that we have begun to cooperate but that we have entered a businesslike stage of cooperation. Of course, we still have questions to address to one another and mutual complaints. But all this is not actually confrontation—it is a dialogue of equals."

The sides are now thinking about holding new meetings, seminars, and conferences devoted to human rights in the Soviet Union and the United States. It has been suggested that temporary joint groups be set up to look for solutions to problems which have built up in this sphere. It is felt that this is the surest path to fruitful collaboration.

Quayle Addresses Parliamentarians

PM0412111389 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
2 Dec 89 Morning Edition p 6

[TASS report: "USSR-United States: Interparliamentary Dialogue"]

[Text] Washington, 1 Dec—The development and expansion of contacts between the parliamentarians of the USSR and the United States is a "very positive event." That was the assessment given by U.S. Vice President Dan Quayle, who met with a group of USSR people's deputies Thursday. The Soviet parliamentarians were taking part in the work of the interparliamentary seminar on humanitarian cooperation and human rights which was held in Washington.

"Of course," the U.S. vice president noted, "this is an important step in establishing understanding between U.S. Congress and the USSR Supreme Soviet." He expressed the opinion that exchanges between representatives of the parliaments will be useful. "Glasnost and perestroika are the path which ensures an improvement in the state of affairs in the human rights field," D. Quayle said.

The idea of the need to expand interparliamentary dialogue and fill it with specific content was also expressed at a joint press conference held in the U.S. Congress building by USSR people's deputies and the cochairmen of the commission on security and cooperation in Europe—Senator Dennis DeConcini and Congressman Steny Hoyer. USSR People's Deputy F.M. Burlatskiy, who spoke at the press conference, described in detail the USSR Supreme Soviet's legislative activity and noted the need to move to businesslike cooperation in the human rights field with the U.S. legislators. "Cooperation in the human rights field is an important component of Soviet-U.S. relations," he noted.

"It may be said with complete confidence that we are satisfied with the results of the discussions which have taken place," Congressman S. Hoyer said in a talk with journalists. "We and our Soviet counterparts had a detailed and frank discussion on a whole series of problems." I think, the congressman said, that a good reliable basis is being created for continuing cooperation

and concluding agreements between our countries, primarily in the arms control field.

USSR-U.S. Antidrug Consultations Reported

PM0512170389 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
3 Dec 89 Morning Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Jointly Against Drugs"]

[Text] As agreed earlier, Soviet-U.S. consultations on questions of cooperation in combatting illegal drug trafficking and drug abuse were held in Moscow 30 November through 1 December. The Soviet delegation at the talks was headed by V.G. Komplektov, USSR deputy foreign minister, and the U.S. delegation was headed by M. Levitsky, U.S. assistant secretary of state. Taking part in the consultations were, on the Soviet side, representatives of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, USSR Ministry of Health, USSR KGB, and Main Administration for Customs Control; and on the U.S. side representatives of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency, the U.S. Customs Service, and the National Association on Drug Abuse Problems.

Both sides expressed serious concern in connection with the exacerbation of the drug addiction problem in the world and noted the growing importance, in the context of international efforts, of joint Soviet-U.S. steps to prevent and halt the illegal production, distribution, and use of toxic substances.

The sides agreed to continue consultations at multilateral forums and to examine political measures to stem the flow of illegal drugs from the main areas of drug production and trafficking.

The sides examined in detail the progress of their cooperation, based on the memorandum on mutual understanding and cooperation to combat illegal drug trafficking signed by the Governments of the USSR and the United States in January 1989, and discussed new prospects and areas of collaboration in this sphere.

They elaborated a draft agreement between the two countries' national customs organs. Expanded cooperation and closer coordination of the Customs Services' actions in combatting drug smuggling is envisaged.

In the sphere of collaboration between law enforcement organs it is envisaged to expand cooperation in the organization of regular exchanges of experts, study of methods to combat illegal drug trafficking, and exchanges of information on people engaged in illegal drug trafficking. There will be an exchange of scientific information on the problem of identifying and destroying illegal plantations of narcotic plants and wild cannabis with the help of chemical and biological agents.

The sides agreed to study the means of curbing the leakage of precursor chemical substances onto the illegal market for use in the processing and production of illegal drugs.

An accord was reached on complementing the existing memorandum on mutual understanding in the given sphere with a special provision on cooperation on medical aspects of combatting drug addiction with a view to stepping up collaboration and exchanges on problems of epidemiology, treatment, evaluation, and prevention of drug addiction and the training of specialists in this sphere.

Both sides agreed to step up scientific cooperation in respect of these problems. In this context both sides noted the existing agreement between the USSR Academy of Sciences and the U.S. Department of Agriculture on research into narcotic plants.

Representatives of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Customs Service accepted an invitation from the appropriate U.S. organs for visits to the United States at the level of department heads for familiarization with measures to combat illegal drug trafficking and to discuss questions pertaining to the coordination of collaboration.

The question of the coordination of the two countries' efforts in the appropriate UN bodies and the organization's specialized agencies with a view to enhancing the effectiveness of their work was also discussed. Both sides emphasized the importance of pooling the efforts of the entire international community in combatting drug abuse, and stressed the role of the upcoming special session of the UN General Assembly on the problem of drug addiction for the attainment of this objective. They noted the importance of the 1988 UN Convention on combatting illegal trafficking of drugs and psychotropic substances and expressed themselves in favor of the implementation of its basic provisions before it officially comes into force.

The sides agreed to continue their bilateral contacts and political consultations on the given problem on a regular basis.

China

PRC Delegation's Visit to Indonesia Previewed

OW0412130489 Moscow International Service
in Mandarin 1400 GMT 3 Dec 89

[(Klesnov) commentary]

[Text] A Chinese Foreign Ministry delegation is to arrive in Indonesia on Monday to discuss technical issues pertinent to the normalization of relations between the two countries. On the visit, our station commentator (Klesnov) writes as follows:

Relations between China and Indonesia have been in a frozen state up until now. The reason for this is known to be the 30 September 1965 incident; that is, Jakarta accused Beijing of being involved in a failed coup attempt and severed relations with China.

This year during Emperor Hirohito's funeral in Tokyo in February, Indonesian President Suharto held talks with Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen. They reached an agreement in principle for normalizing relations between their two countries.

Foreign Minister Qian Qichen again met with his Indonesian counterpart, Ali Abdullah Alatas, at the United Nations General Assembly 2 months ago. The two foreign ministers agreed to hold a meeting on technical issues related to normalization of relations.

The Indonesian side stated that at the meeting, the Foreign Ministry officials of the two countries will talk about the date for restoring relations and have preliminary discussions on some technical details, including the establishment of a diplomatic corps and dual nationality.

It is predicted that the next stage of China-Indonesia talks will probably be a foreign ministerial meeting, which will nail down the date for normalization.

It should be pointed out that Asia has long awaited this moment. That two large countries like China and Indonesia should have no diplomatic ties seems out of step with our times. The normalization of relations between China and Indonesia will foster sound development in the Asia-Pacific region to a great extent. It was repeatedly stated by a Singaporean leader that once Beijing and Jakarta exchange diplomatic envoys, Singapore will immediately establish diplomatic relations with China. At present, there are people who believe that the normalization of relations between China and Indonesia will have a positive impact toward solving the Cambodian conflict. The old political pattern has been studied by all concerned recently. Indonesian political scholar (Sudalsono) not long ago stated that as soon as we are not afraid of the so-called [words indistinct] of China, the Communist Party of China, and the Indonesian Communist Party, it is time not to blame China for our not being able to fully understand the situation and the mistake of the 30 September 1965 incident.

PRC Spokesman Cited on East Europe, Korea

*PM0412131589 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
2 Dec 89 Morning Edition p 7*

[Report by own correspondent Yu. Savenkov: "China's Viewpoint"]

[Text] Beijing—"We believe that ultimately the peoples of the East European countries will be able to find a path for building socialism with a consideration for their 'specific features'"—that was the reaction of PRC Foreign Ministry spokesman Jin Guihua at a press briefing to the requests from journalists for an assessment of the development of events in some European socialist countries, particularly Czechoslovakia, and also to the fact that the Chinese press is giving only meager coverage of the situation in these countries.

The Foreign Ministry spokesman stressed that China is following the development of events with close attention but believes them to be the internal affair of these countries and supports a position of noninterference. "We sincerely hope that the East European countries will live under conditions of social stability and that their economies will develop successfully."

To the question whether China believes that the renunciation of the tenet of the leading role of the communist party in society in countries like Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland promotes the consolidation of socialism, the Foreign Ministry spokesman replied as follows: It is the internal affair of these countries and we do not intend to make any commentaries in this connection.

"Do the PRC leaders intend to invite the leaders of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Poland to visit China?"—this question was asked at the briefing among others concerning the situation in the East European countries. I want to repeat once more, the Foreign Ministry spokesman said in his reply, that our government's position is aimed at maintaining and developing relations with all countries, including the ones you name, on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence.

The PRC Foreign Ministry spokesman was also asked: "Reports are coming in that China is rapidly expanding its trade with South Korea and one South Korean bank is prepared to grant China a loan and also that Shanghai is preparing to open an air route to Pusan. How may the development of relations with South Korea affect relations with the DPRK?"

China does indeed maintain unofficial relations with South Korea, but we do not have official links with it, Jin Guihua replied. In maintaining business ties with South Korea we proceed from considerations to the effect that this contributes to the easing of tension on the Korean Peninsula and to the cause of Korea's peaceful unification. As for our relations with the DPRK, I can describe them as close good-neighborly relations. We always support each other, help each other, and understand each other, the Foreign Ministry spokesman noted.

Northeast Asia

Effect of Malta Meeting on Japan, Asia Pacific

*OW0612104989 Moscow in Japanese to Japan
1000 GMT 5 Dec 89*

[By commentator Dmitriyev]

[Text] As expected from the beginning, it would be very complicated to assess the significance of the summit meeting which was held on the sea off Malta since no concrete agreements have been signed. However, I think that its importance lies in the fact that this unofficial meeting has made the basic trend of relaxation of tension in international relations in recent years irreversible.

What is the basis of such an optimistic conclusion? In his statement on the outcome of the summit, U.S. President Bush stressed that the recent meeting would serve as a beneficial stimulation to achieve human progress in many areas, such as environmental protection and nuclear disarmament. On the other hand, Soviet Chairman Gorbachev said that there were many hopeful factors for progress on both sides. Thus, the meeting has brought about better understanding between the USSR and the United States. Even in the past, bilateral relations have served as the motive force for the present relaxation of tension in many aspects. The continuity of the policy of overcoming confrontation and working for disarmament, as agreed in the past, has been confirmed. There is a possibility that treaties on substantial reduction of nuclear weapons and arms in Europe may be signed next year. As Chairman Gorbachev emphasized in his own statement, we can hope for progress in the issue of 50% reduction of strategic offensive weapons.

Do these things mean the end of cold war? We can imagine the significance of this in the context of the overall relations between the two superpowers, the USSR and the United States. During the recent summit meeting, the ideas of mutual understanding and cooperation, and not the ideas of one-sided interests and confrontation—which were the hallmarks of the cold war—on both sides were notable.

Japanese Prime Minister Kaifu, for instance, welcomed the outcome of the meeting and indicated his view that positive dialogue has overcome the framework of the cold war period. President Bush, in his statement, emphasized the fact that U.S.-Soviet relations have come to the beginning of a completely new epoch. However, it is more than clear that the cold war cannot be ended with one summit meeting.

In an interview with the Soviet television, Chairman Gorbachev said that the world has cut off its links with the cold war, and basically, the cold war has ended. However, at the same time, many things from the Cold War period still remain in the approaches of various countries. He stressed the fact that tools born during that period still remain. Undoubtedly, one of those tools is nuclear deterrence, a product of combining doctrine with material means. This theory, which has brought about the present level of nuclear confrontation in the world, has firmly taken roots in the thinking of quite a number of Western activists.

A recent case in point is the conference of Western military experts held in Tokyo on 1 and 2 December. The participants reached a consensus that even in the future, nuclear weapons will continue to guarantee the security of the Western bloc. The psychological basis of such an approach is the belief that the socialist countries may launch an attack on the Western camp.

For instance, the director of the British Defense Research Center, [name indistinct], asserted that even though the threat from the Warsaw Pact organization has

diminished in scale, it still remains and, therefore, it must be countered by a form of nuclear arms.

We must know that as long as politicians are bound with the idea of an imaginary enemy, bidding a farewell to the cold war is out of the question. This is particularly true with the Asian and Pacific region where a move toward reduction of military confrontation is nonexistent except for the rapprochement in Soviet-Chinese relations and the unilateral actions taken by the Soviet Union.

Professor [first name indistinct] Nishihara of Keio University at the above - mentioned conference in Tokyo called on the Western nations to jointly prepare a peace proposal for the Asian and Pacific region, but U.S. Ambassador Armitage rejected any possibility for it. Apparently, the Western side's position on the peace proposal stems from the position of conservative forces in the Soviet Union which are opposed to a military reduction.

I think, however, the reverse should actually be the case. If there is anything that impedes joint efforts toward alleviation of tensions, disarmament, and overall peace, that is the position of the Western side which does not want to respond to the peace proposal of the Eastern side. To my regret, there is no move toward this seen in the Asian and Pacific region.

Will, then, the two-power summit in Malta bring some kind of favorable effect to this region? President Bush in his speech expressed the hope that peace will be assured and East-West relations will change with the cooperation of the Soviet Union.

The East-West relations extend beyond the Atlantic to the Pacific, possibly ushering in forward-looking changes into this area, too. Of course, if Japan can take a positive stand for alleviation of tensions in the Pacific and play a role of a bridge between the Soviet Union and the United States in this region, the possibility for this will grow.

Japan's actions toward this may be logically justified in view of the circumstances created by the Malta summit.

Tokyo Soviet-Japanese Journalist Meeting Opens

*O: 3011101789 Moscow in Japanese to Japan
1200 GMT 28 Nov 89*

[Text] According to our Tokyo correspondent Potapov, the Eighth Soviet-Japanese Journalist Roundtable Conference opens in Tokyo on 28 November. It is sponsored jointly by NOVOSTI NEWS AGENCY and Japan Association for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries and held regularly and alternately in Moscow and Tokyo.

The theme for the current conference is perestroika and new international relations. Both Soviet and Japanese journalists are scheduled to discuss for 2 days various current issues, such as perestroika being implemented in the Soviet Union, recent events in Eastern Europe, and the upcoming Soviet-U.S. summit talks.

Rogachev Meets KYODO President Sakai*OW3011111189 Moscow in Japanese to Japan
1200 GMT 29 Nov 89*

[Text] Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Rogachev met with KYODO President Sakai in Moscow on 28 November at the request of the president. At the meeting, both exchanged a wide range of views on Soviet-Japanese relations and the Asian and Pacific situation. The important role of mass media in strengthening mutual understanding and trust between the peoples of the two countries was stressed at the meeting.

Belousov Received by Kim Il-song*PM0612095589 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
5 Dec 89 Morning Edition p 5*

[TASS report: "Reception in Pyongyang"]

[Text] I.S. Belousov, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, was in Pyongyang 27 November through 2 December at the invitation of the DPRK government.

During the visit, I.S. Belousov was received by Kim Il-song, general secretary of the Workers Party of Korea (WPK) Central Committee and president of the DPRK. They discussed questions of cooperation between the Soviet Union and the DPRK. The conversation proceeded in a warm, friendly atmosphere.

G.G. Bartoshevich, Soviet ambassador to the DPRK, took part in the conversation.

Soviet Aide Meets DPRK Vice Premier*PM0712155389 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 2 Dec
89 Moscow Evening Edition p 5*

[TASS report under general headline: "Official Reports"]

[Text] Kim Yong-nam, member of the Workers Party of Korea Central Committee Politburo, vice premier of the Administration Council, and DPRK foreign minister, stopped over in Moscow 30 November en route for Berlin and Bucharest. I.A. Rogachev, USSR deputy foreign minister, met and talked with him at the airport.

Soviet Trade Mission Chief in Seoul Meets Press*SK0312120389 Moscow International Service in Korean
1100 GMT 28 Nov 89*

[News report from the feature program "With Asia on Focus"]

[Text] The Soviet Union truly (?supports) the easing of tension on the Korean peninsula and in Asia and the Pacific and the North-South reunification of Korea, said Valeriy Nazarov, head of the Soviet Trade Office in the ROK, to reporters in Seoul.

Referring to trade and economic relations between the Soviet Union and South Korea, he said that the volume of commodity trade between the countries would reach \$500 million by the end of the year.

Southeast Asia & Pacific**Soviet Staffers' Plight in Manila Updated***PM0612115989 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
5 Dec 89 Second Edition p 5*

[PRAVDA and TASS correspondents D. Kosyrev and A. Bokhonko dispatch: "Philippines: Everything Is Still Uneasy"]

[Text] Manila, 4 Dec—A large part of the Philippine capital had come back to life Sunday evening and this morning. Crowds of curious people are standing by the military camps—the rebel soldiers who organized the putsch which almost brought about the overthrow of President Aquino's constitutional regime were there recently.

The embankment and other streets are full of lights, the restaurants have begun work again, as have some stores. State employees have been at work since Monday, some banks have opened, and the international airport has resumed operations.

Helicopters with whirling blades are in constant attendance outside the U.S. Embassy. Helicopters also take off regularly from the Villamor Air Base and patrol the skies. The Malacanang presidential palace is under guard by the Philippine security services in a triple encirclement formed of heavy trucks.

No one knows how many rebel soldiers are roaming the city now, attempting to escape retribution. The main seats of resistance have been suppressed, with the exception of the main commercial area of Makati, which the rebels are still holding.

The PRAVDA office in an apartment block at the intersection of two of the city's main boulevards found itself, as it were, the corner stronghold in the insurgents' irregular square of defense—all the adjacent streets and squares in three directions are exposed to fire from it. The soldiers who occupied the premises proved to be rebel subunits who had captured the block. All office personnel were evacuated and transferred to the TASS office, which is where they are now. But 2 days later the approaches to the block have become a zone in cross fire.

In fact, 48 staffers from Soviet establishments and members of their families—the trade mission, a team of construction workers, the APN bureau, and several diplomats' families—found themselves within the rebels' square of defense. Most of their homes were not occupied directly by the rebels, but they cannot go out onto the street; regular telephone contact is being maintained with them. There have been no casualties among the Soviet citizens, although the food shortage is palpable...

....A telephone call from the APN bureau chief has just come through: He can see from the window that the rebels are changing into civilian gear and coming out, leaving their uniforms and weapons behind. Others are still in the localities at present.

Efforts To End Manila Rebellion Reported

HK0712073389 Moscow in Tagalog to the Philippines
1300 GMT 6 Dec 89

[Text] Philippine President Corazon C. Aquino had formally declared martial law [as heard] to totally put an end to the coup d'etat launched by rebel soldiers 6 days ago.

According to a report, this was the president's latest move in an effort to resolve the conflict in which rebel soldiers hold themselves out in Makati, one of the country's commercial centers. The report said that foreigners staying in Makati, and residents of the area, were evacuated to safe places during a ceasefire. It also stated that the government's bid to negotiate with the rebels failed, adding that the rebels allegedly were willing to die.

In the 6-day fight, 77 people were reported killed while 550 were wounded.

Meanwhile, Foreign Affairs Secretary Raul Manglapus announced that the scheduled December talks between the Philippines and the U.S. regarding the future of the latter's military bases were postponed. Earlier, the Aquino government requested military support from the United States to crush the rebellion.

CPSU Delegation Visits Laos 21-29 November

PM0512124989 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
1 Dec 89 Second Edition p 6

[TASS report under the general heading "Official Reports"]

[Text] Under the plan for interparty ties a delegation of CPSU workers was in Laos 21 through 29 November to familiarize itself with the activities of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party [LPRP] and to exchange experience of party leadership of perestroika processes in the economic sphere. The delegation was received by Oudom Khatti-Gna, candidate member of the LPRP Central Committee Politburo and secretary of the LPRP Central Committee.

Leadership Bodies' Jubilee Greetings to Lao Leaders

PM0512164189 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
2 Dec 89 Second Edition p 1

[Soviet leadership bodies' undated message congratulating Lao leaders on republic's 14th anniversary]

[Text] To Comrade Kayson Phomvihane, general secretary of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party Central

Committee and chairman of the Lao People's Democratic Republic [LPDR] Council of Ministers
Comrade Phoumi Vongvichit, acting president of the LPDR

Comrade Nouthak Phoumsavan, president of the LPDR
Supreme People's Assembly
Dear Comrades!

We cordially congratulate you and, through you, the Communists and the entire fraternal people of Laos on the national holiday—the 14th anniversary of the proclamation of the LPDR.

Over the past years the working people of Laos under the leadership of the People's Revolutionary Party have achieved weighty successes in developing the country's economy and culture. The further strengthening of the people's democratic system and the enhancement of the people's well-being are being promoted by the active implementation of the policy elaborated by the party of the renewal of Lao society.

The LPDR makes an important contribution to the cause of strengthening stability and security in Southeast Asia and turning this region into a zone of peace and cooperation free from nuclear weapons, actively participates in the search for a political settlement of the Cambodian problem, and develops good relations with its neighbors.

Soviet people value highly the cooperation between our parties and countries and advocate the further development of Soviet-Lao relations for the good of the peoples of the USSR and the LPDR.

We wish you, dear comrades, and the entire Lao people great successes in building a new society, happiness, and prosperity.

[Signed] The CPSU Central Committee
The USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium
The USSR Council of Ministers.

Yazov Greets Laos' Siphandon

PM0412110189 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 2 Dec 89 First Edition p 1

[Defense Minister Yazov greetings to Lao counterpart on national holiday]

[Text] To Army General Comrade Khamtai Siphandon, Lao Defense Minister

Esteemed Comrade Minister!

On behalf of the USSR Armed Forces and on my own behalf I cordially congratulate you and all Lao People's Army servicemen on the national holiday—the 14th anniversary of the proclamation of the Lao People's Democratic Republic.

During the years of people's power, Laos' working people under the leadership of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party have achieved weighty results on the path

of socioeconomic transformations. We are profoundly convinced that, as a result of perestroika in the Soviet Union and the reform of the economic mechanism being carried out in Laos, Soviet-Lao cooperation—not least military cooperation—will continue to be comprehensively developed in the interests of our countries' peoples.

I wish you and all Lao People's Army personnel new successes in strengthening your motherland's defense capability and in ensuring the Lao people's peaceful creative labor.

Army General D. Yazov, USSR defense minister

East Europe

Krenz Resigns as GDR State Council Chairman

LD0612182889 Moscow TASS in English 1624 GMT
6 Dec 89

[Text] The GDR news agency ADN reports:

GDR head of state Egon Krenz resigned at a meeting of the Council of State here on Wednesday [6 December].

Krenz, 52, was elected chairman of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) on October 18 following the resignation of hitherto SED leader and head of state Erich Honecker.

Krenz quit as SED chief three days ago together with the entire Central Committee after criticism from vast parts of the party grassroots that the SED leadership was incapable of revealing the whole extent and gravity of offences by members of the former Politburo and of drawing the necessary consequences.

The Parliament elected Krenz State Council chairman and chairman of the National Council of Defence on October 24, 1989.

Gerlach Named Acting Chairman

LD0612182189 Moscow TASS in English 1627 GMT
6 Dec 89

[Text] Berlin 6/12/ TASS—

The GDR news agency ADN reports:

GDR/state

—Urgent—

Manfred Gerlach Chosen Acting GDR State Council Chairman

Berlin (ADN)—Professor Manfred Gerlach of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDPD) was chosen acting GDR State Council chairman after Egon Krenz had resigned earlier in the day.

GDR National Defense Council Resigns

LD0612164589 Moscow TASS in English 1631 GMT
6 Dec 89

[Text] Berlin December 6 TASS—All members of the German Democratic Republic's National Defense Council have been relieved of their posts in keeping with a ruling of the GDR's State Council.

Egon Krenz resigned as chairman of the National Defense Council

The State Council has taken a decision to declare an amnesty.

GDR National Security Officials Resign

LD0612074489 Moscow TASS in English 0739 GMT
6 Dec 89

[Text] Berlin December 6 TASS—The collegium of the German Democratic Republic National Security Department resigned en masse on Tuesday, the ADN news agency reports.

Deputy State Security Minister Colonel-General Rudi Mittag and Lieutenant-General Gerhard Neiber, as well as 17 senior officials of the large subdivisions of the former State Security Ministry, were immediately relieved of their duties.

Agenda for 8 Dec GDR Party Congress Outlined

LD0612183189 Moscow TASS in English 1650 GMT
6 Dec 89

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—The GDR Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) on Wednesday [6 December] called an emergency congress for December 8 in Berlin. The decision was taken by the party's special working group to prepare such a congress because of the situation in the country and within the party.

The working group is to give a report on the situation in the SED and the underlying causes and make proposals for radical renewal of the party from the grassroots to become a modern socialist party. Discussion is to focus on the tasks ahead.

The emergency congress is to elect leading bodies that guarantee the SED's capability to act as an equal party in the process of renewing society. The congress is to effect a final breakaway from the Stalinist system and the monopoly and abuse of power it produced.

The congress was originally scheduled to be held on December 15-17. On December 3, fierce criticism from the party rank and file forced the Politburo and the Central Committee to resign and a special working group was set up.

'Independent' Group Investigating GDR Corruption
*LD0612030889 Moscow TASS in English 2256 GMT
5 Dec 89*

[Text] Berlin December 6 TASS—The independent commission, created in the German Democratic Republic at the beginning of this week by the new political parties and public forces to investigate cases of corruption and abuse of office, held a news conference in Berlin on Tuesday.

Commission members reiterated their call on the country's citizens to help expose attempts to cover up such cases or destroy archival documents attesting to facts of corruption, financial machinations and other criminal actions.

Journalists were told that the commission had received since Monday 60 notifications and other data from the population about violations of socialist legality.

All the data were immediately forwarded to the Ministry of Interior and the Presidium of the People's Police for further investigation into the activities of some party and economic officials and also of the Free German Youth Union, the Free German Trade Unions Amalgamation and the German Sport and Gymnastics Union of the German Democratic Republic.

Government Spokesman Wolfgang Meyer told journalists that the Council of Ministers supported the activity of the new commission. There are no government representatives among the commission's members.

The commission was set up on the initiative of the "Group of November 4" established by the Berlin Union of Theatrical and Cultural Workers, the Social Democratic Party, the New Forum, the Democratic Breakthrough, the Democracy-Now organisation, the initiative group of members of the GDR Academy of Sciences and the Committee for Peace and Human Rights.

Problems Besetting SED, Future Role Viewed

*PM0612162589 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 6 Dec 89 First Edition p 3*

[Article by TASS political observer A. Balebanov especially for KRASNAYA ZVEZDA under the rubric "In the Socialist Countries of Europe": "GDR: Thorny Path of Renewal"]

[Text] Berlin, Moscow—"This is a real mass democratic revolution that has embraced different sections of society from the working class to the intelligentsia. The intelligentsia is playing the role of tribune in this revolution. The range of political-philosophical trends and thrusts is wide," was how Professor Goetz Dieckmann, rector of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany [SED] Higher Party School, characterized the events taking place in the GDR in conversation with me.

It is hard to disagree with that version. I will add that a complex and difficult situation has taken shape

throughout the country and in the party at this time. A situation has come about in which, in the scientist's words, the people no longer want to see in leading party and state posts the people who were previously at the helm. This applies to all state and party organs, institutions, organizations, and scientific research institutes. It seems that the process of renewal taking place in the country has already produced the conclusion that in the future leading party and state posts must not be occupied by comrades without a democratic mandate.

In the present revolution in the GDR, as in any large movement, of course, there are antisocialist and overtly reactionary forces who are trying to thwart the process of restructuring. Nor should it be forgotten that the country has the West German bourgeoisie on its country's border. That is another feature of the political situation in the GDR.

The most noteworthy fact in current events is that in the GDR they want the country to continue traveling the socialist path. People who have taken part in rallies and demonstrations told me that not once did they see or hear anywhere a single slogan demanding the abolition of the forms of socialist ownership. Of course, it is hard to say that such a slogan won't appear later: It all depends on how the socioeconomic problems facing the country are resolved.

I must also note that the processes in the GDR include such elements as a powerful emotional feeling against the SED. From conversations with communists and non-party citizens of the GDR, I have gained the impression that these emotions are often justified. According to local press information, an analysis of the situation and its causes has begun within the party itself. This analysis has already made it possible to highlight abuses of power by a number of former leaders, and, in particular, cases of corruption have been exposed. All this, of course, could not fail to cause indignation among the population, including communists. Many have handed in their party cards and others have decided to stop paying their party dues.

The GDR's communists pin great hopes on the extraordinary SED Congress due in mid-December. They believe that the appearance of new people in the party leadership will make it possible to investigate the causes of the current crisis in the country and the SED. The second priority step, it is believed in the GDR, is the consistent implementation of the provisions of the SED action program and the constant improvement of that program.

My interlocutors in Berlin said that the continuing emigration from the GDR is causing them special concern. The majority of emigrants have decided to leave the country forever, and the changes that have begun in the GDR have not stopped them. The reasons for emigrating include not only the restrictions which existed in the sphere of democracy, but also considerable

material factors, including the low pay of highly qualified specialists, 10 times less than in the FRG. As a result, a considerable proportion of young qualified doctors and engineers have gone to the West.

On the other hand, there are large social groups in the GDR who even by Western standards have a very high living standard—peasants, for example. According to published statistics, not one rural dweller has left the country or the agricultural cooperatives. That tendency is also true of the vast proportion of the country's working class, who aren't even considering emigration. I think all this is because people understand the advantages of the social security system in the GDR, the efficiency of which is such that it is hardly worth comparing to Western equivalents.

What should the SED's future role in society's life be? People in the GDR are considering that question increasingly often at this time. Here is the answer that Prof Dieckmann gave me: "I have no doubt that the SED will continue to play a tangible role in our country's life. Of course, it is difficult to predict its scale. I am convinced that the GDR cannot get by without a German communist party. Whatever name the SED uses in the future, it cannot be removed from our society. That is clear. The scale of the party's influence, in my view, will depend on the results of the upcoming SED congress and on whether the party manages to find a consensus among communists regarding the ways and methods of achieving its resolute renewal."

"Therefore, the task is to strengthen party unity, get the SED back on its feet, and get rid of the careerists and various other crooks. To that end it is necessary to renounce the old thinking more quickly, to take fresh and courageous ideas on board, and to use the experience of other socialist countries. A complex and difficult path awaits us, but it must be travelled in order to successfully implement the process of the country's renewal."

GDR Youth Leader Discusses Union's New Tasks

*PM0612155789 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 5 Dec 89 p 3*

[Interview with Frank Tuerkowsky, recently elected first secretary of the Union of Free German Youth Central Council, by S. Maslov: "Between Past and Future"; date of interview not given; first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] Berlin—Our correspondent spoke to Frank Tuerkowsky, who was recently elected first secretary of the Free German Youth Union [FDJ] Central Council.

[Maslov] The 13th Central Council Plenum, at which the youth union's leadership was renewed, can probably be described as the end of the former FDJ. But we must obviously see this as meaning more than just the resolution of cadre questions. The FDJ is escaping with marked vigor from former illusions regarding its own infallibility. Frank, in your view what was wrong with

the union's activity and what engendered the crisis within its ranks? How great is the loss of confidence in the FDJ that people are now talking about?

[Tuerkowsky] The question of what precisely was the reason for the crisis within the FDJ can only be answered by turning to the history of the organization and the special features of its origins and development. Our union was founded in 1946 with the permission of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany as a united, antifascist, democratic organization—supraparty and open to all young people. In its activity it favored the implementation of young people's fundamental rights, singling out the following four most important: the right to take part in deciding questions of public life; the right to work and education; the right to recreation; and the right to live in peace. If we look at the FDJ's subsequent path, its orientation on one party—the Socialist Unity Party of Germany [SED]—became increasingly perceptible with the passage of time. This process must not be interpreted unambiguously. It was right that the union devoted particular attention to cooperation with the leading political force in society. It was also natural for a youth organization involved in socialist building to be devoted to the ideals of Marxism-Leninism. But, unfortunately, it did not prove possible to implement in full the original concept of FDJ openness to each and everyone.

This was in many respects attributable to the fact that words were included in the FDJ Statute in 1976 at its 10th Congress whereby the union became the "SED's assistant and combat reserve." Leading FDJ cadres began to be selected solely from that party's ranks, which also contravened the organization's original character. The FDJ Constituent Committee was very democratic in composition—I am referring to a pluralism of views.

Departure from the initial principles has resulted in a situation in which other youth organizations are beginning to spring up today, close in terms of their program aims to different political parties. The FDJ has lost people's confidence to a considerable extent. I do not as yet have precise figures, but I can say definitely that since October this year we have lost more than 500,000 members. The remainder—approximately 1.3-1.4 million—also constitute a considerable force. But its vast potential for social activeness must be roused anew. A new FDJ is needed. The 13th Central Council Plenum was the first step in this direction.

[Maslov] This may be an "inconvenient" question but it is inevitable. It follows from the new draft statute that the FDJ is striving for party independence at a time when alternative youth organizations are emerging that gravitate toward various political parties. I believe that not all communists understand this stance. I judge this not only from critical comments in the press but also from my conversations with people. Some cannot help feeling that the FDJ is abandoning the party at a very difficult time. You may have also encountered harsher assessments: The FDJ is allegedly dissociating itself from

the party and thus shifting total responsibility onto the latter for the things that have happened in the youth sphere—despite the fact that some union functionaries sometimes seemed, so to speak, “more” Catholic than the Pope. What do you think about that?

[Tuerkowsky] Let me point out, first of all, that the 2 million or so members of the union are 2 million different people...

As for the essence of the question, some communists are indeed saying that the FDJ is abandoning the party at a difficult moment. But if this were in fact the case, I would not have assumed the responsibility of leading the union. I am myself a member of that party and will remain so.

We are fighting for unity or, if you like, to create a united youth front. From our viewpoint, success here will be of very great significance for the fate of socialism in the country. Will FDJ and SED interests differ here? Not in the least. Independence from the party is by no means equivalent to political and ideological neutrality. Of course, there will be competition between ideas and concepts whereby various social forces may enrich debate within the FDJ. Communists will take a most active part in these debates, continuing the work in the union. They see their task as being to try to raise young people as leaders of socialist renewal. That is how they understand their responsibility to the party.

Dissociation from the SED under present-day conditions simply means putting your party membership card “on the table.” No one forces communists working in the union to choose between the SED and the FDJ. The same can be said about representatives of other political forces who are working shoulder to shoulder with us.

Young people aged 13-14 joining the union—this is our experience—are not yet convinced Marxists or Christians, for example. It would be unrealistic to expect them to have a mature, firm desire at that moment to join their destiny to a particular political party. They still must find their feet among various philosophical tendencies and human values and ideals. We must take this into consideration. On the other hand, the unions, of course, have a clear social stance. Rank-and-file members of the FDJ demand this. Our organization cannot be apolitical. If we say that we will act on the basis of constitutional norms, we mean that we will rest on the socialist state's constitution. We are thus stating our adherence to the cause of socialism and, thus, to the ideas of Marx, Engels, and Lenin.

Communists within the ranks of the FDJ will continue to uphold socialist ideals and values, but in a different way from before. Their “monopoly on truth” was previously considered unshakable and “programmed.” Now alternative opinions and debate must be not merely permissible but normal. Only then will we be able to elaborate a truly effective action program. Despite the creation of other organizations, young Christians, liberal democrats, and national democrats continue to work as before

within the ranks of the FDJ. However, the situation is not the same everywhere. Losses are most considerable in those areas where FDJ functionaries operate by administrative methods.

[Maslov] Do you rule out the possibility of setting up a communist youth union in the country on the FDJ base?

[Tuerkowsky] The question is an appropriate one. Demands can sometimes be heard for an SED youth organization to be set up. I am opposed to this. To be more precise, I am not opposed to a union as such, but I am opposed to the split in the youth movement which could ensue as a result. Provided the FDJ exists, the emergence of new organizations does not mean a split. These organizations' readiness for cooperation can be seen, within the framework of parliamentary representation of young people's interests, for instance. If all young people take up their party corners once and for all, they will represent anyone you like in parliament, but not themselves. As a union independent of any party and open to everyone, the FDJ is a base for unity. I would like to stress that the unity for which we are striving by no means signifies standardization [unifikatsiya]. One more point: Anyone who endeavors to split the youth movement must have a good think about the consequences in the shape of rifts in the country's future.

[Maslov] The former FDJ no longer exists. The new one does not as yet exist. Nevertheless, the FDJ exists, and it has gotten moving. And movement equals life. What does the union live for today? What tasks is it setting itself? What questions are the center of debate?

[Tuerkowsky] The new FDJ does, of course, need a new program. The union's leadership intends to submit the draft of a new program for broad discussion in December. In February the 13th FDJ Congress must pass a final decision on this question. The document will not only clearly outline the philosophical foundations of the FDJ, it will have to determine what the union's role should be in most varied spheres of society's life. The aforementioned question of the representation of young people's interests in the bodies of state power is of particular significance. The principles of cooperation with other youth organizations must also be formulated. All this also worries the members of the union, and they are not the only ones. Impatience is understandable. Time is pressing. At the same time, those people who believe that the union's new leadership has ready-made prescriptions for all eventualities are mistaken. Sometimes even Central Council apparatus workers expect miracles—complete concepts—of us. The following stereotype is active: Many people believe that when the leadership was replaced everything was predetermined and ordained so that, they conclude, people had time to prepare for their new jobs. However, on the morning of the election I did not even think that my name might be among the list of candidates on the secret ballot paper. I am sincere in saying this. I went to the plenum with a well thought-out concept, but only for Dresden Bezirk,

where I was working. It cannot be mechanically "expanded" to republic scale.

We are elaborating a new policy in the process of debate. This is a process during which we will all have to learn a great deal. The grassroots echelons must get accustomed to greater independence. A great deal depends on initiative at the local level. The field of activity here is extensive. Take the question of the union's financial base. Some 82 percent of the FDJ's finances planned for this year came from state subsidies. The state will hardly be able to afford this in the future. Consequently, we must think seriously about finding additional sources of funding.

Another question is: What should the apparatus be like? The problem cannot be solved by ordinary arithmetical operations, although it is already obvious that the number of officials will be reduced. However, we must take not arbitrary figures but concrete conditions as our starting point. The most important thing is to remember that the leadership and the apparatus must serve the interests of the broad masses of rank-and-file union members, rather than the other way round. We will proceed on this premise in all our undertakings.

CSSR's Urbanek Cited on 1968 Events

LD0612153589 Moscow TASS in English 1415 GMT 6 Dec 89

[Text] Prague December 6 TASS—Czechoslovak party chief Karel Urbanek pointed out on national television that unanimity on the 1968 events in Czechoslovakia was reached at the Warsaw Treaty summit meeting.

"The reasons for the 1968 events and their consequences," Urbanek said, "call for a thorough analysis. But the conclusion can be drawn already. First of all, as noted in the Czechoslovak Communist Party draft programme of action, the new party leadership fully supports the inspiring ideas of the 1968 'Prague Spring'."

"We regard as null and void the document 'Lessons Drawn from the Crisis in the Party and Society After the 13th Congress of the Czechoslovak Communist Party' trying to whitewash the liquidation of the reformist movement and backing the revival of bureaucratic administrative methods after 1968."

"We call for the complete political rehabilitation of all those who were expelled from the party because they disagreed with the introduction of troops into Czechoslovakia. We offer them our hand and urge them to cooperate with us for the sake of a democratic socialist society," Urbanek said.

"During our meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev we expressed our firm conviction that it is necessary to deepen friendly cooperation between the communist parties of the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia on principles of equality and solidarity. Both sides will adhere to the principles of sovereignty, independence,

non-interference in each other's domestic affairs, and promote equal and mutually-beneficial economic and political relations.

"This is of fundamental importance for Czechoslovakia. We believe it will reliably guarantee the security of our borders and the positions of our state in post-war European development, primarily in regard to the Munich collusion, Urbanek noted.

"We discussed other questions in the light of the CSCE process and East-West relations, including the stay of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia. We agreed that this issue would be discussed by state bodies with due account for the equal security and inviolability of the borders of European states, including Czechoslovakia.

"Both sides will support the Helsinki process. Its success will help overcome Europe's military division and thereby resolve the problem of foreign troops outside national territories.

"We also exchanged views on the stormy processes of socialism's renovation in some socialist states and arrived at the conclusion that they were caused by the need to overcome deformations of socialism and revive its humanistic and democratic essence," Urbanek stressed.

CSSR Ex-Premier Cernik Writes on 1968 Events

PM0612152189 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Dec 89 Morning Edition p 5

[Article by former CSSR Premier Oldrich Cernik, followed by commentary by IZVESTIYA Socialist Countries Department: "How It Was. Former Premier of CSSR Government on Events of August 1968"]

[Text] On 19 August 1989 IZVESTIYA published under the rubric "Pages From History" three items—by a politician, a military chief, and a soldier—on what happened in the Czechoslovak capital 21 August 1968. Thanks to your newspaper and the fact that you are publishing different opinions on the fateful events of modern Czechoslovak history, the truth is being revealed about the causes and consequences of the entry into CSSR territory of troops from five Warsaw Pact states. That action had profound consequences for the development of socialism in the CSSR and in Europe.

My view of the situation in the CSSR and the introduction of the five Warsaw Pact countries' troops into our territory differs from K.T. Mazurov's viewpoint. At that time I was a member of the Czechoslovak Communist Party [CPCZ] Central Committee Presidium and premier of the CSSR Government, and K.T. Mazurov was a member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo. I am sure that in the future history will make it possible to publish other, still more convincing facts about that complex time.

What happened in the CSSR in 1968? What was the political course of the CPCZ? Was it a course aimed at

the gradual restoration of capitalism or the all-around strengthening of socialism? Did the Czechoslovak leadership violate its alliance treaties, the statute of the Warsaw Pact, or the statute of CEMA? Did the Czechoslovak leadership weaken the Czechoslovak People's Army and the republic's security and thereby the socialist community's security?

The post-January (1968) policy of the CPCZ Central Committee, the CSSR National Front, and the Czechoslovak Government, set out in the CPCZ Action Program, received unprecedented support from the Czechoslovak working people and was aimed at improving and reviving socialism, strengthening its material and technical foundations, and developing socialist democracy and the people's self-management. Of course, this process was not without conflicts. This was a struggle between the old and the new, a struggle with the relics and unviable principles and methods of building socialism in a country with a high economic potential and deep traditions of democratic development. But the decisive factor concerned the tendencies that had begun to appear in Czechoslovakia's development after January and the influence that they exerted.

So which tendencies prevailed? Socialist or antisocialist? Any unbiased visitor who was able to spend even a short time in the CSSR then and visit plants, farms, and institutions and talk with the young, the middle-aged, and the older generation could obtain a clear answer to that question.

The process of post-January development in our country lasted just 8 months. There wasn't a single occasion when the authorities had to resort to force to quell antisocialist forces. The fact is that mass protest actions or antisocialist acts simply didn't occur in the CSSR then. Nevertheless, that process was interrupted, stopped by external military intervention. Why?

The development of events in Czechoslovakia was not and could not have been at that period an isolated internal affair for Czechoslovak Communists and the Czechoslovak people. This process also affected the interests of the fraternal communist and workers' parties in the countries of the socialist camp. The ideological pattern of the period of administrative-bureaucratic leadership, as the grave legacy of Stalinism, was still dominant in all the socialist countries of Eastern Europe. It was the determining factor and served as the basic principle when implementing the practical policy of individual communist parties and the whole socialist community. The theoretical line dominated the practice of socialist building, principles far removed from life stifled new and original decisions, and every attempt to provide a new program corresponding to the realities of life which would have made it possible to ease the growing tension in society ran up against the premise of the leading role of the party. Each such attempt or merely a search for independent solutions was suspect and was interpreted as an attempt to revise Marxist-Leninist principles.

From the military-political aspect, that is, from the viewpoint of the socialist countries' defense and security, specific significance was placed on Czechoslovakia, a country situated in the very center of Europe and at the same time forming a border of the socialist world. Both before and after World War II Czechoslovakia was an industrially-developed country, one of the world's 10 most developed countries. The protracted influence of the administrative-bureaucratic methods of leadership made it impossible to use the new motive forces and increased the distance by which the party leadership lagged behind society's development and the demands of the times. It is common knowledge that from 1956 the CPCZ tried several times unsuccessfully to change the principles and methods of economic leadership. Each attempt at economic reform failed. There was a real danger of serious political conflicts between the CPCZ and our country's working people.

The key question examined at the last three CPCZ Central Committee plenums in 1967 and 1968 was that of the understanding and practical implementation of the tenet of the party's leading role. And when it became clear after broad discussion at the CPCZ Central Committee plenum that the party needed a new leadership, L.I. Brezhnev came to Prague in December 1967 at A. Novotny's invitation. After conversations with some members of the CPCZ Central Committee Presidium and before leaving Prague he uttered the words which best characterize the full complexity of the situation in which the CPCZ and the Czechoslovak people found themselves in 1968. "This is your affair," L.I. Brezhnev said, but just a few months later he confirmed that the shackles of neo-Stalinism were absolutely identical for all the countries in this community and bind them all equally firmly. Therein lay the beginning and end of the Czechoslovak reformist movement 21 years ago.

In the history of our peoples it is impossible to find another similar instance of the allied states' flouting the inalienable right of the Czech and Slovak peoples to freely choose their own development path. The question of the entry of the allied states' armies into CSSR territory is within the legal competence of the legitimate Czechoslovak state organs alone. Without the consent of the president of the Republic, the National Assembly, and the Czechoslovak Government such an act is a violation of the CSSR Constitution and cannot be assessed any other way.

Just what kind of practice of mutual relations had formed among the friendly states and fraternal Marxist-Leninist parties when a member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers could arrive in the CSSR capital at the head of a vast number of military subunits of five Warsaw Pact allied states without first notifying the CPCZ Central Committee Presidium or the Czechoslovak Government, could not even bother to visit the CPCZ Central Committee, the CSSR president, or the CSSR Government, but, on the contrary, could order that the first secretary of the CPCZ Central Committee,

the chairman of the National Assembly, the premier of the CSSR Government, and other representatives of the CPCZ be arrested and taken out of their country? What name do you give to such an operation? Such an act can never be legally justified. And the argument regarding the political reasons for this initiative by certain leaders of communist and workers parties, which are obliged to protect and ensure the peoples' right to state sovereignty without any exception, cannot be convincing under any circumstances.

It saddened me very much to read the closing lines of K.T. Mazurov's piece, in which he writes that in the specific situation of August 1968 he acted out of conviction, and if the situation recurred today he would do exactly the same thing. To accept his words is to legalize in the communist movement the principle that might is right. But that is alien to socialism.

Only the legitimate political and state organs of the country in question are best placed to conduct an objective analysis of the internal political situation there. They can listen to the opinions of others; they can do so, but aren't obliged to. That is each country's right. The leadership of the five fraternal parties did not take seriously enough the political description of the situation in the CSSR unanimously given by the CPCZ Central Committee, but, on the basis of unofficial information, in accordance with the ideological concept operating at that time, came to the conclusion that socialist gains in the CSSR were under threat and that therefore the entire socialist community was under threat too.

A very different approach to the solution of the Czechoslovak political crisis was shown by the results of the Warsaw meeting and the attitude to it of the CPCZ Central Committee, which was also shown later in the speeches by the delegations of the CPSU Central Committee and the CPCZ Central Committee during the meeting at Cierna nad Tisou. K.T. Mazurov reports that the CPCZ Central Committee leadership refused to go to Warsaw for conversations with the fraternal countries' leaders. As far as I am aware there isn't a single written document in existence to that effect. On 12 July 1968, after a discussion of the five parties' demand for a joint meeting (the materials presented for discussion did not indicate the meeting's proposed date), the CPCZ Central Committee Presidium suggested to the five parties that they begin by holding bilateral meetings, which could end with a joint conference of all the parties.

But the five parties' meeting in Warsaw was held as early as 15 July. What were the grounds for the five fraternal parties' discussing the situation within another party and another socialist country without considering the CPCZ Central Committee's viewpoint and without the participation of its official representatives?

After the publication of the five parties' joint statement adopted at the Warsaw meeting, the Czechoslovak leadership published in the Czechoslovak mass media both the full text of the statement and its own reply to it,

which had been unanimously approved by a plenary session of the CPCZ Central Committee. The leadership of the five states still has not published the CPCZ Central Committee's reply.

The talks between the CPSU Central Committee and the CPCZ Central Committee at Cierna nad Tisou were indeed complex. But, nevertheless, it proved possible to overcome the consequences of the five parties' meeting in Warsaw and agree to convene a new meeting in Bratislava 3 August, this time involving representatives of the CPCZ Central Committee. This was undoubtedly the positive outcome of the political talks. The agenda of the talks and the transcripts of the participants' speeches are preserved in the CPSU Central Committee archive. I am sure that the time will come when the archives will be opened and will show what concepts for the solution of the Czechoslovak crisis were proposed by the representatives of the CPSU Central Committee and the CPCZ Central Committee. They will also show how the Czechoslovak delegation acted, what it defended and demanded, what it promised, and which of those promises were subsequently kept.

The six countries signed a joint statement in Bratislava. The Czechoslovak television report broadcast after its signing will remain forever in the memories of the Czechoslovak people: From the balcony of the palace in Bratislava the representatives of the six allied countries affably waved to the triumphant inhabitants of the Slovak capital. The tension had eased. The Czechoslovak people breathed a sigh of relief.

So what actually happened in Czechoslovakia 18 days after the triumphant conclusion of the successful talks? Why was it necessary to bring the five countries' armies into Czechoslovakia's territory?

In an open letter to the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Government, the leadership of the other communist and workers parties, and the governments of the five Warsaw Pact countries which sent their troops into CSSR territory on 21 August 1968, and also to the CPCZ Central Committee and the Czechoslovak Government—the letter is dated June this year—Alexander Dubcek, the first secretary of the CPCZ Central Committee in 1968, and Oldrich Cernik, premier of the CSSR Government in 1968, refuted the allegation (which K.T. Mazurov cites in his piece) that a counterrevolutionary coup was expected in Czechoslovakia. What forces were supposed to carry it out? Where were the counterrevolutionary centers concentrated and how did they operate? What forces and means did they possess, and what threat did they pose to socialist development in the CSSR, the country where the CPCZ enjoyed boundless support from the people that it couldn't even have dreamed of previously?

Does this allegation mean that the leadership of the CPCZ Central Committee and the Czechoslovak state themselves were preparing the coup? That is absurd, of

course. There is another explanation: A counterrevolutionary coup was being prepared by antisocialist forces. But in that case the entry of the five states' troops should have been directed against those forces and help should have been given to the lawful Czechoslovak organs at their own request, and only if they were unable to defend socialism by their own efforts.

But even that scenario did not fit into the political assessment and the solution being prepared for the Czechoslovak question. In the opinion of the CPSU Central Committee and the other parties, the CPCZ and the Czechoslovak state at that time were headed by a right-opportunist wing whose policy of socialist reforms seriously undermined the CPCZ's leading role and thereby created favorable conditions for the activity of antisocialist forces. In the interests of defending socialist gains in the CSSR and to safeguard the development of socialism in the five other countries, which were being adversely affected by the development of events in Czechoslovakia, it was necessary even before the 14th CPCZ Congress (planned for September 1968) to remove that leadership from power and, again before that congress, dismiss once and for all the reform program of the CPCZ and the Czechoslovak people.

I am convinced that the question of the military solution to the Czechoslovak problem, that is, the elimination of the CPCZ reform program, had been decided within certain political structures even before the meeting of the six parties' representatives in Bratislava.

The newly created worker-peasant government was supposed to legalize the entry of the five Warsaw Pact states' troops into CSSR territory. But there was a snag. During the night the Czechoslovak people found out about the CPCZ Central Committee Presidium's statement and afterwards were informed by the Czechoslovak Government, the National Assembly, and the president of the republic that this action—the introduction of troops—had been taken without their knowledge and that this was a violation of Czechoslovak state sovereignty.

The unanimous and resolute action by the Czechoslovak people in defense of their rights, the world public's condemnation of the five states' act of violence against the people of an allied country, and the condemnation of that step by the majority of communist and socialist parties provoked an extremely negative reaction in the world to events in the CSSR. The new situation forced the CPSU Central Committee to agree to talks with interned representatives of the CPCZ Central Committee and the Czechoslovak Government. As a result of those talks, which were held in inequitable conditions, the Moscow protocol was adopted which emphasized neither the counterrevolutionary situation in the CSSR nor the legality of military intervention in the process of the development of events in Czechoslovakia.

The introduction of troops made it impossible to hold the extraordinary 14th CPCZ Congress on schedule. From the viewpoint of the five countries' interests, this

gained time to enable the top leaders of the legitimate organs of the CPCZ and the Czechoslovak state to take the necessary steps for the gradual normalization of the situation in the republic. At that period a Czechoslovak leadership of a different composition could hardly have achieved that.

At the same time, under the protection of the allied armies, which were the ideological and organizational buttress of certain forces in the CPCZ, changes were prepared and gradually carried out in the leading organs of the CPCZ, the National Front, the National Assembly, and the CSSR Government. One component of the policy of the normalization and consolidation of political relations in the CSSR was the expulsion from the CPCZ of several hundred thousand Communists dedicated to the socialist cause. Hundreds of thousands of Czechs and Slovaks paid in material terms for supporting the course of CPCZ reforms and opposing the introduction of the troops. Tens of thousands of our fellow citizens left the country.

At the stage of normalization, in the 1970 document "Lessons of the Crisis Development in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and Society After the 13th CPCZ Congress" the new leadership of the CPCZ and the Czechoslovak state legalized politically but not de jure the introduction of troops as internationalist assistance in the struggle against counterrevolution.

Nevertheless, the 21 years since the introduction of the five Warsaw Pact states' troops have shown in the context of revolutionary reforms in a number of socialist countries that:

- the reform program of the CPCZ and the Czechoslovak people to revive socialism was a program of socialist transformations that was meant to create and could have created a flourishing socialist economy under conditions of broad democracy and the people's self-management;
- there was no counterrevolution in Czechoslovakia. The Moscow protocol signed by the representatives of the CPSU Central Committee and the CPCZ Central Committee contained no such characterization of the situation in the CSSR;
- the reform program of the CPCZ and the Czechoslovak people, which was aimed at reviving and renewing socialism, was destroyed by the Warsaw Pact armies' intervention; the solution of political problems by military means violated Czechoslovakia's sovereignty and did irreparable harm to the interests of socialism in Europe. The internationalization of events in Czechoslovakia harmed the international communist and workers movement;
- the introduction of the five states' troops made it possible to forcibly eliminate the process of reforms and reintroduce outmoded methods of administrative and bureaucratic leadership in a developed central European state, and as a result led to the trends of the

period of stagnation, our country's lagging behind the developed countries of Europe, and the loss of the CPCZ's prestige among the overwhelming majority of working people, in particular among the younger and middle generation;

—the period of normalization did not eliminate, but on the contrary deepened the socioeconomic contradictions in our country to such a level that now there is a demand, as the CPCZ states, for revolutionary reforms in the economy and changes in all spheres of socialist society's life.

These are just some of the results of the interference in Czechoslovakia's affairs. The shadow of 21 August 1968 that hangs over our mutual relations and the history of the Czechoslovak peoples must be lifted in the interests of the further development of socialism because the peoples' future is born from the truthful analysis of the past.

These wasted years cannot be made up. Nor can the loss of moral values be made up, a loss which affected all generations of the Czechoslovak people then and now. Just how much hard work awaits us all we can see clearly from the example of the other socialist countries, which are incurring great material, moral, and political losses in their work to overcome the grave legacy of the period of stagnation. [Cernik ends]

The IZVESTIYA editorial office has received letters from Czechoslovak citizens, including those people forced to emigrate from the country. They contain responses to the newspaper's publications ("It Happened in Prague" and "August Harvest") on the events of August 1968. The essence of those events and an attitude to them are expressed, not without subjective elements of course, in the abridged letter from O. Cernik, formerly a prominent Czechoslovak Government figure.

In today's issue the readers will find the official reply to the question raised by the writer. It is contained in the statement of the leaders of the five Warsaw Pact states and the statement of the Soviet Government.

Changes in CSSR Government Reported

PM0612132189 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
5 Dec 89 Morning Edition p 5

[Own correspondent L. Kornilov dispatch: "The CSSR: More Strike Action?"]

[Text] Prague—The first sitting of the new CSSR Government was held on Sunday. I will go into the agenda a little later on, but first of all I would like to talk about what preceded this sitting.

At the suggestion of L. Adamec, chairman of the government, and the recommendation of the National Front, CSSR President G. Husak confirmed M. Calfa, a member of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCZ) and hitherto a minister without portfolio, as first deputy chairman of the government. The following new

members of the Cabinet were also confirmed: deputy chairman—Doctor of Theology J. Hromadka, who is not a party member; national defense minister—Colonel General M. Vacek, member of the CPCZ; internal affairs minister—F. Pinc, member of the CPCZ. Ladislav Dvorak and Frantisek Reichel, representatives of the Socialist Party and People's Party, as well as a number of nonparty people, also received portfolios. So now by no means all members of the Czechoslovak cabinet are communists. New faces account for 40 percent of the government and eight of its members are below the age of 50. This government is to remain in place until free elections are held. However, as L. Adamec has stressed, it cannot be ruled out that the composition of the government will undergo some changes before that.

The first sitting of the new government was devoted to the most topical questions and tasks. L. Adamec made an extensive statement. The following document was approved:

"The CSSR Government regards the introduction of troops from five Warsaw Pact states into Czechoslovakia in 1968 as a violation of the norms of relations between sovereign states. The federal government instructs its chairman, L. Adamec, to acquaint the Soviet Government with this position. At the same time, the federal government proposes to the Soviet Government that talks begin on an intergovernmental treaty on the temporary presence of Soviet troops on CSSR territory. Foreign Minister J. Johanes is empowered to conduct these talks.... The CSSR Government is prepared to set up a group of historians with other countries to discuss every aspect of the events of August 1968."

The congress of agricultural cooperatives, which came to a close on Saturday, formed a preparatory committee to set up a Peasants' Party and prepared the drafts of its program and statute. It was stated that "agriculture in Czechoslovakia will continue to develop on the basis of socialist principles. The activity of unified agricultural cooperatives will increasingly expand."

A sitting of the National Front Central Committee was held on Sunday. M. Jakes resigned as chairman. It was decided that there will be rotation in this body every 2 months. The leader of the Socialist Party, Bohuslav Kucera, was elected chairman for the first term.

The announcement of the new government has prompted various reactions. Whereas the CPCZ Central Committee Presidium has expressed its full support for the new government, and the National Front Central Committee likewise, the "Civic Forum" has reacted differently. A spokesman for this opposition organization said on television: "We are convinced that this is still not a new government. There have been no changes in the key posts. The CPCZ must now work on the basis that it no longer has a leading role enshrined in the Constitution, even though the overwhelming majority of people in the government are still Communists." Students and figures in the arts world are also dissatisfied

with the degree of change in the government and see any changes made so far as "cosmetic." At the same time, representatives of the Socialist Party and People's Party have spoken out in favor of the changes, believing that the process must be assessed as it goes along.

The "Civic Forum" has announced that a new demonstration will be held in Vaclav Square on Monday at 1600 hours as a mark of protest against the fact that "the leading role of the CPCZ has been eliminated only on paper." A general strike is planned for 11 December.

New Czech SR Government Named

LD0512212389 Moscow TASS in English 1921 GMT
5 Dec 89

[Text] Prague December 5 TASS—Responding to the proposal by Frantisek Pitra, chairman of the government of the Czech Socialist Republic, the Presidium of the Czech National Assembly appointed new members of the republican government. They included seven representatives of the Czech Communist Party, nine of the Socialist and Popular Parties and some non-party people.

The appointments took into account the opinions of political parties and public organizations, as well as the demands of the opposition movement "The Citizens' Forum".

CSSR's Urbanek, Adamec Meet With Opposition

LD0712012289 Moscow TASS in English 0002 GMT
7 Dec 89

[Text] Prague December 7 TASS—By TASS correspondents Valeriy Rzhnevskiy and Vitaliy Yaroshevskiy:

After an upsurge of political passions on Monday, caused by the formation of a new federal government, the situation in Czechoslovakia is returning back to normal.

During the formation of the new republican government in the Czech Republic, proposals and wishes of the public organizations, political parties and the Citizens' Forum movement were taken into account.

The coalition government of the Czech Republic consists of eight communists, including the head of government, two representatives from the socialist and two representatives from the popular party, and five non-party people.

Nevertheless, immediately after the new administration was formed, the Czechoslovak Popular Party issued a statement disagreeing with the composition of the new government. The statement was supported by the Citizens' Forum. To put it in a nutshell, they demanded that half of the government should consist of non-party people, and the other part of representatives of political parties.

Meanwhile, head of the federal government Ladislav Adamec began consultations with representatives of the

leading political forces, including the leaders of the Citizens' Forum to discuss additions to the country's chief executive body.

The upcoming extraordinary congress of the Czechoslovak Communist Party will soon discuss the issues of vital importance for the party. It is scheduled for the last ten days in December. Delegates will be elected at district conferences. In response to the demand from the grassroots organizations, the Communist Party decided to waive the delegation of Communists to the congress by the regional conferences.

J. Siroki, in charge of a Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee department, told a news conference that people who are to blame for the crisis will be called to task. In spite of the grave situation, the Communist Party has not lost its workability.

After November 17 nearly 5,000 people left the party. At the same time nearly 1,000 people applied for membership.

The official news agency CTK reported that General Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee Karel Urbanek met on Wednesday leader of the Citizens' Forum movement Vaclav Havel. This was their first meeting.

CSSR Strike, Protests 'Exceptionally Calm'

PM0712104789 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN
in Russian 7 Dec 89 p 4

[Dispatch by own correspondent S. Pomerantsev under the rubric "Czechoslovak Reportage": "Crisis for Society or Historical Turning Point?"]

[Excerpts] Prague, 6 Dec—Czechoslovakia has not experienced such tempestuous and drastic events since August 1968 of sorry memory. Over the past 3 weeks there has not been a single day when the "heart of Europe," as its inhabitants affectionately call their country, has not been beating quickly and excitedly. [passage omitted]

In the country and abroad the events of this fall in Czechoslovakia are often called a social crisis. Academician V. Komarek, a scientist respected by many people and director of the institute of forecasting, explains in the press: "The crisis did not arise suddenly, it was manifested and aggravated over the years. And now society has come to a historical turning point which opens up the opportunity for a real way out of the chronic crisis in politics, the economy, and morality."

At this time of breakthrough the Czechoslovak people are demonstrating their high standard of political struggle. On the streets you can often see lighted candles—symbols of the rejection of violence. The appeals saying "don't break the glass windows!" hung up in the windows of some stores have proved unnecessary. The

27 November general strike took place in an exceptionally calm and organized manner. At a number of enterprises with a continuous production cycle the working people took part in it symbolically, without stopping work. At others they undertook to make good after hours the losses from the production stoppage.

But alongside its political culture, society is firmly demonstrating its adherence to democracy and freedoms that have not been driven into the narrow confines of someone's unrealistic ideas. What next? The new meeting of 150,000 people on Wenceslas Square in Prague on Monday under the slogans of the revision of the proposed new CSSR Government, the resignation of G. Husak from the post of the republic's president, and the holding of free elections next year showed that despite the satisfaction of a number of demands people remain dissatisfied with the excessively slow pace of political renewal.

The real possibility of a new general strike early next week remains in the country.

Prague 4 December Demonstration Reported

PM0612115389 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
6 Dec 89 Morning Edition p 4

[Own correspondent L. Kornilov dispatch: "CSSR: Square Sets the Tone"]

[Text] Prague—As representatives of "Civic Forum" promised the day before, a demonstration was held once again 4 December at 1600 hours on Wenceslas Square in Prague. Ice and smoggy fog did not prevent almost 300,000 people from coming and standing there for more than an hour, chanting slogans and brandishing national flags.

The speeches from the balcony of the Melantrich Publishing House voiced a resolute protest against the proclaimed composition of the federal government and demands for the immediate implementation of further changes and for young, honest, and knowledgeable people to be brought into the government. "Further changes must be made to the government before Sunday," "Civic Forum" representatives said, "otherwise there will be another strike. Free elections must be held no later than next July. We are in favor of increasing democracy in our country, but neo-Stalinists in the Czechoslovak Communist Party [CPCZ] want to gradually return us to the outmoded system..."

The square chanted: "Resign!" and "General Strike!" To cries of "Punish Them!" demands were heard for those people who "betrayed Czechoslovakia in 1968" (a reference to the people who "invited" five states' troops into the CSSR) to be punished. The rally ended with the singing of the CSSR national anthem. According to the announcement from the chairman [vedushchiy], Karel Gott and Karel Kryl (a famous Czechoslovak singer, now an emigre) started the singing and the whole square joined in.

Some people may think that your correspondent is covering the rally in a onesided manner. Not at all, I believe, for no one heard or saw slogans there in support of the new government or speeches or banners with the positions of the government itself or the CPCZ. Was this the result of actions by the organizers who failed to invite Communists or did not grant them the floor? I do not know. But facts are facts.

Some 11 of the Czech Socialist Republic's 14 ministers have resigned. F. Pitra, head of the government, has drafted proposals regarding the new composition of the Czech Cabinet, which, according to him, is being changed radically. This will be a broad coalition government.

What stories did the newspapers carry on the morning of 5 December? The statement signed in Moscow by leaders of the five Warsaw Pact states assessing the advance of allied troops into Czechoslovakia in August 1968 along with the Soviet Government statement on the same subject were published in a prominent place. RUDE PRAVO is continuing to print the opinion of Communists and nonparty people on the draft CPCZ action program "In Favor of a Democratic Socialist Society in the CSSR" and an extensive report has been published by the parliamentary commission investigating the inappropriate actions by the forces of law and order against the 17 November peaceful student demonstration, giving an overall assessment of the reasons behind the dramatic denouement. The course of events is set out in detail but specific culprits have not as yet been named.

Last, a kind of sensation: The first day that it became possible to travel abroad without any formalities, one was not conscious of the anticipated crush at the Czechoslovak-Austrian border. Numerous Western journalists who went there specially were disappointed. Why? People here believe there are difficulties with currency, Monday is a working day, and the number of people leaving will rise on Saturday and Sunday. That is quite likely but the reason may also be that Czechoslovak citizens want to witness and take part in events in their homeland these days.

Reportage on Visit by Bulgarian Leader Mladenov

News Conference on Gorbachev Talks Cited

PM0612122589 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
6 Dec 89 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Making Use of Experience"]

[Text] The conversations in Moscow were held in a spirit of comradeliness, cooperation, and friendship. They confirmed the two countries' common resolve to firmly follow the path of democracy, development, and renewal. This was stated by P. Mladenov, general secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party Central Committee and chairman of the Bulgarian State Council. On

5 December, after his meeting with M.S. Gorbachev, the guest addressed a press conference at the USSR Foreign Ministry.

Briefly informing journalists on its content, P. Mladenov stressed that Soviet experience of perestroika is of great significance for Bulgaria because the changes taking place in our countries are of the same type. However, it is essential here to bear in mind that, unlike the Soviet Union, Bulgaria is a small state.

Speaking about the concept of perestroika, Mladenov noted that there are several approaches to implementing it. Some consider it essential to give priority to the economy, others to the political system. For us it is important, he stressed, that perestroika in the USSR is taking place in all spheres, and we would like to follow precisely that path.

Speaking about the prospects for cooperation, P. Mladenov voiced his conviction that they have a fine future ahead. Such a conclusion, he observed, can be drawn from our talks with M.S. Gorbachev. Bulgaria and the USSR are resolved to develop them in all spheres—politics, the economy, trade, and the spiritual sphere. As far as reserves are concerned, particularly in the sphere of the economy, it is clear that new forms of cooperation must be created and direct ties and relations with individual Soviet republics developed. Much also remains to be done in the sphere of science, culture, and tourism, P. Mladenov stressed in conclusion.

Seen Off by Yakovlev 5 Dec

PM0612122989 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
6 Dec 89 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report under the general heading "Official Reports"]

[Text] P. Mladenov, general secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party Central Committee and chairman of the Bulgarian State Council, left Moscow on 5 December. He had been in our country on a working visit at the CPSU Central Committee's invitation.

He was seen off at the airport by A.N. Yakovlev, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee; R.P. Fedorov, first deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee International Department; and other officials.

G. Pankov, Bulgarian ambassador to the USSR, was among the sendoff party.

Polish Spokesman on German Reunification

LD0612094289 Moscow TASS in English 0810 GMT
6 Dec 89

[Text] Warsaw December 6 TASS—The Polish president and government, all senior politicians and public forces of the country have repeatedly stated that any discussion of the future of Germany should above all take into

account the guarantees of security of Germany's neighbours and the whole of Europe, the Polish president's spokesman stressed in a statement made here.

This is reaffirmed by numerous pronouncements by leaders and representatives of other states.

Poland expresses sympathy and support for new thinking in all its manifestations and firmly and unequivocally favours conscious respect for mandatory international treaties and agreements, the statement said.

Poland cannot be indifferent to the events in both German states, particularly to the recently formulated reunification plans, the statement stressed.

Poland has the historical, moral and political right to express its stand on the problem, very important to the future of Poland and the whole of Europe. Military equilibrium is the condition for stability and security in Europe.

The violation of its basic principles would sharply contradict the sense of security, the spirit and the letter of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Poland will never agree with the revanchist declaration that the Polish-German frontier remains "an open question." The Odra and the Nysa Luzyczna frontier is inviolable and final, the Polish president's spokesman said.

Sejm Debate on Constitutional Changes Cited

PM0612150389 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 2 Dec 89 First Edition p 3

[Unattributed report: "Poland. Debates in the Sejm"]

[Text] In Warsaw the session of the Polish Sejm is continuing its work, discussing the question of reexamining Article 3 of the Polish Constitution, which concerns the leading role of the Polish United Workers' Party [PZPR] and the previous coalition of allied parties comprising the PZPR, the United Peasant Party [ZSL], and the Democratic Party [SD].

PZPR Deputy J. Bogusz put forward a proposal to change the provisions in the Constitution in view of the fact that they no longer correspond to the sociopolitical changes that have been taking place recently in the country. He stressed that in the opinion of the PZPR Deputies Club, there is no need to set down the place, role, and links of individual political parties in the Constitution. Questions of this type must depend exclusively on the will of the people, expressed in the process of free, democratic elections.

On behalf of the Citizens' Parliamentary Club "Revival", which incorporates parliamentarians from "Solidarity" as well as the SD and ZSL deputies' clubs, an alternative draft document was submitted which

proposes that Article 3, on the leading role of the PZPR, should be left out altogether.

The Sejm adopted a decision to submit both drafts for examination by the appropriate commissions, which will study them and propose a final version of the document.

The SD Deputies Club proposed that the article of the Constitution on the name of the state be changed, omitting the word "People's," and also that the national emblem revert to the prewar version, with the crown replaced on the head of the white eagle—the country's national symbol. The argument used to justify this was that, according to opinion poll figures, the overwhelming majority of Poles support such changes.

Soviet Leadership Blamed for Split With Albania

*PM0612142589 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 28 Nov 89 First Edition p 3*

[Doctor of Historical Sciences N. Smirnova article: "We Fought Together: On the 45th Anniversary of Albania's Liberation"]

[Excerpts] On 29 November 1944, the 2d Shock Division of the Albanian National Liberation Army drove the fascist German invaders from the town of Shkoder—their last stronghold in northern Albania. The national flag—the two-headed black eagle on a red field—was hoisted over the Rozafat [name as transliterated] fortress, which towered above the city. Liberation was complete.

The transitional democratic government had entered Tirana from the south of the country the day before. Addressing a large rally, Enver Hoxha, chairman of the Council of Ministers and commander in chief of the National Liberation Army, congratulated the Albanian people on the victory won in the bloody war. At the same time, he noted that Soviet people had borne the main burden in the struggle against fascism. "The Red Army's brilliant victories were also our victories and the victories of the whole world," he said, "because they were the main factor in routing Nazism. Thanks to those victories, the struggle of the enslaved peoples was accelerated. The Red Army's victories brought nearer this day, the day that we are celebrating. And our people express their boundless gratitude to the heroic peoples of the Soviet Union and the glorious Red Army." [passage omitted]

It is well known that Soviet-Albanian relations were broken off in 1961 on the arbitrary decision of the then Soviet leadership. Military ties were also ended. In the years after that a negative attitude to the Soviet Union was actively inculcated in Albanians' consciousness. Despite that fact, however, the people have retained the highest regard for the Red Army's role in liberating Europe and Albania from fascism.

Marshal G.K. Zhukov's reminiscences contain an item relating to Albania which perhaps did not appear in his book or the movie for that reason. Here is what it says:

"...I loved the country, the people, and the army... I felt as though I was among brothers—although thousands of kilometers apart from one another we and the Albanians were fighting for freedom, a new life, and socialism."

West Europe

Gorbachev, Mitterrand Confer in Kiev

Gorbachev, Shevardnadze Arrive

*LD0612133989 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1300 GMT 6 Dec 89*

[Text] Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, arrived in Kiev today. By agreement with President Francois Mitterrand of France, there will be a working meeting here to exchange opinions on developments in the international and European situations. Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR minister of foreign affairs, arrived together with Comrade Gorbachev.

Hold Working Meeting

*LD0612195189 Moscow TASS in English 1926 GMT
6 Dec 89*

[Text] Kiev December 6 TASS—Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and President Francois Mitterrand of France had a working meeting here today.

It continued a traditional Soviet-French dialogue which has become particularly intensive of late.

The two leaders who have long been acquainted and understand each other well had a substantive exchange of opinions.

They discussed conceptual problems connected with the rapidly changing world situation.

Both sides noted that these changes require intensive thinking and appropriate adjustment of policies.

The two leaders exchanged information on specific aspects of the foreign policy activities of the two countries.

Gorbachev spoke of the results of his Malta meeting with U.S. President George Bush. Both leaders expressed their satisfaction with progress in Soviet-American relations.

Much attention was, naturally, given to the evolution in European affairs.

Gorbachev and Mitterrand believe that the dynamism of this evolution requires the intensification of the dialogue and the interaction of countries participating in the European process, certainly of the Soviet Union and France, the relations of which are marked by mutual understanding and concord.

President Mitterrand told Gorbachev of the intentions of the member-countries of the European Communities to deepen contacts and ties between countries of Eastern and Western Europe, about plans to create institutions, specifically, a bank that would promote this process.

Gorbachev showed a keen interest in these plans.

Both sides expressed the confidence about the need of priority development of European cooperation on the basis of principles formulated in the Final Act of the Helsinki conference.

Gorbachev and Mitterrand agreed to maintain permanent contacts and decided on new directions of the constructive development of Soviet-French relations.

Kiev Activities Detailed

LD0612223789 Moscow TASS in English 2151 GMT
6 Dec 89

[Excerpts] Kiev December 7 TASS—By TASS special correspondent Boris Zverev:

A brief working meeting between Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and French President Francois Mitterrand was held in Kiev on Wednesday.

The meeting was part of the traditional Soviet-French dialogue that has grown especially intensive lately.

The leaders of the two countries met at the Borispol Airport and then rode to the Mariinskiy Palace in the heart of Kiev for talks.

En route to the palace they stopped at the Kiev-Pechersk Lavra (monastery of the caves), where the first Russian cave monastery was founded in 1051, and were shown around the world famous Cathedral of Saint Sophia, a monument of architecture, history and monumental painting erected in the first half of the 11th Century.

After that, Gorbachev and Mitterrand went to the Mariinskiy Palace. The interlocutors who have known each other for a long time and have learned to understand each other well, Gorbachev and Mitterrand discussed in-depth conceptual problems connected with the rapidly changing world situation. The sides noted that these changes call for intensive thinking over and respective modifications of the policy. [passage omitted]

After their talks, Gorbachev and Mitterrand held a joint news conference followed by a dinner Gorbachev gave in honour of the French president.

The programme of their meeting completed, Gorbachev and Mitterrand left Kiev.

Hold News Conference

LD0712140689 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1710 GMT 6 Dec 89

[Joint press conference by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and French President Francois Mitterrand in Kiev; Mitterrand speaks in French with superimposed Russian translation—live]

[Excerpts] [Gorbachev] Esteemed ladies and gentlemen, The president of France, Francois Mitterrand, and I arranged this meeting, and you were made aware of it. Now that it has taken place, we have something to tell you and our peoples. Above all, this is a continuation of the French dialogue which in the past few years has been proceeding very dynamically, being packed full of content. And it seemed to us that at this time of great changes, major events taking place in the world, in Europe, in the Soviet Union, in Eastern Europe, and in the Western European countries, it was necessary for us to meet without waiting for official visits.

I have said, and after this meeting I want to reiterate, that the Soviet-French dialogue is a major political quantity. When speaking of Soviet-French relations, we always stress not only their importance but also their privileged nature for us. We also value the fact that we are hearing this very same thing from France and the president of France. It was natural that we should meet again at this time.

We did not waste any time on formalities, and a wide-ranging conversation, which embraced key questions of present-day politics, took place both between us and the ministers of foreign affairs. We naturally devoted part of our meeting to my briefing the president on my unofficial meeting in Malta with the President of the United States of America, George Bush. We both arrived at the conclusion that this was important, not only from the point of view of ensuring the continuity of Soviet-American relations, but also from the point of view of world politics. I told the president of France that we are satisfied with the results of this meeting and that we are fully justified in designating it a major international event, which fits organically in the dynamic dialogue between East and West that is under way, taking into account the challenge of the time and the need to impart to the foreign political process a flow that is adequate to meet this present situation.

I already happened to speak on my own account—more correctly, to give a more detailed briefing on this meeting, and I would only like to stress that the president and I, while discussing other matters, deemed it necessary to stress something that was stated both publicly and in our previous conversations from both sides—that we regard the participation by the United States of America in European building at the new stage as an important and indispensable element of this process.

But nevertheless, we, of course, devoted most of the talks to Europe. I, for my part, note that this meeting of ours

was marked by a more in-depth analysis of the roots of the processes and changes taking place in Eastern and Western Europe and in the Soviet Union. The president and I had a thorough discussion of these questions.

We once again—because also prior to this the president and I had exchanges by letter and telephone conversations on these questions—observed as a result of an in-depth exchange that the general thrust of these changes is such that we can count on an improvement in the climate in Europe, on an improvement in relations between the countries and peoples of the whole of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, and that in the final analysis in general terms this meets the interests of all countries.

It seems to me—perhaps I am mistaken, it would be interesting for me also to hear the president's point of view—that we are not being excessively ambitious when we say that at the present stage of Europe building Soviet-French dialogue is assuming an even greater importance.

The last thing I would like to say: We were united in believing that everything taking place now on the European Continent is of fateful significance both for the peoples living on this continent and for the whole of world politics.

Maybe at this stage of the development and changes taking place in European countries we can legitimately speak now of the pioneering, questing activities on this continent, activities which should broadly open up the door leading to a new stage of development not only of Europe, but also the world, a stage which we would like to see as long and peaceful. I would like to thank Mr. President for the mutual understanding that was always present in our conversations, for the substantive nature of our dialogue, for the constructive approach during the examination of all the issues we discussed. In the person of Mr. Mitterrand, president of France, I value a partner, a political figure with whom we have succeeded—at least up until now, the current meeting included—to continue the quest and continue addressing, in the most open manner, in an atmosphere of respect and trust, the questions posed for France and the Soviet Union, for our peoples and governments, for all peoples by the present tumultuous, watershed period our civilization is going through. Thank you. I ask the president to take the floor.

[Mitterrand] [Passage omitted on Mitterrand thanking Gorbachev for his hospitality, expressing pleasure with the talks, and evaluating Soviet-French relations as very fruitful and good.]

[Gorbachev] Well, now let us go over to questions. I hope we will be combining our functions with that of press attache. Please.

[(Saliba), in French with superimposed Russian translation] ('Aziz Saliba), correspondent of the Lebanese magazine AL-NIDA'. The question for the two esteemed presidents, Gorbachev and Mitterrand, is: We know that

the Soviet Union and France have supported the Al-Ta'if accord. In this case, how do you see a possible way out of the Lebanon situation in conditions in which General 'Awn refuses to recognize the new president; when he, in fact, has engineered a break and has occupied the Presidential Palace?

[Mitterrand] [Passage omitted: Account of France's efforts to find a solution to the Lebanese conflict and its view of the Lebanese problem in general.]

[Gorbachev] On my part, I would like to make only a brief response to this question. Well, first and foremost, I wish to say that this question makes it possible for me and President Mitterrand alike to state that France and the Soviet Union constantly cooperate in the search for ways to solve the Lebanese conflict. We share a common view here. Our sympathy goes to the Lebanese people, and this sympathy of ours is transformed in support of its just demand for the preservation of Lebanon's integrity. The president and myself have a positive attitude toward the initiative of the three. Both President Mitterrand and I have received representatives of those three countries. In my turn, I would like to say that the Soviet Union is using its possibilities, and fairly actively, to have a positive influence on a solution to this conflict on the basis of the proposals made by those three countries.

We are actively maintaining a dialogue with President Al-Asad and other Arab and European countries which in one way or another are involved in untangling this very acute situation. Shortly before leaving for Kiev—and I hope that perhaps...[changes thought] maybe President Mitterrand is not aware of that—I received a message from Lebanon's current president, [word indistinct]. He asked us once again to discuss the situation, and (?asked) us for help and support for the just cause of the Lebanese people.

I can give an assurance that in this sense both the Soviet Union and France are unanimous and will do everything, employing all their possibilities. Yes, we continue to support the just, thoughtful, and as it seems to us, realistic initiative put forward by the three states. We recognize the legitimate nature of the present government, and we hope that, in the final analysis, positive solutions will be found, despite the whole acuteness. We are categorically against this degenerating into a civil war. This would aggravate the whole problem even more, and would bring new sufferings to this people, who have already suffered much. We have agreed with the president, and our ministers, too, that we will continue consultations and will maintain permanent consultations on this issue.

Next question, please.

[Unidentified reporter, in Russian] A question from THE FINANCIAL TIMES: Could I ask you to answer whether today you discussed the question, particularly the question of Germany's reunification? Were you able to reach some sort of common ground on how the remaining part of Europe should view the question of a

common Germany? Are there any differences between France and the Soviet Union on this question?

[Gorbachev] Probably this time I will start, so that we make our moves in turns. This question was discussed within the context of an examination of problems connected with the development of the situation in Europe, Eastern Europe included. We discussed it in a substantive manner; I hope Mr Mitterrand will concur. We looked at all the processes taking place in all Eastern European countries as, above all, a part of those deep changes that have seized the world and Europe, including Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. From this viewpoint, one can speak of differences, of the specific forms in which these changes are taking place, but one must also speak of their general thrust toward greater democratization and openness in these societies, the creation of such structures as would perceive and implement the interests, moods, and aspirations of the people.

What is important is the fact that this is also being accompanied by the fact that people in all these countries and in the West of our European Continent are concerned about Europe's future and insistently come out in support of what we now call the new thinking. Its scope presupposes arriving at new forms of cooperation, a strengthening of peoples' security, the consolidation of peace on the continent, ridding the continent of the arms with which it is full to overflowing, and tackling numerous questions of economic and ecological cooperation, of cultural exchanges, and so forth. This is the first thing. Thus, we are of the view that from the viewpoint of both internal developments and external conditions, the thrust of these changes inspires one with hope. This is the first thing, and it is important to perceive it.

We proceed from the fact that it is every people's right to be free to choose, that they have a right to tackle their internal affairs in an independent manner and in their own interests, but naturally this touches on the interests of all countries. As for [changes thought] this pertains to the GDR, too, as a matter of principle, but in connection with this, there arises and did realistically arise the question that all of us have in our field of vision today—politicians, the public, the press—the reunification question.

Over the past days, I have had occasion to speak on this score repeatedly. Hence, it is difficult for me to refrain from repeating myself, since my position does not change. If I changed my position every day, perhaps it would be possible to avoid repetition, but I was compelled to repeat myself so as to say yet again that we are of the view that at present we ought to proceed from the fact that the new stage of changes in the world is unfolding on the basis of achievements and realities that emerged following the war and which are enshrined in political agreements and within the framework of the Helsinki process. We deal with two German states that are sovereign UN members, and this presupposes...and we are of the view that...and this... [changes thought] the

changes taking place now do not change the situation in such a way that we would cancel these established realities today.

There really is a problem; it can now evidently be better crystallized: The problem of reunification. We view this issue the same as I have already stated on numerous occasions. The current reality is the reality of certain historical events, certain historical processes on our continent, and history should see to the nature of the fate of the future of this continent. Taking into account the fact that I began my response with precisely this, that profound and fundamental changes are occurring on the Continent of Europe and included in this is Eastern Europe, we are speaking about reassuring prospects for the new stage of the development of the European process and the construction of a common European home. Precisely within the framework of the development and formation of a new Europe, the development of new relations on the European Continent, it should occur and we must also receive an answer to the question that you asked; this is precisely how we imagine it.

Any artificial urging on of this issue could only complicate all these positive processes that have unfolded on the European Continent and which we welcome. We hope that as a result of these changes we will move towards a better world, to better relations, to a new Europe where all the people, all the states from the Atlantic to the Urals, will feel like partners with equal rights, cooperating and exchanging their achievements. Precisely within the context of the European process we believe we should gain answers about the forms and how it will occur and how the problems of the reunification of the two states will be resolved. I do not believe that this issue is topical today, as this would introduce elements not justified by anything at all. We would create a situation that could complicate the whole European process and the very problem of interrelations between the two German states. This is my answer to this question.

[Mitterrand] I remind you that France is an ally and friend of the Federal Republic of Germany. These are provisions that were precisely defined in the Elysee Treaty [as heard] signed by Chancellor Adenauer and President De Gaulle. That was a text that was naturally adopted in keeping with the situation at the time, and it took into account the military situation. Taking into account the [word indistinct], it is obvious that France which regards itself, [changes thought] which is a friend of the FRG, cannot regard in an unbiased manner everything that concerns the German people—taking into account that France itself was divided, and it is not so long ago that it was divided. It happened within the memory of my generation. Therefore, we very well remember what it means to experience a drama of that type.

But the question is being posed quite specifically. I defined that more precisely several weeks ago. There can only be democratic changes, there can only be changes of

a peaceful type. When talking about democratic changes, we have in mind those conditions whereby both Germans will talk about the issue, in peaceful conditions naturally. Not one of the European countries—especially when it is a question of a (?meeting) of the relevant countries among them, when they are in practice disposed in the corresponding manner—not one of the European countries can act without paying attention to the European chambers, without taking into account the opinion of others, without taking into account the historical situation that we are living through and that we inherited from World War II. I think that there is no need to change places and no need to pose the question of borders first and foremost. There is a great deal to do. Here is an example.

From the point of view of the Western side, the most pressing issue is that of strengthening the structures of the community. It is necessary especially that the European alliance have genuine content imparted to it, as was the question in Stuttgart a few years ago. I think this will already create a new element in the real situation existing in Europe.

Let us look at what is happening in the East. Considerable changes are taking place there. Many will say that they are indeed considerable. Let us see what is happening there. Let us exclude possible interference from without. Let us leave the peoples, these states, to determine their position for themselves in the European balance, in the European balance in its present situation. Let that which was already agreed from the start develop between the East and the West. Let there be a frank dialogue, let agreements be concluded, treaties between all the European countries, both in the East and the West, where the need arises for meetings of representatives of the (?EEC) in 1990.

This is consistency from the viewpoint of the various, important factors. I hope this situation will gain a necessary foundation and that there will not be a striving to divide, to somehow fragment Europe, that there will not be a situation like that which existed on the eve of 1914, which did not lead to anything good, a situation which on the contrary might simply frighten people off. I think that if everything is done consistently, then all the elements will fall into the right place and those well-informed journalists who are here will probably find in our explanations those points of coincidence that can exist between France and the Soviet Union.

[Passage omitted: APN correspondent asks Mitterrand and Gorbachev whether they consider that after the Kiev meeting the idea of convening a second Helsinki meeting in 1990 is materializing, and how this affects the all-European process and the Vienna arms talks. Mitterrand states that France is in favor of the Helsinki forum and that the United States and Canada should be a party to it since their troops are stationed in Europe. He says Europeans should cooperate now that the frontiers are easier to cross, but those frontiers must remain inviolable. Mitterrand says it is necessary to settle all unsettled

matters in Europe. This can only serve to improve East-West relations. Quantities of arms must be reduced, Mitterrand says.]

[Gorbachev] Since I have already touched on the general part, I will endeavor to give an answer that is closer to your question. Is Helsinki-2 closer following Kiev? Yes, if we are talking of the position of the Soviet Union and France. Mr. President and I are of the view—and we noted this during this meeting—that we have approached the necessity of having a broad meeting within the Helsinki process, one that can be called Helsinki-2, so as to be able to come closer to an understanding of the necessity of such a meeting in view of the rapidly moving processes on the Continent of Europe. Since these processes and the deep changes have posed many problems, including the question of what we are to do with the institutions and structures that had taken shape earlier during the first stage of the Helsinki process that is now in force, and the question of what new structures and forms of cooperation we ought to arrive at in the future, within the framework of constructing an all-European home—all these are major positions. [sentence as heard] More than that, we could make signing a Vienna Treaty that will be agreed upon and prepared in Vienna a part, a specific part of the Helsinki-2 meeting.

President Bush and I established in Malta that it is possible to sign this treaty today. We emphasized this, we emphasized this coincidence of viewpoint on this score with President Mitterrand, too. So, since we are talking of states here such as the Soviet Union and France, then, following the fact that this meeting brought to light not only our common position, one that coincides, but also a desire to act in this direction, we can say that Helsinki-2 is closer. It is another matter by how many meters, kilometers, 1 month, 2, half a year—this, as it were, is a different question. Please go ahead. You are from that country. [several voices heard, but before correspondent Gorbachev spoke to can take the floor, Mitterrand's interpreter is heard asking to speak for Mitterrand]

[Mitterrand] It is necessary to correctly emphasize these questions and reply, taking into account aspects of Chancellor Kohl's plan. Chancellor Kohl told me and others that there is no schedule attached to these proposals—no specific time schedule—that is, he does not envisage that any kind of stages of changes will be agreed on officially, thereby refraining from exerting pressure on the situation. [Passage omitted: Mitterrand replies to APN correspondent's question, saying it would be a good thing to have a meeting along the lines of Helsinki-2 in 1990.]

[Yuriy Romantsov] Yuriy Romantsov, TASS agency [words indistinct] Recently, Mr President, you proposed that the European Community be convened in Strasbourg to jointly examine questions of interaction with the countries of Eastern Europe, including, as I understand it, the Soviet Union. How do you imagine tangible implementation of such interaction? Thank you.

[Mitterrand] You know, you want me to speak in the name of the Community. We have another 3 weeks left of Presidency of the Community, but I shall give the same answer in the name of France. I am sure that the events in the East and the changes occurring there must evince a corresponding response from the West, understanding by the West, and a corresponding juxtaposition of structure, their strengthening. So from this viewpoint it is necessary to make this more precise. As far as interaction between East and West in Strasbourg is concerned, there are already many peoples and countries who meet in Strasbourg. If I am not mistaken, there are, I think, 23 states in the Council of Europe. Why can there not be more? Why not organize some kind of working conferences with the participation of Eastern countries if they would like this? And during France's presidency, during France's chairmanship, a kind of treaty has just been concluded with Mr Shevardnadze during the course of this round. I think that this was perceived positively—I mean that interaction is possible between the Soviet Union and the Community. You see that this works and functions well. The project of the European Development Bank—my proposal of 18 November in Paris during the common meeting—will be presented precisely and in detail the day after tomorrow in Strasbourg to all of the European countries and I hope very much that this will be crowned with success. This envisages not only the participation of the twelve Community countries, but also the participation of those countries that will interact within the framework of the bank. That is, these countries will take part, and they will not just be subject to some decisions. If the Soviet Union decides to participate, it will participate there like any other country that makes a decision about this. I think everything is quite obvious here. It was simply not necessary to extend the authority of the European Bank and its jurisdiction, which has its own status and own rules. Its participation and efforts in this direction should have been extended. I think this is fully in keeping with those measures and agreements reached between Shevardnadze and Dumas.

[Unidentified reporter, in Russian] Is the historical link between France and the Ukraine the only reason Kiev was chosen for your joint meeting? Or does the fact that Kiev was chosen indicate the role of the Ukraine in the all-European process?

[Gorbachev] You are putting that question to both of us jointly? I'll elaborate on that now. It will now be my turn to be the first to speak. You've probably noticed how full of events in world politics recent days have been. Here the movements have been big ones—movements towards one another, and other kinds. You will have noticed that we have engaged in meetings. I met President Bush in Malta. President Mitterrand and I agreed, as quickly as possible, in a telephone conversation; we decided to meet, and that it should happen halfway, as it were. I suggested to the president that he choose a town that he liked. He was pleased to immediately choose Kiev, without any hesitation. We welcomed his interest,

just as the president's and my own joint choice was also welcomed, I know, by the government and the people of the Ukraine. [Gorbachev to Mitterrand] They're asking you to say something too.

[Mitterrand] [Passage omitted: Mitterrand says the choice for him was determined by the fact that the wife of Henri I of France was the daughter of Yaroslav the Wise in the 11th century. This was a shrewd move by Yaroslav, who clearly was very wise: He was already thinking of the common European home! The choice of Kiev was a purely sentimental one, not determined by any political motives. We are the guests, Mitterrand says, not only of Mr Gorbachev, but also of the Ukrainian authorities.]

[Unidentified correspondent, with superimposed translation in Russian] Mr President, a month ago you visited Czechoslovakia. I would like to know whether you were able to foresee those changes that have occurred since then. How do you see this context—of the changes in Czechoslovakia?

[Mitterrand] Of course, I do not want to speak as someone who can foresee everything, especially rapid changes, but when I was in Prague I said to my friends in the delegation who were with me: You know, this will not hold for long. I will not talk about what I meant in particular. You know, this turned out to be quite correct. Perhaps there is no particular wisdom in this. Having said this, what else would I like to add? Could I foresee the further development after all of this? I think that here it is necessary to follow the logic that dictates greater democratization and the aspirations that are striving towards freedom. I think that first and foremost the question will be resolved between the Czechs themselves. There are many people there who, of course, are attached to what has determined their history over the last half century and there are others who think differently. But an abrupt change has taken place. Who could really foresee this? But I think that Czechoslovakia is heading towards genuine democratic expression and I welcome this. Sir, please your question...

[Unidentified reporter, in French with superimposed Russian translation] You have just spoken about this abrupt change, about a leap forward, that what is happening was really not a foreseeable event, in particular in the GDR. I would like to know from Mr. Gorbachev, can abrupt changes, in particular in the GDR, be permissible? In what way...

[Mitterrand] You know, if we talk about abrupt changes, the president says I think that there should be no attempts to stop the movement that is taking place. I will not foretell the outcome of the situation, but what is happening now, the evolutionary process, an infectious process as it seems to me [changes thought] although at the same time, the process does not set the question in a European dimension, for this is taking place in the framework of sovereign states and beyond any sort of possibility of external interference. For this reason, we

are interested in and passionate about the events, but we are observers. Whatever these profound changes may be, I think Europe should not be touched. In speaking about the GDR, you address yourself directly to Mr. Gorbachev concerning these abrupt changes.

[Gorbachev] This is how I would answer this question. Everything that is taking place—here I repeat myself, but it is necessary—is natural and has been prepared by the very course of events. The specific forms in which this takes place depends on a great deal. Above all, I think, it is connected with the extent of the timeliness or untimeliness of the reaction of political structures to the requirements and problems that have come to a head.

On this score we in the Soviet Union already have a great deal of experience. Where we are late, where we do not see in good time that specific problems are coming to a head, where we do not grasp things in time, where we fail to put forward adequate political solutions—there the course of the process acquires a painful nature. At times it is also accompanied by emotions and acute forms.

I think that when we speak of the GDR, one must bear in mind that it is one of the East European states in which during the postwar period a great deal of work has been done. In that country, which has little by way of its own resources, the people, the German workers, peasants, the intelligentsia have done a great deal and the GDR, as far as its socioeconomic indicators are concerned, is among the first ten of the world's developed states. It is an achievement of that state and of the people there; it is a demonstration of the potential inherent in that system established there.

But there is nothing as dangerous as adherence to certain forms, regardless of the passage of time and the requirements placed on any organism, including the social organism. In this case, I think—I hope I will be correctly understood—I am simply voicing my own viewpoint. I do not wish to decide this for the German people, for German political circles; it is within their responsibility. But, as Mr. President has said, we all see, observe, analyze, reflect, and this is quite understandable—it is in our Europe, it is by our side.

When we speak of the GDR, they are our friends with whom we have traversed a complex path. I think that what has been done on that soil represents the fruits of this cooperation. All that is close to us. We perceive everything closely and we want these changes to be successful and a breakthrough to new horizons. I think this authorizes me to be somewhat more specific about what Mr. President has said on this question.

It appears that, to a degree, the time for responding adequately and at a political level to what was already knocking at the door has been lost. Now it has happened. Quantitative accumulations have resulted in qualitative, so to speak, changes, and this is taking the forms that are in evidence. Let us wish success to the people of the

GDR in solving the tasks that time has confronted it with and that it has tackled so resolutely. Next question, please.

[(Zerel), in French with superimposed Russian translation] (Marianne Zerel), Swiss Television and Radio. Mr Gorbachev, what is your view of the East European Bank and how are you going to participate in it?

[Gorbachev] We discussed this subject with the president, and the president had previously voiced this idea, which has taken shape in the European Community. In principle, we in the Soviet Government respond positively to this idea and maybe—I even told the president today—this is one of the instruments of a united and common Europe, the self-same all-European home. We already need new mechanisms for serving the construction of the all-European home. So, from this point of view, my attitude to that would be a positive one. But naturally, we in the Soviet Union need concrete details for continuing and deepening this exchange of views, but I hope that this idea will be implemented.

Gentlemen, we have talked for over an hour. Regrettably, we cannot carry on with our press conference any longer. We still have some protocol matters on the agenda, and we are also returning today to the capitals of our respective states. I would like to thank you for active and constructive participation in this meeting, and if the president wishes to say anything, he is welcome.

[Mitterrand] You know, in my view we have said everything in response to the questions that were put to us and on the topics that were touched upon. Mr Gorbachev and I did not intend to encompass everything fully in a global way, so forgive us for that. But as for the questions that were of interest to us, those that had us by the throat, so to speak, of course we worked on them here. I think that first and foremost one should guard oneself against things that can poison and complicate a situation which is complex enough. Personally, I have confidence in the German leaders. To have confidence means to speak honestly and openly, and to follow the response of both sides in order to implement our common policy, which we all need very much. Thank you, and I would like to thank President Gorbachev once again and all his colleagues who have enabled us to carry out this exchange of views today.

[Gorbachev] Goodbye.

Shevardnadze, French Foreign Minister Hold Talks
LD0612212589 Moscow TASS in English 2104 GMT
6 Dec 89

[Text] Kiev December 6 TASS—A conversation between Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and French Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Roland Dumas was held in Kiev today in the framework of the Gorbachev-Mitterrand working meeting.

Some specific questions of the evolution of the situation in both parts of Europe, of relations between them in the conditions of turbulent and profound changes were in the focus of the debate.

The sides expressed common understanding of the need to speed up the Vienna negotiations of the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments and give them a political impetus.

A vigorous pace and effectiveness of the negotiations would be promoted by a meeting of foreign ministers of the 35 countries, participants in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

Both sides expressed support for the idea of holding as early as in 1990 a conference of heads of state and government of European countries, the United States and Canada.

The importance of effective interaction between Eastern and Western Europe on a new basis was emphasised.

An agreement on trade and cooperation between the Soviet Union and the European Community, to be signed shortly, is called upon to play a considerable role in this.

Shevardnadze noted that France, which is now presiding over the European Communities, made a remarkable contribution to the drafting of the agreement.

During the discussion of the situation in Lebanon, special emphasis was made on the need for consistent effort to ensure that a peace process in Lebanon becomes stable and dynamic and leads to the implementation of the Al-Ta'if agreements.

The Soviet Union and France hold that at the present stage it is important to show broad international support for lawful Lebanese authorities.

Some aspects of the further development of Soviet-French relations, specifically, in the legal and commercial and economic areas, were also discussed.

Ties With France Major Factor in 'Stability'

*PM0712091989 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
7 Dec 89 Morning Edition p 5*

[Report by own correspondent Yu. Kovalenko: "USSR-France: Ahead of the Dialogue in Kiev"]

[Text] Paris—The French president's working visit to the Soviet Union on 6 December occupies a special place in the packed calendar of bilateral and multilateral top-level conferences that are virtually a daily occurrence as the year comes to an end. It is the fifth meeting since 1985 between M.S. Gorbachev and F. Mitterrand, who attach exceptional significance to personal contacts.

The meeting is necessitated, in the opinion of both sides, by the rapid changes in the world, associated above all with events in Eastern Europe. It is believed in the

French capital that the historic process of overcoming the split in Europe, ending the cold war, and making real progress in the disarmament sphere is gathering speed. A totally different system of mutual relations and new structures of cooperation is being created.

This process was given powerful momentum by the Soviet-American meeting in Malta. Even the normally skeptical Paris press described its results as "the advent of a new era."

Speaking the other day at a special session of the NATO Council in Brussels, Mitterrand said he supports the accord reached at the Soviet-American meeting on the need to accelerate the whole process of disarmament. France, the president noted, favors the speediest completion of the Vienna talks on conventional armaments and the Geneva talks on chemical weapons and welcomes the determination displayed in Malta by M.S. Gorbachev and G. Bush to conclude an agreement in 1990 on a 50-percent reduction of strategic offensive armaments.

Journalists were told in the Elysee Palace that M.S. Gorbachev and F. Mitterrand will consider, in addition to disarmament, the whole range of European problems, first and foremost the revolutionary transformations in Eastern Europe and the integration processes in Western Europe. The future of the entire European Community largely depends on the way relations develop with the socialist states, F. Mitterrand believes. The CSCE, which possesses the basic structures necessary for building the common European home, has an increasing role to play in these conditions. Paris, too, judging by the official reaction, is prepared to support the Soviet proposal on holding a Helsinki-II conference in 1990.

The French president, who wants to learn first-hand in Kiev about the course of perestroika in the Soviet Union, has consistently advocated support for democratic reforms in Eastern Europe. At the same time, a note of anxiety can be traced in his statements about whether the cause of perestroika, beset by manifold difficulties, will succeed.

It is possible that in Kiev, on the eve of the opening of the summit meeting of state and government heads of the 12 EEC countries, which takes place in Strasbourg in a few days, F. Mitterrand will set out the basic points of a Common Market "aid plan" for the socialist countries—granting credits, setting up a development and modernization bank, training specialists, and so on.

All the transformations taking place in Eastern Europe, F. Mitterrand noted, should be carried out by peaceful, democratic means, taking into account nations' right to self-determination, but without damaging stability in Europe. Neither does Paris question the borders established as a result of World War II. Judging by official statements, Paris is in no way seeking an accelerated solution of the German question and intends to avoid all possible obstacles in the way of West European building.

In the Ukrainian capital M.S. Gorbachev and F. Mitterrand will exchange opinions on the issue of regional conflicts and will discuss the situation in the Near East and Lebanon. The French president's latest initiative on the resumption of the Paris conference on Cambodia deserves to be singled out. "Only a global political settlement," he said, "can give Cambodia back its sovereignty and the people their identity and dignity, and protect them against all dangers associated with a return of the Khmer Rouge to power."

Whereas only recently, when analyzing Soviet-French relations, political observers tended to note a coincidence of positions on particular issues, today they are increasingly talking about possible collaboration between our two countries in solving key present-day problems. In the situation of unprecedented change in the East of the old continent, dialogue between Moscow and Paris becomes one of the chief factors of stability in Europe, a sign of obvious change in East-West relations.

FRG's Genscher Emphasizes European 'Stability'

*PM0612193789 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
7 Dec 89 Morning Edition p 4*

[Report by S. Guk: "H.D. Genscher News Conference"]

[Text] "Stability" was perhaps the word that appeared most frequently in H.D. Genscher's utterances during his press conference. The FRG, the vice chancellor said, not only wants the reforms in the USSR and the other socialist countries to take place "unimpeded." Bonn intends to make its own contribution to ensuring that the renewal processes develop in conditions of stability.

We do not intend to interfere in the GDR's internal affairs, the minister assured the assembled journalists. Chancellor H. Kohl's government statement (10 points on German and all-European, including disarmament, issues—see IZVESTIYA no 334) should be seen as a proposal to the GDR and no more than that. It is now up to the GDR to decide what path of development it is going to choose and what kind of relations it is going to have with the FRG.

Does he believe in integration between the two German states in the next 5 years? That was one of the questions. It would be a mistake, the FRG foreign minister said, to draw up plans or timetables right now. It is necessary to continue to promote the process of rapprochement between European states in accordance with the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act, H.D. Genscher said. "Rapprochement between the two German states" will be an integral part of this process. He said that the creation of security structures in Europe, increasing mutual trust, was a prerequisite of rapprochement. Moreover, disarmament should not lag behind the development of political cooperation. Then rapprochement between the two German states, according to Genscher, would be easier and neighbors would be less concerned about this process.

The fact that concern does exist was evidenced by a number of questions at the press conference, in particular: Does the FRG recognize the border along the Oder-Neisse? (The aforementioned 10-point "Kohl plan" ignored the issue of the Eastern borders—S. Guk). The minister gave assurances that the FRG recognizes their inviolability. Bonn is committed to a "stable Europe" and to the development of nonconfrontational relations between East and West.

Genscher Shows 'Understanding' on German Issue

*LD0612150989 Moscow World Service in English
1210 GMT 6 Dec 89*

[Viktor Glazunov commentary]

[Text] The vice chancellor and foreign minister of the Federal Republic of Germany, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, has ended an official visit to this country. He had a meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev. Viktor Glazunov of our staff comments on the results of this visit:

The visit was of special importance in the light of changes in the East European countries including the German Democratic Republic. These changes are basically positive and pave the way for closer ties between East and West. But it is important in the present-day conditions to show restraint and responsibility. Any attempt to use the difficulties of the restructuring process in the socialist countries for one-sided selfish aims without due account for long-term all-European interests may carry a threat to the positive things gained in Europe and upset the European stability.

The German issue was considered also under this angle during the Moscow talks. It is already significant that the issue came up for discussion. We did not accept until recently the idea of an open German issue, but that did not close the issue. Now that a broad international discussion is underway about reunification of Germany, this is only extra proof that the problem exists.

It is important to put the problem in the proper context. To my mind, says Viktor Glazunov, the Italian foreign minister, Gianni de Michelis, was right when he declared a few days ago that reunification of two Germanys is possible only within the context of unification of the whole of Europe. But the unification of Europe is a long way off, so far, and for this reason, to raise the issue of reunification of Germany on the agenda of current politics is not only illusory but also dangerous. That was said straightforwardly to the vice chancellor and foreign minister of the Federal Republic of Germany during the Moscow talks.

Raising this issue brings confusion, creates fears, and spreads distrust and suspicion. And that can have its negative effect on European stability. Small wonder the plan for a German confederation advanced by Chancellor Kohl a few days ago sets the NATO quarters on their guard, too. Chancellor Kohl has admitted this himself after the NATO summit session in Brussels.

I have the impression, says Viktor Glazunov, that the guest from the Federal Republic of Germany showed understanding of the situation during the Moscow talks. At his final news conference Hans-Dietrich Genscher paid special attention to promoting European stability. He said that inviolability of borders was the basis of all life in Europe. Answering a question about reunification of Germany, he said it would be erroneous to make plans and a timetable; we will do our best, he said, for stable structures to be retained in Europe. The German Democratic Republic is a sovereign state, and it's up to it to establish its own social system and how to build relations with the Federal Republic of Germany, said the West German visitor.

This is a realistic and a responsible point of view. The main thing is for it to be carried out.

Comparison of Shevardnadze-Genscher Talks
PM0612170189

Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian on 7 December 1989 carries in its Morning Edition on page 4 a TASS report on the 5 December talks between Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and his FRG counterpart Hans-Dietrich Genscher. Comparison of the IZVESTIYA item, entitled "Talks at USSR Foreign Ministry," with the Moscow TASS English version published in the 6 December Soviet Union DAILY REPORT, pp 47-49, reveals the following variations:

Page 47, column two, paragraph one, first sentence, IZVESTIYA reads: [Text] Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and West German Deputy Federal Chancellor and Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, on an official visit in Moscow, conducted negotiations at the Soviet Foreign Ministry on 5 December. [new paragraph]

In the opinion... (omitting dateline, substituting date for "today")

Page 48, column one, paragraph one, first sentence, IZVESTIYA reads: ...conversation, which had a frank and straightforward nature,... (rephrasing, adding punctuation)

Same sentence, IZVESTIYA reads: ...which requires a very high sense of... (adding word)

Paragraph three, only sentence, IZVESTIYA reads: ...with dangerous consequences. [new paragraph]

It is impermissible...(omitting words)

Paragraph nine, first sentence, IZVESTIYA reads: reforms, profound renewal, and the democratization of the country's sociopolitical life. There is tremendous creative work ahead which will take time. In this period it is important that all interested sides continue to show restraint and prudence and do not interfere in the internal affairs of the GDR, a UN member, either verbally or actually.

Nor should it be overlooked, E.A. Shevardnadze stressed, that the GDR is our friend and ally and that the present development affects the vital interests of the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact countries, and ultimately all Europeans. Soviet people, E.A. Shevardnadze said, remember well the history and tragic lessons of World War II. Our public opinion is highly sensitive to things which affect its results. No one should forget that.

The Soviet Union supports the expansion of cooperation between the GDR and the FRG and thinks that it should be made more multifaceted—on an equitable basis, of course, and in the spirit of the joint statement signed by the two countries' top leaders. This mode of... (supplying indistinct passage)

column two, paragraph ten, last sentence, IZVESTIYA reads: ...confirmed again the coincidence in the position... (substituting "coincidence" for "confidence");

page 49, column one, antepenultimate paragraph, only sentence, IZVESTIYA reads: ...important directions of practical cooperation between the... (adding words)

column two, paragraph two, last sentence, IZVESTIYA reads: ...Soviet Union and West Germany in these... (substituting "West" for "East")

CPSU's Zagladin, Portugalov on German Question
PM0612164489 Milan L'UNITA in Italian
29 Nov 89 p 5

[Unattributed report: "Zagladin: 'Wrong To Force The Pace'"]

[Excerpt] Rome—The Soviets do not like the "Kohl plan" for Germany's unification—the 10-point plan the chancellor presented to the German parliament yesterday. "I read the news of Kohl's plan in the newspapers and was surprised, because, as far as I can understand, the federal chancellor is contradicting his own recent statements." This was the comment yesterday from Vadim Zagladin, CPSU Central Committee member and Gorbachev's international affairs adviser, who is in Italy as a member of the Soviet leader's delegation. Next Zagladin added that Kohl wants to plan the future of reunified Germany "without taking into account that he is talking about another sovereign state (the GDR—L'UNITA editor's note.)" "I do not know to what extent this initiative can be described as realpolitik," Zagladin added, "but in any case, it is necessary to display moderation at present." Next he said he agreed with Italian Prime Minister Andreotti, who spoke in a recent interview in terms of "one nation but two states." "Andreotti said it would be dangerous to force the pace. I agree with him," Zagladin added.

Nikolay Portugalov, a CPSU International Department expert on German affairs who is also in Italy with the Soviet delegation, said: "I do not rule out the possibility of the development of a confederal structure," though "from the geopolitical viewpoint Europe could not now

withstand the unification of Germany." Portugalov went on: "If Kohl wants to achieve a German confederation within the context of building the common European home, then his initiative is acceptable. If, however, he intends to increase the pace and set the issue of German unification as a priority, then the engine could break down." Next Portugalov further explained the Soviet viewpoint on the German issue: "A confederation and a confederal structure are two different things. If we are talking about the development of a confederal structure in the field of cooperation in the ecological or economic sphere, then this is possible. But if we are talking about a confederation as such, that is, a single state consisting of two entities belonging to two different politico-military blocs, then this is absolutely impossible."

So, according to Portugalov "the issue of creating a confederation does not arise now. It would be possible to raise that of the development of a confederal structure, but only while keeping the two existing German states separate." As long as the two Germanys belong to two different alliances—NATO and the Warsaw Pact—"unification is, in fact, just theoretical speculation." [passage omitted]

Raisa Gorbacheva Attends Rome Perestroyka Exhibit

*PM0512134989 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
1 Dec 89 Morning Edition p 5*

[TASS report: "Soviet Exhibition Opens"]

[Text] Rome, 30 Nov—"Perestroyka in Action" is the name of the Soviet exhibition that opened Tuesday in the Rome Exhibition Center, one of the biggest and most prestigious exhibition facilities in the Italian capital. The exhibition marks M.S. Gorbachev's state visit to Italy.

Its various sections contain world-famous masterpieces of painting and drawing from the Leningrad State Russian Museum and State Tretyakovskaya Gallery. Italian visitors have shown a great deal of interest in Caravaggio's picture "The Lutenist," sent to Rome from the

Leningrad Hermitage. As well as paintings, the exhibition contains a wide range of books, posters, and photographs. A large section is devoted to science and technology. Working models of the "Tokamak" thermonuclear fusion and "Delfin" laser thermonuclear fusion facilities are on display in Italy for the first time.

Five o'clock in the evening. Those assembled in the central hall of the Rome Exhibition Center applauded the arrival of R.M. Gorbacheva, S.A. Sitaryan, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, V.T. Saykin, chairman of the Moscow City Soviet Executive Committee, I.T. Frolov, chief editor of PRAVDA, N.Ye. Kruchina, member of the CPSU Central Committee, USSR People's Deputies K.V. Frolov, I.D. Laptev, and M.N. Rakhmanova, Metropolitan Yuvenaliy, and writer L.N. Vasilyeva for the opening ceremony. Livia Andreotti, wife of the Italian prime minister, Italian Government ministers, and representatives of political parties and public organizations were also present.

Addressing the guests, Angelo Barbato, prefect of Rome, stressed that the exhibition is a wide-ranging panorama of Soviet scientific and cultural life. It is of great importance because it contributes to bringing our people closer together through mutual knowledge and creativity.

R.M. Gorbacheva cut the ribbon to open the exhibition.

The Italian media are devoting a great deal of attention to the Soviet exhibition.

Primakov Receives Netherlands Envoy

*LD0212214289 Moscow TASS in English 1643 GMT
1 Dec 89*

[Text] Moscow December 1 TASS—Yevgeniy Primakov, chairman of the Soviet Parliament's Council of the Union, received Dutch Ambassador to the USSR Petrus Buwalda in the Kremlin today.

They discussed bilateral relations and prospects of parliamentary ties between the Soviet Union and the Netherlands.

Supreme Soviet Session

Official Views Deputies' Congress Tasks

PM0712100389 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
5 Dec 89 First Edition p 2

[Article by V. Kucherenko, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet of the Union Planning, Budget, and Financial Commission, under the rubric "Toward the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies": "The Dream is the Starting Point of the Plan"]

[Text] So the Second Supreme Soviet session is behind us, and the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies lies ahead. Between them there are 2 weeks of thinking, analysis and conclusions connected with the session which has just ended.

Will the strengthening of unity at the Congress and the desire for mutually acceptable compromises, which was particularly vividly manifested in the last days of the session's work, continue? I would like to believe so. Especially as now, at the present stage of the economic transformations, faced with a disorganized economy, an imbalance in money circulation, ruined ties between enterprises, and a state plan for 1990 reconciled to resources with difficulty, we—both the deputies and the country as a whole—have an urgent need for this unity at the Congress in the search for the correct choice of paths, methods, and schedules in order to solve immediate and long-term problems. I particularly stress this, for the experience of forming the plan and budget for 1990 at the last session showed both the Supreme Soviet's strength and its weakness. Yes, there is no doubt that the Supreme Soviet and its committees and commissions showed understanding and principle in making unprecedented decisions. I shall list them. The session approves the expenditure for 1990, but can implement it only if the revenue target is met; the maximum deficit in the budget is R60 billion, and the government cannot exceed it without the Supreme Soviet's decision; the maximum permissible emission of money is R10 billion for next year, and the maximum foreign debt limits are clearly established. These are seriously considered positions. Whatever happens these should be maintained and consolidated at the Congress of People's Deputies.

But, on the other hand, a serious weakness was demonstrated in the committees' and commissions' work on the plan and budget for 1990 presented by the government. I am referring primarily to the danger of dissipating the expected revenue around the departments and regions, losing sight of the main priorities and the general character of the plan's social direction. We shall recall that the discussions followed these lines: Deputies representing "transportation workers," "agricultural workers," "culture," "public organizations," and other groups demanded that the needs of "their own" sectors be the first to be met from centralized state budget sources. Moreover, as a rule the arguments they put forward were serious, which complicated the conversation. As a result proposals for additional appropriations

from the budget grew by almost R50 billion. But where can they be obtained? The deputies proposed sources of additional revenue of less than R10 billion. And these are connected not with the increase in production output, but with the redistribution of revenue as a result of specific measures. Thus departmentalism has to a certain degree also established itself in committees and commissions.

I think that this can be avoided in the future only by clearly determining at the Congress the stages and character of radical economic reform, its real possibilities and schedules. In the end one of its main results must be a strong and consistent budget at all levels—from the local soviet to the federation. But at the moment this is just a dream. But the dream, as is well known, is the starting point of the plan. The deputies of the Planning, Budget, and Financial Commission are following intently the discussion of all the country's major economists on further ways to develop economic reform. We are looking for an answer to how to approach the formation of the 13th 5-Year Plan targets, to what wholesale and purchase prices in the national economy and the tax rate of enterprises' profits should be like, and to how to distribute tax revenue among the Union, republic and oblast budgets....

We are seriously concerned about the dissent on vitally important problems among many of the country's prominent economists. And we hope the Second Congress of People's Deputies will clarify matters here.

During the examination in the committees and commissions of the plan for 1990 proposed by the government the question was raised in earnest of calculating the living standard and supplying food and industrial goods in line with the normatives which have been worked out. The plan must be based not on industrial output growth percentages, but the growth of people's prosperity. The government gave an assurance that the 13th 5-year plan will be based on this principle and the discussion of it at the second Congress is very important for assessing the new 5-year plan. But it should not be forgotten that the main guarantee of its feasibility is the successful work of labor collectives, an increase in the country's revenue, and the economy's efficiency. Everyone willingly discusses filling the consumer "basket," but they very often forget who should do this and how.

I think that the Congress, while thinking about the stages of economic reform, should not avoid discussion about the role of centralized financing and the increasing significance of enterprises' funds. After all, it is a paradox that while there is a state budget deficit enterprises have to their credit tens of billions of rubles of so-called free surplus funds which are not backed by material resources. The funds are also responsible for the totally unjustified "plundering" in the noncash sphere, when enterprises pay for specific output sums which sometimes exceed wholesale prices several times over and thus turn noncash resources into cash [beznaichnyye v nalichnyye dengi]. This undoubtedly has an extremely

adverse effect on financial circulation. A serious discussion is now under way about the size of deductions be from enterprises' profits, and whether tax rates should be equal for all or differentiated. If they are cut, as many people are demanding, then we should clearly determine the directions in which financing from the budget should be cut after it has lost its relevant sources of revenue.

A serious conversation lies ahead at the Congress. But it is not only conversations which are needed. Decisions which have been weighed up and well thought out are needed. People are waiting for them.

Political & Social

Gorbachev, Shevardnadze Return to Moscow 7 Dec
LD0712094289 Moscow TASS in English 0927 GMT 7 Dec 89

[Text] Moscow 7 December TASS—Mikhail Gorbachev returned to Moscow from Kiev last night. He participated in a brief working meeting with President Francois Mitterrand of France in the Ukrainian capital.

Eduard Shevardnadze returned together with the Soviet president.

Deputy Backs Down on Call for General Strike
PM0612200189 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 7 Dec 89 Morning Edition p 3

["Letter To IZVESTIYA"; final five paragraphs comprise editorial comment]

[Text] To the chief editor of IZVESTIYA.

Having read for the first time the "Appeal" by a group of people's deputies, which included my name, after it was broadcast by Western radio, I consider it necessary to state that I endorse all the positions apart from the call for a two-hour strike. I am now resolutely opposed to a strike of any duration—it is playing with fire.

[Signed] Yu. Chernichenko, USSR people's deputy; 4 December 1989.
From the Editorial Board:

Although Western radio stations received the "Appeal" before we did and have done our job for us by conveying its content to many readers, it is nonetheless necessary to explain what it is all about. Six USSR people's deputies, Comrades A.D. Sakharov, V.A. Tikhonov, G.Kh. Popov, A.N. Murashev, Yu.D. Chernichenko, and Yu.N. Afanasyev have urged all working people in the country to hold a two-hour general political warning strike. It is proposed by such a "simple" method to make the Second Congress of People's Deputies work not in accordance with the agenda that is proposed by the USSR Supreme Soviet, but in accordance with one that the aforementioned deputities would prefer.

We are talking about the draft laws on land, on ownership, and on the enterprise. The importance of these acts is beyond doubt. But let us remind readers that nearly all these drafts have been examined by the Supreme Soviet and have already been published for nationwide discussion.

There is another point in the "Appeal," which would seem to explain why it was written: Article 6 of the USSR Constitution. Yet it is well known that this point too has been examined by the Supreme Soviet. The question of the need to change this and other articles of the Basic Law has already been discussed at a recent session of the Constitutional Commission set up by the First Congress of People's Deputies, which is working on the relevant specific proposals. Incidentally, two of the deputies who signed the "Appeal" are on this commission. How can we expect to build a rule-of law state, if, whenever a particular deputy disagrees with the majority opinion in our parliament, we hear in response calls for general strikes. And this is in a situation where the country is still catching its breath after the stoppages at the coal mines and other conflicts. How can there be any respect for the Law when deputies themselves are ignoring the Appeal and Resolution of the USSR Supreme Soviet in connection with the strikes, adopted only recently. How do you ensure the authority and productivity of the Congress' work when even before it has begun you have groups of deputies, irrespective of their platforms, calling for mass pressure on the Congress in order to defend their own particular position.

It is regrettable that people's deputies are trying to organize the kind of action that the country dreads most—a strike. How is it going to help the people and what burden will it relieve? It will not help at all, it will not solve anything. It will only aggravate poverty, problems, and confrontation.

Now that really is "playing with fire," as the deputy who is named as coauthor of the "Appeal" and who, alas, did not see it before it was so widely broadcast by Western radio stations put it.

Sukharev Denies Accusations Against Ligachev
LD0512225389 Moscow International Service in Hungarian 1730 GMT 5 Dec 89

[Excerpts] [Announcer] Listen to our radio magazine, "On Moscow's Wavelength." The guest of our program today is Aleksandr Sukharev, the Soviet Union's procurator general. [passage omitted]

Accusations of corruption have been levelled against Yegor Ligachev, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo. Our impression is that a situation of stalemate has developed. The one side, that which makes the allegations, is not able to prove what it holds to be true; while the other side is not able to reject the accusation.

[Sukharev in Russian fading into Hungarian translation] I categorically disagree with this allegation, says Aleksandr Sukharev. As we know, Yegor Ligachev officially asked the Soviet Union's Procurator General's Office to carry out an investigation in the matter of the trumped-up allegations of the detective Ivanov, and to call Ivanov to account. We studied this request over a long period of time; we examined the affair and we interrogated Ligachev. We established precisely that the accusation of corruption against Ligachev is a barefaced lie. Therefore, your supposition that one of the sides is not able to prove the corruption of leading persons, and the other to reject the accusation, is a mistake.

[Announcer] There have been rumors that you are connected to Yegor Ligachev with family ties.

[Sukharev] I too have heard such things—true, as is usually the case, a little bit later. First of all this gossip aroused merely my amazement; but then, when the thing began to swell, when rumors began to go around that my wife was Ligachev's sister—this can only be the subject of (?decision). Just as the rumor that Ligachev's son is my daughter's husband. Both my wife and I come from Voronezh oblast, and I do not even have a daughter. Rumors of this kind are put about deliberately. There are other kinds of gossip, too, which arouse not just my incomprehension but my outrage. In a word, the relationship between Yegor Ligachev and myself is exclusively of an official nature. [passage omitted]

KGB Conference Adopts Decision on Terrorism

LD0612134889 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1245 GMT 6 Dec 89

[Text] Moscow, 6 Dec (TASS)—A decision on elaborating specific proposals for the further development of business contacts between the state security organs of the USSR and the special services of the capitalist states in the interest of combatting international terrorism has been adopted at a conference of the leadership of the USSR KGB. It was chaired by Vladimir Kryuchkov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the USSR KGB.

Speaking at the conference was Lieutenant General Fedor Scherbak, retired, deputy chairman of the Council of KGB Veterans, who told of his trip to the United States in October through the auspices of the Soviet-U.S. Society for Combatting International Terrorism.

During his trip there were meetings and conversations with former leaders of the CIA William Colby and Ray Cline. It was the common view that the meetings inaugurated a constructive dialogue in seeking ways of resolving a problem common to all mankind—curbing international terrorism and uniting for this purpose the forces and resources of all states irrespective of their political and social system.

Tretyakov Profiles Gorbachev

PM0512152289 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 48, 26 Nov 89 pp 9-10

[Vitaliy Tretyakov article: "Gorbachev's Enigma. A Political Profile Against the Background of Perestroika."]

[Text] Perestroika marches on, and the flow of critical arrows flying at Gorbachev keeps on mounting. The pricks are increasingly more painful—there is no hiding this. And judging by his psychological frame of mind, it seems that he is not particularly able to hide this. Yet he has continued marching. Whither? Why doesn't he turn? And someone will ask: why is he zigzagging? And in general how has he managed not to have fallen through?

To be a target of criticism and discontent is just as much a part of the professional life of the leader of a state as the official protocol. In the case of Gorbachev this is also a reflection of the course of perestroika in our social awareness. And vice versa: the reflection of present-day social consciousness in perestroika. The reflection is so alarming that a question unwittingly arises: Do we and Gorbachev understand each other?

Strategy

Referring to Lenin, Gorbachev once proclaimed the supremacy of universal human values over class ones. This happened roughly two years after his election as General Secretary. And it is this that became the beginning of real—radical and democratic—perestroika.

Interpreted with a greater or lesser degree of rigidity, the class principle has permeated the whole of Soviet history. All the sacrifices and all of the country's achievements were placed at this altar. And all of a sudden an initially indiscernible, deceptively weak little fire blazed up nearby. It was not extinguished at once, I believe, simply because it was unnoticed and if it was noticed, then it was considered just another fireworks launched to blind the West.

The flame grew in strength, and its gleams began to reflect the ideals which we formerly lived without: human rights and liberties, pluralism, tolerance of dissent....

Today both flames are blazing side by side. And society has been divided into those who continue warming themselves by the old one and those who do not permit the new one to be extinguished. Gorbachev keeps dashing about from flame to flame. Like a medieval alchemist, he tries to find the radiance of the "philosophers' stone" now in one, now in the other flame, now in their intertwining. But judging by the fact that we see him more often at the altar of universal human values, the trajectory of his movement seems to be fairly clear.

The slogan "More democracy, more socialism" mirrors an intricate ideological collision in perestroika. Prior to

1985, the formula for the West was this: "Either democracy or socialism". For us it was: "Socialism is democracy", but real life refuted this day in and day out. And we arrived at the absurd version of the slogan: "Socialism is above democracy."

Gorbachev has solved this problem. A subtle semantic analysis of the terms—what is "socialism" and what is "democracy"—is a matter of secondary importance. Pride of place attaches to something more flexible, taking better account of both the ideological sympathies of social consciousness and the established political structure, but, most importantly, pushing us forward to the realization that real socialism is democracy based on universal human values. Such is Gorbachev's strategic line, the quintessence of his "new mentality".

It has to be admitted that Gorbachev's "new mentality" generated much more profound enthusiasm in the West (after some wavering, it is true) than in the leadership of the Eastern-bloc countries. Only now has rapprochement on this plane been developing rapidly, which has given Gorbachev greater freedom to manoeuvre. But all the same it remains a paradox that his internal policy enjoys greater popularity in the West than, for instance, in Soviet society itself. The West and Gorbachev are still lingering in the sweet period of their "honeymoon", whereas the Soviet people have already gone over to a more complicated—if we were to continue the metaphor—period of "marital life". In the latter, as we know, romantic passion is put to the stern test of "everyday inconveniences", unfulfilled hopes, and financial difficulties (the latter is not even a metaphor, but an exact definition of one of the claims laid against Gorbachev inside the country). And yet what did he win over the West's heart with?

By the very fact of proclaiming the "new mentality" Gorbachev started destroying the "enemy image" in which the Soviet Union was seen by the West. Moreover, he demonstrated his desire to destroy the same image, but now the West's, in Soviet public opinion. The implementation of the "New mentality" concept in the shape of specific foreign policy acts, including the Soviet troop pull-out from Afghanistan, became just as serious a confirmation of Gorbachev's sincerity in foreign policy as the release of political prisoners did in domestic policy.

Before 1985, Western intellectuals could think about universal human values all they liked, but without consensus with the East these values remained no more than a dream. They became a real guidepost for peace only when Gorbachev accepted this consensus.

Policy

Thus, the strategic objective is clear (I shall yet return to the question whether it was clear to Gorbachev himself at the beginning of perestroika). But the way to get there isn't short and it must be punctuated by real policy. It is easy to record on paper the idea of the supremacy of universal human values, of emancipating the human

race. What should be done to move our society towards it, a society which used to worship a different idol in all of its structures, all of its traditions, its consciousness, and even its law-enforcement systems?

Gorbachev went ahead consistently, gradually crystallizing a policy the substance of which was disclosed at the 19th Party Conference—also not at the very beginning of what we call perestroika. It is the reform of the political system, and with the added specification—reform in the party.

But at first there were different intermediate guideposts. First and foremost, it was only the acceleration of socio-economic development, yet not a mere buildup of tempos, but acceleration through the emancipation of the producer, through the substitution of initiative and economic incentive for social apathy.

Then came glasnost, at first rudimentary, as it was then a question of additional information needed to achieve better acceleration. Then, glasnost as a means of analyzing history: Where were the mistakes made? And finally glasnost became an independent and integral policy, for which an analysis of the past is the background, while its key element is exploring the ways towards real democracy. Step by step this glasnost started approaching our old Soviet taboos—the themes that had for decades been closed for discussion: socialism, a multiparty system, the October Revolution, Lenin, the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, the Baltics in 1940, the events of 1956 in Hungary and of 1968 in Czechoslovakia, and many other things.

Then there arose the concept of a law-governed state. A guidepost also not the most innocent for those who felt a threat in perestroika. Let us recall that in Brezhnev's times even the demand to observe the USSR Constitution was considered to be dissident. The "law-governed state" guidepost, productive as it is for the further course of perestroika, initially manifested itself as being "protective", lulling the conservatives who clearly felt that the old system was in danger. The "protective nature" of the theory on a law-governed state was seen in the fact that it presupposed the supremacy of any law, but by that time, the majority of our laws still remained at least "semi-Stalinist" in spirit, and quite often also in letter. However, by its true meaning the concept of a state committed to the rule of law pointed to the democratic perspective. It demanded that the old laws be observed not only by the "lower depths", but also by the bureaucracy, which had forgotten how to do this. And most importantly, this concept implied renewing the laws themselves—down, as it became clear later, to the Constitution itself, including its Article 6, which has now become the focus of discussion. The problem posed by this article in our society can be decided by a Congress of People's Deputies. But the date has already been fixed for the 28th CPSU Congress, which will also be confronted with this problem. At this congress, I believe, the outline of the full reform of the political system, proclaimed by Gorbachev, will acquire finalized features.

Tactics

Gorbachev is a politician who wants to know the real situation, to grasp as far as possible its components, and to take the country along the road on which the resultant force of these components and his, Gorbachev's understanding of perestroika coincide to the utmost at each particular moment. A set which seems to be obvious, but difficult to realize. After all, today this resultant is deflected (due to miners' strike, for instance) to one side from the perestroika vector, but tomorrow (again due to strikes, but on part of the Russian-speaking workers in the Baltics) it will swing to the opposite side. It is difficult to keep one's course in these conditions. But Gorbachev perseveringly strives to do this. That is why recently he publicly refuted the reproach that he was sitting on several chairs and said that in fact he was sitting on one—his own. And the best confirmation of this is a retrospective look at Gorbachev's policy, which shows that everything he has already managed to do has been done in a perfectly uncompromising way, and if those who believed yesterday that they were able to "tie in" his decisions by their reservations and conditions, took a look at this "yesterday" from today, they would have seen—there were conditions, reservations and, consequently, a compromise, but as a result there is something irreversibly different and new.

Still, Gorbachev's political tactics are the tactics of compromise. But every day and every month they move us forward. It is easy and convenient to criticize them, for there is always something in them which someone (and at times everyone) looks askance at. But simultaneously there is also and always in them something which someone (and more often everyone) not only likes, but which has been woven out of the thread of their interests.

These tactics are based on a subtle perception not only of all the variables in the political and economic spheres, not only on taking into account the constantly changing balance of these variables (which can, after all, change both forward and backward), but also on the perception (or knowledge?) of what this balance will be like tomorrow, and what must be done to forestall any rolling back by an abrupt advance—perhaps in another sphere.

Not infrequently Gorbachev achieves this advance in the course of his trips abroad. In so doing, he decides by peaceful means what many other leaders, especially in the past (or even today, i.e., the war over the Falklands), achieved by implementing the theory: "We need a small, but victorious war".

He acted this way at the end of last year, for instance, by voicing, not in Moscow but from the UN rostrum in New York, the specific (though still moral, not yet legal) commitments which Soviet society undertook to assume: observance of the principle of freely choosing the political system; renunciation of being enclosed in the circle of orthodox communist values; guarantees against persecution for political and religious views, etc. Why didn't

he proclaim this programme equally vigorously in Moscow, from the rostrum, for instance, of the Supreme Soviet? In 1988 the Supreme Soviet of the USSR was not what it is today. Only by a big stretch of the imagination could its rostrum be called parliamentary at that time. However, a country must be ready to heed the words of the prophet. By his statement in New York, Gorbachev once again "won over" the world, which is not indifferent to any country.

The very gist of Gorbachev's tactics is, incidentally, that he uses compromise not as a defensive, but offensive weapon; he himself offers compromises wherever his political opponent doesn't expect this, and always accepts the sharpening of a compromise instead of its obscuring in the eyes of public opinion. Such was, for instance, his detached behaviour when the Afghan theme was discussed at the 1st Congress of People's Deputies. And in this way he takes over the initiative in looking for a way out of the hitherto hushed up problems—in the given case, the differences in appraising the war in Afghanistan.

I still have the feeling that the very word "compromise" has been so greatly discredited by our "Short Course" theory that it always contains some negative meaning, no matter how many reservations one may make. But, after all, a compromise means tolerance, pacification, constructive dissidence, the antithesis of extremism, if we use the term which frightens many today. By means of compromises Gorbachev weakens extremes one after another. Moreover, the radical extreme is all the same marching forward, pulling perestroika behind their premature calls, whereas the conservative extreme is forced to move under the pressure of the general mass of changes, admitting their obvious (first to the radicals, then to all others) sins and their inability to move independently in any direction except backwards. And the centre itself, while constantly remaining in the middle, is permanently shifting—together with the whole bulk of society—towards what only yesterday seemed to be radicalism, the shattering of foundations, and political sacrilege, towards democracy.

The political purport of Gorbachev's policy of compromise also consists in his ability to enter into a compromise between what he is today and what he will be tomorrow, that is, to change, constantly rising to the level of the new tasks facing perestroika. The actions of those who try to catch Gorbachev for inconsistencies with what he said yesterday are meaningless. For some reason they are reluctant to see what in the given case lies on the surface—the self-development of a leader who, in 1985, decided to lift one political weight, but who has again and again been forced to lift ever heavier weights.

Gorbachev's tactics of compromise have been brilliantly polished up. Quite often he introduces novelties dangerous for the bureaucracy which are not on the main track of his advance. The idea seems to be skidding, discrediting itself in the eyes of those whom it is spear-headed against, and they lose the feeling of danger. And

suddenly it appears exactly where it belongs. Such was the case, for instance, with the alternative elections. At first, Gorbachev introduced them in production, where their need is questionable, and only then in the elections of people's deputies, where an alternative is an absolute necessity.

In proposing something new, Gorbachev envelopes it in old forms habitual for the majority. The apparat accepts this, and even gets carried-away by this "renewal". And it gets defeated, because today the point is no longer in forms, but in the real confrontation between the new and old forces. The most glaring example is elections from the public organizations. It was clear that this was meant for the apparat to enable it to retain its maximum representation in the new political structure. Many radicals were furious. And what was the result? Nearly a half of the radically-minded people's deputies were returned via public organizations. To crown it all, the possibility of making one's way "stealthily" from these organizations developed into making public the results of the voting in them as well. And today many conservatives already take exception to elections from public organizations.

Quite often Gorbachev raises the level of glasnost to a new height. Sometimes he raises it sharply (publication of the verbatim reports of the two latest plenums of the CPSU Central Committee) and sometimes prudently, as if to reassure the old forces. The next day one magazine crosses the limit. The day after another one skips over it. A month later everyone has already forgotten where the limit used to be, but already there is nothing that can be done.

He carefully listens to the conservatives' arguments, often agrees with them, invites them to conferences, and despite this, for instance, the post of Vice-chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers is held by Academician Abalkin, whom it was almost fashionable to criticize after his speech at the 19th Party Conference.

One more of Gorbachev's methods is to appeal to the people, which was also used by the previous Soviet leaders. He uses appeals, which usually have a lulling effect on conservatives—they, at any rate our conservatives, are "biologically" unable to imagine that the people may think differently than they do. But, after all, the people think in different ways: today one way, tomorrow some other way, and even today there are different views among the people. With the help of the "people" Gorbachev more often "slows down" the radicals who run too far ahead, then "drives on" the conservatives. But even compromise may not be a game with one goal, each of the sides sacrifices something there. It's a pity that the "people" is too subordinate a category here.

By laying bare and publicly demonstrating a compromise while sharpening political confrontation at the Congress of People's Deputies, Gorbachev, on the one hand, tears off the veil of secrecy from political struggle (which is the

most he can do for the radicals today), and on the other, by so doing, he always takes the initiative into his hands (the best he can do for perestroika today without injuring the conservatives).

It is not worth thinking that always and in everything the use of compromise ensures success for Gorbachev and perestroika. The main weakness of this policy is that compromises tend to obscure the movement's strategic line, which occasionally misleads the advocates of democratic perestroika and lowers the degree of confidence in its leader. And given their immoderate or unskilful use, compromises can also distort this line. Besides, a compromise always spells the loss of tempo: there may simply not be enough time for the solution of both local problems (e.g., Nagorno-Karabakh) and nation-wide ones (the danger of the economic reform's collapse). Lastly, there is some moral frontier which must not be crossed when having recourse to compromises. And this happened when, for instance, things were not only not called by their proper names, but when no regret was expressed in time on the national level over the punitive action against the population in Tbilisi. Such "compromises with morality" discredit Gorbachev's policy, however serious may be the reason that have caused them.

And one more thing. Far from each compromise advancing perestroika is a gain merely for the progressive forces. The conservatives carefully keep an eye on their "share" in the compromise and often use this "share" for intensifying attacks against political rivals, and in the final analysis against perestroika. They can easily assess yet another compromise at a signal for turning back, as a command to attack the "enemies of socialism". Every critical word of Gorbachev's even one uttered in a fit of temper to the democratic press, is immediately caught up with redoubled forces by those who modestly call themselves the camp of "healthy conservatism". The history of perestroika has yielded quite a few proofs to this effect.

Allies

Of all the Soviet leaders, including Lenin, Gorbachev has been the first to win himself allies among intellectuals. This sort of allies are fickle, quarrelsome and annoying for their criticism and impatience—while unlike obedient, flattering conservatives (who have of late grown less obedient and whose flattery has turned into threats). An alliance with intellectuals is important for many reasons. It raises society's appreciation of intellect and justice, things in such short supply in this country before 1985, and which aren't so abundant today, intellectuals are said to be too liberal and tolerant of political extremes to be relied upon at a time of important political change. Never in human history have intellectuals laid claims to political power, because they value their intellectual freedom over power. For this reason, intellectuals are politically disinterested allies of Gorbachev.

Theorists may some day determine the dividing line between workers and intellectuals. Perestroika takes a different view of it. The urge to do independent work has always been present in the healthy and socially normal person. Gorbachev recruits his allies from among such people in every class and section of the population.

It would be interesting to know how many trusty allies Gorbachev expected to make in the competitive elections of people's deputies? The most gratifying part of it is that they cover the entire social gamut in the country, representing all nations in the broadest way possible and showing their efficiency in the election tussle. And perhaps the most important thing is that they are backed by millions of voters. Democracy indeed is a goose that lays golden eggs. And the very first competitive elections have brought benefits. How many more allies is Gorbachev going to win in the elections to Republican and local soviets, during the elections of delegates to the Party congress if these latter elections will be the kind required by perestroika!

Are there that many people ready for perestroika? There is no definite answer to this question, which inspires those who tell Gorbachev rather than themselves: the peasants aren't ready to take land, the workers don't want to take over factories, Soviets are unable to take power.

The old Soviets are indeed unable to do it. But elections are coming and we shall soon see what the new Soviets will be able to do. Workers don't feel like taking over factories? Perhaps, but they don't feel like taking over factories together with the ministries, the old trade unions and the State Committee for Material and Technical Supplies. The latter, in its monopolism, is stronger than any market. The peasants are not ready? Ridiculous! Nobody has really offered them land. Not only the peasants but urban dwellers are ready to take land. If there are reforms there'll be allies. The more there are of the former, the more there'll be of the latter.

The Person

One of MN's readers wrote in with this question: "You're talking about some sort of apparat being omnipotent. Isn't the General Secretary of the CPSU apparatchik No. 1? And can he afford not to be?"

Let me attempt an answer by supposing that Gorbachev were out to prove that he isn't an apparatchik (he would surely score many points given the present populist wave). He would perhaps have said what resolute democratic radicals usually say at numerous meetings. This would be a strange thing to do for a head of state. Not only is there no need for Gorbachev to address unsanctioned rallies, it is simply dangerous, even if he said what he said using sharper words and mentioning names. Gorbachev, Boris Yeltsin or Yuriy Afanasyev have different roles to play in perestroika. But they, Gorbachev and a conservative vested with power are the components of one complex system—Soviet society, whose self-preservation is not ensured at rallies, even if rallies

are an important part of a stable democratic system and an eternal antidote to the recurrent tendency to revive bureaucracy and abuse the functions of power in society. But society's onward movement is not the doing of conservatives. Gorbachev's policy is a skilled search for the possible peaceful coexistence of both, a skill neither are willing to learn. The earnest of perestroika's irreversibility lies in that this skill should become a habit with us rather than a show of political courage.

If Gorbachev is apparatchik No. 1, he is also radical No. 1 in Soviet society. Even if because he is carrying through real reform at the top state level. Gorbachev does not want the apparat to reproduce antiperestroika structures within the government system. And he doesn't want people to be part of these structures, even if they work in the apparat, but live inside society, which is restructuring itself. He is fighting the apparat where it has created its own power and everyday unconstitutional "autonomy". The fact that Gorbachev climbed the apparat stairs to become the country's leader only proves that there were no other stairs before 1985. In order to create alternative opportunities Gorbachev relied on his own human and democratic qualities that survived that past.

Gorbachev once admitted that he had never expected the depth of the abyss the country was on the brink of. He also said there were fears at the start of perestroika regarding the progress of the human rights issue. There were no fears as regards the success of planned economic reform.

When Gorbachev was put forward as the most "trusty" leader among the younger men, he didn't attempt perestroika on the present scale. He wanted to make things move faster, a renewal rather than a completely new construction. But then there emerged an abyss here, a danger there and a trap somewhere else. Everywhere officials guarding their own turf: Be our leader, but let us live like we used to. The only way out of the deadlock was deep-going, fundamental, revolutionary reform. Thus perestroika went deeper.

Gorbachev demonstrated his inexperience, or was it his lack of power, when he failed in the first of his attempted reforms—the notorious decree to fight alcoholism. Mocking it at the time, we could hardly expect to hear words about common human values so soon, then we saw Sakharov return from internal exile and Soviet troops from Afghanistan. We saw the birth of an almost uncensored press, discussion of Party reform and real Republican sovereignty.

Most Soviet leaders have taken pride in their worker or peasant origins. Few of them, however, can preserve their psychological link with the people at the height of their career. Khrushchev managed it, but overdid it. Gorbachev is trying to keep this link with the grassroots. His frankness enables him to stand up to all official statistics, even the top secret.

Gorbachev's "populism" lies in his special wariness, his unwillingness to make desperate moves unless he absolutely has to, in his political circumspection, which might even be excessive at times.

During the conference with the country's leading economists Gorbachev the politician did not dare give them authority over the economy fearing, presumably, that they might immediately delegate this authority to producers. This is the compromise neither the old apparat (which is no longer the main obstacle on the road to reform), nor the people at large are ready for (as the offensive against the cooperative societies indicates). It is no accident that during the economics conference at the CPSU Central Committee Gorbachev reacted to Gavriil Popov's proposal to introduce market economy with elements of free enterprise, as follows: "All I know is that after two weeks of such 'market' economy the entire people will take to the streets and sweep aside any government, however earnestly it might have sworn allegiance to the people."

Realistic as they are, these fears have made Gorbachev's domestic policy doubly cautious. One cannot compromise with the consumer: the goods are either there, or they aren't. But the consumer is also the producer. And a compromise with the latter is possible. What kind? The kind that is now transpiring: sacrificing trading cooperatives in exchange for freedom for the ostensibly state-owned producers.

All things considered, I find Gorbachev a good sport in the best sense of the word. Spurred on by early failures and in the face of sneers from the Politburo patriarchs, he stubbornly pushed ahead. The complex task was a challenge which demanded strength and energy. Where were they to be found? Of course, he had mobilized all that was best in himself, his friends and colleagues, and the society which, perfectly unaware or only half-aware, was "pregnant" with perestroika by April, 1985.

It turned out that "stagnation" reigned everywhere except in most people's minds. Ideas came in a landslide—one more seditious than another, according to the standards of that period. All of them had the attraction of the forbidden and the promise of turning a senile colossus into a real power.

Gorbachev owes much to us, his fellow citizens, for rising from his initial concept of perestroika (restructuring) to the idea of reforming the political system. We steadily ignored decrees like the antidrinking one (indicating that it was a mistake), but eagerly responded to every real innovation. Calls for reform (which we had heard from Brezhnev, too, 20 years before 1985) were perhaps less important than such trifles as a normal human smile and a notable aversion to wearing medals.

We owe our thanks to the West, too, for patiently and eagerly waiting for reforms in the East; for responding benevolently to the first attempts at glasnost; for making much of the seemingly casual mention of universal human values; for explaining to us, using the best

Western scholars, the advantages of Gorbachev's policies we tended to disregard or were too self-conscious to appreciate.

Of tremendous significance for the acceleration of perestroika was Gorbachev's tolerance. I feel that, despite certain outward signs to the contrary (which might be due to changing moods or circumstances), tolerance is Gorbachev's inherent human feature. How annoyingly impatient the left-wing press must have seemed to him all these years! Yet it has remained left-wing and continues to annoy him! How many times he has been pushed into a tough course and forced to apply a "strong hand"! But he has refused throughout! He preferred public humiliation (when the promise to lift the blockade on Armenia within two days was not fulfilled) to sending troops to Azerbaijan. Indeed, how can it be considered a humiliation if the motive behind the action was his ingrained reluctance to take part in the destruction of a country so many former leaders have been so good at destroying? More than once he publicly said he would rather go than allow anything like that to happen.

Gorbachev reminds me of a chess player who always has a hidden reserve of unexpected moves for all sorts of contingencies. More than once he has used such contingencies against the opponents of perestroika, but life has also forced him to use them against the "democratic left"—the interregional group who argue with Gorbachev, while remaining his staunch allies. The problem is how to outplay these opponents without resorting to either conservative or centrist methods? The move must be subtle. What will it be like? I don't know what Gorbachev's reserves are and I don't feel like making public conjecture at this difficult stage of perestroika. However, the fact that, recently, he once again began talking of acceleration (in a more radical sense than back in 1985) is a sure sign to me of his search for a winning move.

It has often been said of late (too often, perhaps) that perestroika has given the people nothing tangible. I don't subscribe to this, but I will not argue the point now. I'd rather dwell on yet another aspect of Gorbachev's enigma: Why doesn't he try to compensate for the apparent "skidding" of economic reform by stepping up the effective social demagoguery we are all so used to?

You can hardly call it political coolheadedness. You may remember that at the beginning of perestroika we were called upon to stand firm for two or three difficult years. We weathered the time patiently, but faced nothing but new promises, which were not kept either.

Now the promises are no longer given, although they are being recalled daily, as if were given earlier today. A similar situation may eventually arise in connection with the affirmation, "A flat for every family by the year 2000!" Hopefully, the strongest barrier to more unrealistic promises is Gorbachev's personal honesty, which is a remarkable quality, so difficult to retain in big-time politics.

Gorbachev is closely monitoring the reactions of the intellectuals to his actions and often seems offended by the lack of understanding on their part. My feeling is that his resentment is being actively fanned by those who keep declaring perestroika the exclusive cause of the working class and blackmailing Gorbachev into choosing between the all-understanding workers and the allegedly wayward (because they lack class conscience), "power-thirsty" and "politically conceited" intellectuals. If this blackmail is going on, the intelligentsia will do well not to concentrate on their grievances (real or imagined) against Gorbachev, let alone ascribe to him injuries inflicted by other characters in the political arena. Playing on human and group weaknesses is a strong argument in politics, especially in backstage politics. We cannot allow Gorbachev to stand backstage alone.

From "taking realities into consideration", through "dialogue", to "consolidation"—these are the key words Gorbachev keeps using in his public addresses. The above formula describes his path towards the perestroika he has in mind, and explains his—and our—success where anyone would have failed long ago.

Today, Gorbachev has two levers: the old one of command, and the new one of democracy. The democratic lever is already moving of its own accord. The command lever is to be eased to the extent the democratic lever gathers strength. Not a degree more or less. This can only be achieved by keeping an eye on the democratic lever, and regulating society's moves with the command lever—until the latter is no longer needed at all.

'Information Policy' Changes Reported

LD0712115289 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1100 GMT 7 Dec 89

[Text] Pleasing news was published today in the newspaper IZVESTIYA. Very soon, fundamental changes in the sphere of information policy are awaiting us. We will, for example, be able to use Xerox machines freely and subscribe to foreign periodicals. In a conversation with IZVESTIYA's diplomatic correspondent, Comrade Petrovskiy, USSR deputy foreign minister, also confirmed that Soviet people will have the opportunity to watch foreign satellite television programs. Any organization or private person will receive the right to acquire a special aerial, to install it on the roof of the house and watch programs put out by the United States, or, let's say, British television companies. The government has already charged the relevant departments with drawing up a draft decision regarding the installation of satellite aerials by 1 June next year.

Lithuanians Abolish Communist Power Monopoly

AU0712110089 Paris AFP in English 1042 GMT
7 Dec 89

[Text] MOSCOW, Dec 7 (AFP)—The Lithuanian parliament Thursday abolished the Communist Party's monopoly on power in the Baltic republic, officials in Vilnius said.

The republic's Supreme Soviet (parliament) thus becomes the first in the Soviet Union to abolish the article of the Constitution that affirms the leading role of the Communist Party.

Lithuanians Postpone Article 6 Amendment Debate

LD0712135689 Vilnius in Lithuanian to North America
0100 GMT 7 Dec 89

[Excerpts] Rima Jakutyte, Vilnius radio news presenter, reports on the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet debate on Article 6 of the Constitution.

[Jakutyte] The debates on this issue was stopped by Algirdas Brazauskas himself. He proposed that the constitutional commission hold yet another meeting and rethink their decision. During the break, the constitutional committee held another meeting, and later held council with all deputies who are members of the Communist Party. A proposal was made in the evening session to amend Articles 6 and 7 of the Constitution and to adopt a decision concerning political parties. The new edition of Article 6 of the Constitution reads as follows: Parties, public organizations, and public movements are a part of the political system of Lithuania. These parties and organizations as well as organs corresponding to them are set up according to the order established by the law and the activity of these proceed within the boundaries of the law and the Constitution of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR].

The status of the present day Lithuanian Communist Party in the proposed decision to be adopted on political parties is as follows: To recognize the currently existing Lithuanian Communist Party as the party which took over the rights of the Lithuanian Communist Party registered at the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania on 25 of June 1940. To entrust to the Supreme Soviet Presidium the task of defining the order of registration of political parties which will continue to be valid until the law on political parties in Lithuania has been adopted.

An amendment to Article 7 in the Constitution has not been included in the agenda of the session. However, it was discussed and this is only logical because Article 7 legalized the All-Union Lenin Komsomol which no longer exists in Lithuania. [passage omitted]

Such a turn in the Supreme Soviet session did not raise any more debates and there was nothing left for deputies but to carry out their mission—to adopt these historic decisions. And the fact that this has not been done can perhaps be blamed on our quick temper when the aspired aim is right here—to grab at it without delay.

The possible defeat at the session was anticipated most by Lionginas Sepetys, chairman of the session, who scrupulously checked the number of deputies present at the session, and proposed to take a vote as to when—

today or tomorrow—the deputies would wish to take a ballot on these decisions. The deputies voted to do it today. [passage omitted]

In order to give you a better understanding of why the defeat took place today I would like to give you some figures: There are 342 deputies at the Supreme Soviet. Only 258 deputies took part in the session. To have a decision adopted two thirds of the total number of deputies must vote in favor of the motion. Therefore, 228 deputies had to vote in favor of the amendment. Unfortunately, only 219 deputies voted in favor of the amendment of Article 6 of the Constitution. One was against and 30 deputies abstained. Several deputies did not take part in the ballot and even left the hall. [passage omitted]

Passions were high again. Proposals were advanced to make the results of the ballot invalid with the understanding that this issue was too serious to have decided by such a small difference in votes. There was a proposal that this question of the agenda be adjourned until tomorrow and discussed again [passage omitted]

At this crucial point, the chairman of the session, Lionginas Sepetytis took a resolute step using his powers as chairman by declaring that the issue had not been prepared properly. Stopping the debate on the issue he declared that this issue should be discussed at tomorrow's session.

Lithuanian Communist Party's Future Viewed

PM0512131589 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 5 Dec 89 Second Edition p 2

["Lithuanian Communist's Letter" by S. Balyutskiy, agent of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee Ideological Department: "It Is Necessary to Determine Oneself"; first paragraph is SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA introduction]

[Text] The central newspapers recently published M.S. Gorbachev's appeal "To the Communists of Lithuania." The first to familiarize themselves with it were the participants in a Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee plenum and the inhabitants of this Baltic republic. "And it was perceived in very different ways," Sergey Balyutskiy, senior official of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee, wrote to the editorial office. "This is not surprising: Public opinion in the republic has attained a critical polarization. Some said: 'At last!' And some said: 'So what?'"

Vilnius—So what is happening in Lithuania? This question regularly comes to the surface among public opinion probably not only in my republic but also in the country and even in the world. Many people answer briefly and categorically. Only the replies are frequently like "ice and fire," diametrically opposed to each other.

"Lithuania has stridden further than anyone along the path of democratization and perestroika!" some say.

"Save socialism in Lithuania!" others appeal.

Who is right? Whom are we to believe? For many of my fellow citizens the reply to these questions determines the choice of the political force to which they can entrust their fate and, thus, the choice of the future—their own and that of their children and grandchildren.

When the talk turns to self-determination, you most frequently think of concepts such as "interethnic relations," "the right of nations," and "the federal system of the Union." All this is so. Or, more accurately, it was so when the right to self-determination remained just a declaration and when—for the umpteenth time!—that multifacetedness and inexhaustibility of life which recently we used to acknowledge, at best, only in philosophical monographs had not been manifested.

The nations' self-determination has become a reality today. This right is not only recognized unconditionally by practically everyone but is also already being realized. And the general secretary rightly pointed out in his appeal: A fundamentally new political situation has been created and has released the colossal energy of public awareness.

The laws of the Baltic republics, Moldavia, the Ukraine, and Uzbekistan on language, on social security for certain groups of the population, on elections, on the referendum—what are these, if not the realization of the right to self-determination? If, of course, we understand this not in the former, "precise" formulation, meaning only the right to secession, but more broadly and more humanely—as the right to decide our own fate ourselves and to build our own life ourselves.

Yes, the nations' right to self-determination includes unconditionally and without fail the right to secession, which is one aspect of the nations' sovereignty. Or, more accurately, the people's sovereignty. For what is decided with the resolution of the question of secession is the fate not just of one nation but of all the nations, ethnic groups, and national groups living in the republic and of its every inhabitant.

But oh how difficult it is to determine for oneself how to live—to self-determine!—in Lithuania today... Difficult for everyone. Both for its indigenous inhabitants and, particularly, for people who, to use official language, are not part of the nation which gave its name to the republic. (There is no way I can get accustomed to the following terms, which have recently become widespread: "Russian-speaking population" and "non-Russians").

The Law on Citizenship of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] was adopted in the republic in November. The debate on it had started long before. At least three drafts of the law were published in the press. Practically all political forces were involved in discussing them. Special newspaper rubrics, cycles of television programs, public opinion polls which, however, did

more to shape opinion than to disclose it, rallies, pickets—this, in general outline, was the atmosphere which preceded its adoption...

Any law is like a cutting edge. In certain hands, skilled, noble hands, it can serve life, like a surgeon's scalpel. In others...

This applies doubly to the Law on Citizenship. Governing citizens' relations with the state, it can unite them as a single people or it can split them into mutually warring groups, grouplets, and groupings...

What of the law adopted in Lithuania? So as not to appear prejudiced, since I myself took a quite active part in the discussion, I will cite the opinion of it given in the article "On the Way to a Rule-of-Law State" carried in the republic newspaper TIESA 15 November this year. Commenting on an opinion poll among Supreme Soviet deputies, the correspondent asks: "Will the legal guarantees (accorded by the Law on Citizenship—author) strengthen the faith of people of other nationalities in the future, and will they feel better protected?" And he himself replies: "Two-fifths of deputies answered the question in the affirmative, but half doubted it."

I will not say that this conclusion came as a surprise to many people. (True, it is somewhat surprising that the figures cited above differ significantly from the voting results—the Law on Citizenship was adopted practically unanimously). Why? Again I will cite a newspaper. This time, the Vilnius VECHERNIYE NOVOSTI, which 17 November this year carried an interview with one of the leaders of the "Sajudis" movement. This states, in particular, that, following the adoption of the Law on Citizenship, the republic's society has been "granted the opportunity (by adopting citizenship of the Lithuanian SSR) to dissociate itself from fulfilling the civic duties laid down by the USSR Constitution... Our constitutional conflict with the unitarian USSR is assuming a serious nature and scale for the first time."

Just so! It turns out that only by "dissociating" yourself and participating in the "conflict with the unitarian USSR" can you become a citizen of Lithuania.

But what about those who do not wish to do this? To this question too the same leader gave a reply which was set forth in issue No 40 of the newspaper VOZROZHDENIYE, the organ of "Sajudis":

"...Do you Lithuanian Poles, our brothers, agree to build the Lithuanian state together with us? If so, here is our hand on it, and we will march together without any 'mistrust'—both you and we were equally hounded (to death—author) and even driven out of ourselves by Stalin's boys! If you do not agree—go there, where your motherland is, and become its citizens. You Russian brothers, you do not believe us and want to protect the 'minimum of trust'—Soviet power? But wait, perhaps this time we should express mistrust in you. And this is what we will do as soon as the day for the adoption of

citizenship comes. Because we are creating the Lithuanian state, not Russia! Are soldiers citizens or not? No? Then what question can there be of their participation in elections? Is this clear? Clear enough, I think."

It really is clear enough. The Poles must be divided into "Poles of Lithuania" and simply Poles. The former must without a shadow of doubt follow...follow whom? The Lithuanian people? Or those who speak in the name of the Lithuanian people? And the latter—those who do not want to follow they know not whom and go they know not where—good riddance to them.

It is not even proposed that the Russians participate in the building of the Lithuanian state. They will simply be shown mistrust, which will have to be embodied in something specific after the adoption of the Law on Citizenship.

The law has been adopted, and nothing "specific" has happened. So am I, perhaps, simply fueling passions?

Only after adoption—this is not just tomorrow but also in 1 week's time, 1 month's time, 1 year's time. This means—wait and see... Wait for what? I do not know. Quite a lot of doubts and simply fear has been put into many souls. Many people feel confused and impotent today.

For, according to the law, we can use our present passport for only 2 years (!)—no, we do not remain citizens of the USSR. This is all that determines the relationship between citizenship of the Lithuanian SSR and citizenship of the USSR.

But is self-determination possible under such conditions—under conditions of total uncertainty?

Naturally, the following questions also arise: "What is the Communist Party's place in the political system? What should the Lithuanian Communist Party itself be like? What should its ties with the CPSU be like?"—this is a far from full list of the questions being actively discussed today in primary party organizations and at party committee plenums, in the press and on television, in lines and buses. Yes, yes! In lines and buses, at workplaces, and when visiting people, one way or another the conversation boils down to the future of the Lithuanian Communist Party.

Was this debate necessary? Both at the 18th Lithuanian Communist Party Plenum, which announced it, and later the opinions voiced on this score were frequently diametrically opposed.

The debate in the Lithuanian Communist Party also has its own special features connected, of course, with the sentiments in society and with the political situation which exists in the republic. The public atmosphere filled almost to overflowing with national ideas, national symbols, and national history is the reality of the present day in the republic.

It is possible to ask: "Is this a good thing?" But...is it possible? Is it possible to assess national feelings, national priorities, national traditions? For the spiritual world of a nation and its freedom and independence are akin to freedom of conscience, the guarantee of which is one of the values common to all mankind.

Both the published drafts of the Lithuanian Communist Party program—one prepared by a Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee commission and the other by a group of the creative and scientific intelligentsia—have been painted in national colors. And there would be nothing bad in this. But, imposed on the crisis situation that exists throughout the party today, it is precisely national factors that have become dominant in the general concept of a way out of the crisis set forth in the drafts, pushing social factors into the background and, in the final analysis, even coming into conflict with them.

Indeed, can statements that the future Lithuanian Communist Party will unite Communists of all nationalities—not that it can be otherwise in a Communist Party!—be combined with the thesis that it expresses, as recorded in one of the drafts of the program, "above all the will and interests of the Lithuanian nation"?

Of course, the defense of national interests, the creation of conditions guaranteeing not only the nation's survival but also its development, and the possibility of self-expression must be among the party's chief tasks. But would a national policy providing for the equal and equitable satisfaction of the national interests of the Lithuanian nation and all the national groups living in the republic really wound the Lithuanian nation in some way and do it out of its fair share? Instead of this, we frequently see the desire, as M.S. Gorbachev put it, to disperse "to national apartments" and immerse oneself in one's own passions.

This is how delegates to the future 20th Extraordinary Lithuanian Communist Party Congress assess the draft program documents in VMESTE I NARAVNE, the newspaper of the Socialist Federation of Lithuania's Working People.

Doctor of Historical Sciences Professor M. Burokyavichyus on the draft prepared by the creative and scientific intelligentsia group: "The group for preparing the latter does not actively adhere to the platform of the CPSU, to the platform of Marxism-Leninism."

Doctor of Historical Sciences Professor I. Yermalavichyus on the draft prepared by the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee commission: "The draft 'Fundamentals of the Lithuanian Communist Party Program' cannot be either the basis of the party's program or its action platform. This document does not indicate the way out of the situation that has arisen, out of the economic crisis. The drafts of both documents do not contain a clear-cut communist, party-minded view. This is a collective withdrawal from the CPSU."

I also cite these quotes to show how far removed the ideas enshrined in the documents are from the right to claim to express the views of all Lithuanian Communists.

It is paradoxical and bitter to divide up Communists according to nationality. But this is not my invention. The danger of a split in the Lithuanian Communist Party really does exist.

Yes, terms like "factions," "split," and "federalism" which—or so it seemed to us earlier—could exist only in textbooks on party history. Factions today are a reality of the Lithuanian Communist Party's internal life. Or at least one faction, operating beneath the slogan "A Sovereign Party for a Sovereign Republic," which shaped itself into the "Coordinating Council for the Solution and Implementation of the Problem of the Lithuanian Communist Party's Status." What are the criteria for belonging to it? They are very simple. The Coordinating Council's platform for the 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress says: To advocate the perestroika of "the Lithuanian SSR's party organization into an autonomous Lithuanian Communist Party which will build relations with the CPSU on the basis of partnership and not on the basis of principles of subordination." Other options—like perestroika and renewal of the Lithuanian Communist Party jointly with the CPSU and democratization of internal party ties—are not acceptable.

During the course of debate within the Vilnius City party organization, all primary organizations should have discussed and adopted one of the three options setting out the Lithuanian Communist Party's possible future: The Lithuanian Communist Party should remain as it was, nothing in it ought to be changed; the Lithuanian Communist Party ought to undergo radical perestroika but should remain part of the CPSU; the Lithuanian Communist Party can be renewed only provided it withdraws from the CPSU.

And so, less than 10 percent of Communists were in favor of the first option. But, with a stubbornness worthy of better application, those who favored the second option—renewal of the Lithuanian Communist Party as part of a renewed CPSU—are today for some reason also classed as advocates of stagnation. Autonomy of the republican party organization is neither someone's whim nor someone's invention. Just like the republic's economic and cultural autonomy, it is a commandment of the time. But does this rule out the unity of the CPSU? Not "barracks" unity when everything, right down to the structure of party committees, was being decided hundreds of kilometers away from the republic, but a true party unity, perceived as the unity of like-minded people who, as M.S. Gorbachev writes, have the same fundamental goals?

I do not think that it does. One of the posters displayed on the picket line outside the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee building on the day of the

plenum read: "Fully Autonomous Lithuanian Communist Party, Not a 'Part of.'" Indeed, can there be an autonomous Lithuanian Communist Party as part of the CPSU? The answer would seem obvious. But counterarguments cross one's mind: How autonomous is someone working within a collective? How autonomous is a plant collective working on a republic's territory and obeying its laws? The answers to these questions are not all that simple. After all, the autonomy and unity which are most often in effect today are the legacy of the times of dogmatism. Autonomy is taken to mean a complete break in relations. Unity is taken to mean total subordination. The fact that these terms have still not been filled with the content of perestroika provides one more argument in favor of not being hasty. Their new perception can be formulated only collectively, by the entire party at its 28th congress.

Nor is there today an answer to these questions: What sort of ties will exist between the Lithuanian Communist Party and the CPSU, what will be the legal status of Communists deciding not to join the party that will be created? Even those who can and must answer them seem to sweep them aside as frivolous or at least premature.

But is this really so? After all, while we are pondering whether they are premature or frivolous, the commentator on one television program declared in a businesslike and calm tone of voice that the CPSU will undoubtedly be outlawed on the republic's territory following the Lithuanian Communist Party congress. Dubious? Unrealistic? But one USSR people's deputy proposed at the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet session that activity by other states' political parties should be banned in Lithuania. Don't be deceived by the words "other states." Neither the U.S. Republicans, nor Britain's Conservatives, nor any other party intend to establish a base in Lithuania. The "Aesopian" language of this proposal indicates the CPSU... We are still waiting for something to happen. We were waiting for the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee plenum which has only just been held. Much of what is on my mind was discussed at the plenum and, of course, will be on the agenda of the extraordinary Lithuanian Communist Party congress (to be held in December). By that time, each and every Communist living in the republic should have made his choice. Oh, how difficult this choice is.

I am writing these lines knowing in advance that I shall be accused of bias, of charging the atmosphere, and God knows what else. But no matter what accusations are leveled, they will not make the aforementioned questions go away. And yet questions without answers are already problems. And problems cannot remain unsolved. Unsolved problems are an exceptionally explosive material. Nobody can tell where the explosion will take place, be it at a rally with extremist outbursts or in the heart, with a blood vessel. And behind all this stand living people, for whom a separate path is a path to nowhere.

Lithuanian KGB Chief Discusses Tasks

LD0612113789 Moscow TASS in English 1021 GMT
6 Dec 89

[Text] Vilnius December 6 TASS—By TASS special correspondents Yuriy Sizov and Kazis Uscila:

For the first time in their history the Soviet KGB [State Committee for State Security] is now playing a dual role. In addition to its direct duties of ensuring the country's security, it is now rehabilitating persons subjected to repressions during Stalin's rule.

"Jointly with the republic's Procurator's Office, the Lithuanian KGB has already exonerated more than 3,000 people," Eduardas Eismuntas, Lithuanian KGB chief, told TASS. He noted also that it would be wrong to say that there was no organized armed resistance of local nationalists during the first years of Soviet power in the republic (1940).

"The war and the post-war period," Eismuntas said, "brought incalculable sufferings to the Lithuanian people. As many as 370,000 Lithuanians were killed by German occupationists or local collaborationists between 1941-1944."

Speaking of the Nazi criminals who avoided punishment by fleeing abroad, Eismuntas said that the Lithuanian KGB was still hunting for them. Many of them now reside in the United States, West Germany and Great Britain.

"The republic's prosecuting bodies," he said, "recently prepared materials for the extradition of Antanas Gecavičius, a Nazi criminal and former chief of a punitive police detachment, who now lives in Edinburgh, in Great Britain.

Assessing the progress of perestroika in Lithuania, the KGB chief stressed that it had galvanised society, stirred up unprecedented political activity. This evokes the West's legitimate interest in Lithuania.

In 1989 alone the republic was visited by 14,000 people from capitalist countries. The republic is glad to receive guests. Many regulations restricting the movement of foreigners have now been lifted.

"Such steps strengthen international understanding and do away with suspicions and tension," Eismuntas stressed. "At the same time, it is obvious that some foreign guests interfere directly in the republic's domestic affairs. The KGB has facts showing that several foreigners are rendering extremist forces in the republic not only moral, but also material assistance."

Eismuntas described this as interference fraught with grave consequences.

In conclusion the KGB chief expressed concern about the fact that forces hostile to the constitutional system in the republic have become intolerant of differing views and assessments, although they themselves pretend to

advocate pluralism and freedom of expression. "Political blackmail and labelling have become quite commonplace. Moreover threats to resort to violence and calls to take up arms are occasionally voiced," he said.

"The job of the KGB is to ensure normal conditions for perestroika in the country," Eismuntas stressed.

Sajudis Head Argues for Baltic Independence

PM0512150589 Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 22 Nov 89 p 5

[Sajudis Chairman Vytautas Landsbergis "Debate" article: "Do Andersson's Words Hold?"]

[Text] Swedish Foreign Minister Sten Andersson asserts that only a minority of Balts wants independence. He is wrong.

The real popular movements in the Baltic region—the people's fronts in Estonia and Latvia and the national reform movement Sajudis in Lithuania—have as their goal the independence of the Baltic states. We are not minorities, still less are we extremists.

This fall Sajudis collected 1.8 million signatures on a petition protesting the proposed changes to the Soviet constitution. Thus over half of Lithuania's 3.5 million inhabitants signed the petition.

In a declaration on Lithuania's national day, 16 February, last winter the Sajudis delegates' assembly declared that the movement's goal is a democratic and neutral Lithuania whose political system is to be decided by the people without diktat from outside. On the same day mass meetings were arranged in Vilnius and Kaunas where Sajudis' promise to fight for Lithuania's freedom was announced. In the subsequent elections to the Soviet Congress of People's Deputies Sajudis candidates won 36 out of 42 possible seats.

This summer we in Lithuania collected signatures in support of an appeal that the 1939-1941 Hitler-Stalin pact be condemned and its consequences swept away via the withdrawal of the Soviet Army of occupation from Lithuania. We also asked for the addresses of those people who signed the appeal. This meant that initially people were afraid to sign, since lists of names and addresses could be used as readymade deportation lists if the Soviet power were again to begin sending Balts to Siberia. But people plucked up their courage at Sajudis' call, and over 1.5 million people signed.

On the 50th anniversary of the Nazi-Soviet pact, 23 August this year, the Sajudis Executive Committee adopted a declaration which once again clearly set out our goal—an independent Lithuania not subject to Soviet legislation or administration. That same afternoon the Baltic chain from Tallinn to Vilnius was formed by Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Russians, Jews, Swedes, and others taking each other's hands to

demonstrate our common desire for the reinstatement of historical truth. This "extremist minority" numbered 2 million people.

Assertions that only an "extremist minority" in Lithuania and the rest of the Baltic region wants to become independent are irresponsible. Such assertions unfortunately give the impression that, out of everything said and done in the Baltic region in the last 2 years, the Swedish Government only hears what it wants to hear and only says what Moscow wants to hear. It is sad that the Swedish Government, in the struggle between the Soviet Union and the Baltic states, has taken Moscow's side ever since 1940.

Swedish volunteers shed their blood to prevent Finland being occupied during the Winter War, despite the fact that in their criminal deal Molotov and Ribbentrop had agreed that Finland, like Estonia and Latvia—and later Lithuania too—could be occupied by Stalin with Hitler's approval. If Stalin's blitzkrieg against Finland had succeeded, would the Swedish Government take the view today that the Finnish people voluntarily joined the Soviet Union?

The view of the Baltic people is clear and is voiced openly. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were occupied in the summer of 1940 as a result of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and the base agreements the Soviet Government forced onto the Baltic governments. This has been stated recently by the Supreme Soviets of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

The fate of the Baltic peoples is therefore an international problem which still remains to be solved today. The problem was not created by Estonia, Latvia, or Lithuania, but by the policy of the Soviet Union from 1939 to 1989. Those in power in Moscow are not chiefly being pressurized by the Baltic peoples, but by their own guilty consciences. Mikhail Gorbachev's policy of reform must therefore contain a de-Stalinization of the Soviet state, if the Soviet Union is to win lasting confidence in it abroad and no longer be seen as a threat to other countries, most importantly neighbors like Sweden. As far as the Baltic states are concerned, Moscow must be given help to choose developments in the direction of democracy and justice. This is in the free world's own interests.

In Moscow people follow very carefully how far we in Sajudis—and the people's fronts in Estonia and Latvia—are prepared to go. Without doubt they also take account of reactions abroad when determining their policy. They want to know whether the rest of the world is taken in by the propaganda that the friends of reform in the Baltic region are moving forward too quickly and are threatening Gorbachev's position, or whether it will continue to support a continued peaceful policy of renewal in the Baltic states.

As a neighbor Sweden has a special responsibility to tell the Soviet Union that it considers that the current peaceful developments must be allowed to continue. If

Sweden shoulders that responsibility you could help to ensure that the Baltic region becomes free. But it does not look as though the Swedish Government is prepared to assume that responsibility.

Last Saturday [18 November] Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson is reported to have said that it is not Sweden's business to demand freedom for the Baltic region. Last Monday the foreign minister is said to have explained to Baltic demonstrators that Sweden is now suddenly demanding "democracy and independence" for the Baltic region. At the same time others are saying that the foreign minister does not mean what he says, but on the contrary means "self-rule" within the framework of the Soviet Union. Could we have a clear message from Sweden's prime minister or foreign minister: Does Sweden support our call for "independence" or does it just support "self-rule" within the framework of the Soviet Union?

In the absence of any clarification, the impression remains that the Swedish Government seems to be more interested in struggles for freedom in distant lands. But we hope that in the longer term the Swedish people will be able to get their government also to support their Baltic neighbors in our common striving for freedom. The occupation of the Baltic region and the ensuing terror were after all crimes against humanity, and under international law such crimes must be put to rights.

We know that Sweden's then government recognized the occupation. But that government no longer exists. We also know that the Swedish Riksdag never debated or approved this recognition. Above all, Sweden as a democratic state should concern itself with the fates of other democratic states.

That is why it would be valuable if the Swedish Government were to declare to the Soviet Union that the continued occupation of the Baltic states does not strengthen the picture of a Soviet Union seeking peace. It is difficult to see how the Soviet Union will be able to enjoy full confidence in the West if it has committed aggression against its neighbors and continues to enjoy the fruits of this aggression. If, however, the Soviet leaders were to agree to restore to us Balts our independence, the Soviet Union would score an enormous diplomatic success. It would also undoubtedly derive greater economic benefit from the Baltic region as independent states than as occupied union republics. A free Baltic region would be the best proof that the military-industrial complex in the Soviet Union has lost its power and that the old political thinking has been replaced by new.

Brazauskas Interviewed on Politburo Meeting

*LD2311120189 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian
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[Interview with Algirdas Brazauskas, Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee first secretary, by correspondent B. Rupeika in Vilnius on 17 November]

[Text] [B Rupeika] I am thinking about the first question. Well I think it would be best of all if I asked you: Is your reaction good or bad to the sitting of the Politburo, having returned from Moscow?

[A. Brazauskas] Well, you ask me so directly—good or bad. Well, if I take a generalized look at what took place yesterday I can say that it is good. But then of course the word good does not embrace all the speeches and the wide discussion which lasted for several hours. However, going back to your question I would like to say that things are good. Good because the congress will take place.

[Rupeika interrupting] ...of the Lithuanian Communist Party?

[Brazauskas] Yes, the Lithuanian Communist Party congress will take place. We have to do a considerable amount of work before the day the congress convenes, but then this is clear and this was foreseen already. We have to think over our draft documents, although these were already made public. But they were hurriedly prepared. Of course some statements will have to be given deeper thought and consideration. However, the issue of an independent Lithuanian Communist Party will be discussed. That can be confirmed today.

Well, a lot was said during the discussion. I do not think I can tell it all in one sitting.

[Rupeika] Then I will ask you in a different way. Eight hours of nighttime is for sleep. However I think you were thinking more about what happened there in Moscow rather than sleeping.

[Brazauskas] I had been thinking about it for a long time before I went there. And of course now that I have returned I would even like to get away from all this to some extent. However, it is very difficult because some statements made there were right and some of them were wrong, in my opinion. One must always think and consult the members of the bureau again. The event, of course, is absolutely unprecedented, that all the members of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau were summoned to take part at a sitting of the CPSU Politburo. This no doubt, is far from regular.

[Rupeika] And the essence of this event would be that the Lithuanian Communist Party is resolutely moving along the road to independence.

[Brazauskas] Yes, this is the essence, and the main topic of our discussion was the preparation for our congress. The discussion started with the question why there was a need for a congress, why the decision was adopted to convene the 20th Congress of the Lithuanian Communist Party so early, before the draft program documents of the CPSU had been made public? These should be discussed at the congress. And here we are the first; well, of course we are the pioneers and it is much more difficult for us. This has been widely discussed. Both my

colleagues and I tried to explain to the Politburo members why this congress is needed.

[Rupeika] Was this a talk between two equal partners or was it a sitting of an auditing commission?

[Brazauskas] Oh, no. This was not a sitting of an auditing commission. I can tell you that this was a discussion held by two equal partners.

[Rupeika] And right from the start?

[Brazauskas] Well, at the begining there was much greater tension then at the end of the discussion. As I understand it, the members of the Politburo had information from official sources. When they heard the arguments from our lips, about the situation here in this republic, they understood that certain processes do take place here in social and political life which give rise to such cardinal actions as the congress of the Communist Party.

[Rupeika] Perhaps this sitting is an initial model of the relationship between the future independent Lithuanian Communist Party and the CPSU Central Committee Politburo?

[Brazauskas] No, first of all I do not think that one can fix some unchanging model because processes which currently are taking place rapidly. Therefore, it is difficult to tell what the pattern of contacts will be in the near future...

[Rupeika interrupts] However, secretary, this kind of [word indistinct] is not common over there in the Kremlin?

[Brazauskas] Yes we can say that this does not happen often. This is the first case. However, I already said at our last plenum that relations with the center, if I can use this abbreviated form, the center of the party, have lately undergone a considerable change, a change for the better. Because today we are already working independently. Indeed, it is not what it used to be a year and a half or 2 years ago. There is no comparison.

[Rupeika] Well, even the telephone here in your study is much silenter that a good half a year ago.

[Brazauskas] Oh, well, there are times when the telephone rings very often. These quite often are local conversations. But then now we do not have any more categoric instructions, say, to discuss this or that question, or other statements concerning cadres. Now this form of contact is no longer there. And in fact this independence is starting to achieve the practical meaning of independence. However, the legal side, the juridical formulation of the Communist Party's status is lagging behind. This is perhaps one of the reasons why the legalization, or rather the official registration of this independence which has arisen, becomes logical.

[Rupeika] Let us remember one of your previous interviews when you said that this silence, the silence of

contacts with Moscow—no interference in Lithuanian affairs—could be the calm before the storm.

[Brazauskas] I would not by any means like to say that this was a clash of different potentials, by no means. The objectives of perestroika are common. They are common indeed. However, there were numerous questions which had to be clarified: What is the sovereignty of the republic? How is this sovereignty interpreted by the members of the bureau and what is my interpretation? I had to explain this. What component parts, according to us, should be included in the legalization of statehood, or sovereignty? After several members of our bureau reported on this issue I could see that the Politburo members also began to understand the essence of the main statements.

[Rupeika] And nevertheless, listening to this quiet narration now after 24 hours one begins to doubt, as if nothing were heard and seen before. There has been no reaction to anything. It looks as if it were an exam of some kind. I cannot find any other name for it. Do you and your colleagues feel that way?

[Brazauskas] Yes, you can say it was an exam. And it was not an easy exam for me or my colleagues. There were many questions which we had to answer. However, once again going back retrospectively to yesterday, I consolidate that the statements and ideas I voiced here in Lithuania, say during our meetings, or at individual working collectives, with people in Lithuania on the main issues, such as the whole idea of sovereignty, or the restoration of national statehood and the circle of problems this would involve—verifying and weighing everything I said there [in Moscow] once again—I can say that I voiced the same ideas and thoughts I am talking about at home here in Lithuania, things I am saying now.

[Rupeika] Perhaps this is not a very good idea. You and the people who support you do not play the behind-the-scenes game. Perhaps this is your weak spot.

[Brazauskas] I do not think this is my weak spot. If I do not have a firm stand point and say one thing at this meeting and quite a different at the next, then of course I would not be able to sustain peoples confidence in me for a long time, when I hold a responsible post or am a responsible man...

[Rupeika interrupts] Well which would be more precise, perhaps being a responsible man.

[Brazauskas] Yes, perhaps. But then perhaps these ideas and statements are not always acceptable to everyone. It is evident that considerable differences of opinion exist in our lives and people are taking an active part in political life, or to be more precise, they talk politics. Therefore, each word uttered by somebody, and even by myself, I would imagine is subject to comments. Some people agree, others disagree.

[Rupeika] Perhaps you did not know that Lithuanian radio reports are quickly heard not only abroad but also in Moscow.

[Brazauskas] Yes, nowadays such technical possibilities do exist, that a word uttered by a man into a microphone is heard almost simultaneously.

[Rupeika] Did you receive any reproaches in Moscow yesterday that you contact Lithuania too often, every week?

[Brazauskas] On the contrary. There was a question how the ideas, convictions, and standpoints of the members of the bureau and the secretaries are voiced. Well, I said that this was done through the mass media: newspapers, radio, television and all these means are available. If somebody wishes, he can express his views at any time. There were also remarks that sometimes I also speak too often. This does not concern our conversations. However, foreign correspondents are greatly interested in the events in Lithuania; there are many journalists here in Lithuania and they make efforts to meet me. I think there are two reasons why the number of these encounters should be reduced. First, the preparation for the congress is under way, there is much work; there is much responsible work and we must concentrate on that. And another reason would be that making a prognosis before the congress which they all would like very much—they ask what will happen, what decisions will be adopted, what can happen—this would be very irresponsible on my part if I began to discuss these things in an assured way, voicing my thoughts with an authority that this is what is going to happen and not this. [Rupeika] And how was the bureau of our Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee? I would think that people have expressed views on new subjects.

[Brazauskas] I more or less understand what you are driving at. I can tell you this: members of our Politburo in the main spoke unanimously at the Politburo session yesterday in Moscow. And indeed, no diametrically different points of view were voiced.

[Rupeika] Let us continue. Which one of those who went with you to Moscow and made a report there would you single out? Juras Pozela said briefly on the phone that the leaders of Lithuanian Communist Party had not changed their positions.

[Brazauskas] Yes, this is indeed what had happened. His speech was very interesting, and he also spoke on a topic which is very complex and very sensitive: matters of national statehood. All the Politburo members including Gorbachev listened attentively to his speech, which was very well argued. His speech, of course, was rather different from the speeches we made. We are the people who directly participate in the political life and we are organizing the congress. He is the person who is able to take a look at all these political events currently taking place here in Lithuania from an objective point of view.

I liked the speech made by Alfonsas Maldonis [Lithuanian poet]. He also paid much attention in his speech not only to the processes taking place here in Lithuania, that is, the process of the party renewal, the key issues in the party program, and the statutes which are being prepared, but he also spoke about the restructuring processes taking place in the entire Soviet Union; he pointed out that the processes that are taking place here in Lithuania could not be viewed as local processes only, isolating these from everything that is taking place outside the republic. He said that those processes which sometimes could be labelled as radical were also taking place in other places, in other republics too in the USSR, and even outside the USSR.

[Rupeika] Usually when you make a speech and when the situation is tense, Vladimiras Beriozovas makes a speech too. Did he make a speech?

[Brazauskas] Well, you know as a second secretary, he has to make a speech. He spoke immediately after me. His speech was more about party-organizational matters, about the party rules which are currently in force. His speech was of course a concrete one. Well, I do not want the task of commenting every speech that was made there by members of the team.

[Rupeika] Well, I see how tired you are, so I will ask you a different question. Who and what rendered you the greatest support?

[Brazauskas] You mean from our people? I simply would not be able to single out any one in particular. I think that everyone supported and held the same corner of the hut. Well, as people say, we were all holding on to the same corner of the hut; it was both heavy and important, however, we all held onto it.

[Rupeika] It would be very interesting to hear how some well known members of the Politburo, such as E. Shevardnadze and, Y. Ligachev, presented their position.

[Brazauskas] Yes, Comrade Shevardnadze made a speech. He provided a political evaluation of the processes taking place in the Baltics. He spoke about the effect these processes might have here in this region, in Eastern Europe, and perhaps in Europe as a whole; he linked these with the events that are currently taking place in the neighboring states, I have in mind those outside the USSR. He also said that the issue of the congress of the Lithuanian Communist Party, where the issue of the independent Lithuanian Communist Party has become so apparent recently, is widely linked with other issues and that it could not be regarded as an event in the internal life of the party, as a local event. This issue should be looked upon from a wider aspect keeping in mind the possible consequences.

Now, Comrade Ligachev, who as we all know had been engaged in the party-organizational matters, also spoke professionally on these matters. He was interested in who could be elected to the administrative organs of the party, who would these people be, was there a prognosis,

was it possible to foresee? Who would the delegates be? So, these were the party-organizational question.

Well, of course, certain bitter words were addressed to us by him as well as by other members of the Politburo who spoke about...that, well, nevertheless, I would put it this way: perhaps I would compare. What is the priority in the present situation? Is it the majority of the Communist Party members, people, their opinion, or the necessity to hold on to absolutely rigid principles on tactical matters. I do not have strategic objectives in mind. This is taken for granted. I have in mind tactical issues. And as I understand, even M. Gorbachev in his concluding speech at the end of this dragged out meeting said, however, that there could be differences on tactical issues which are aimed at a common goal; strategic aspirations are aimed at the main objectives. Tactics can be of various kinds. We think that our tactics of carefully and sensitively listening to the opinion voiced by the Communist Party members and the people is the method of our work. And there is no other way of working these days. That is what I think. And on several occasions, I made an attempt to stress this.

[Rupeika] So you are not going to change your style of work here, nor could you in Lithuania.

[Brazauskas] Well, you know I am not the only one who determines the style. I am convinced that a common opinion, including mine, should serve as the basis for our work. Of course, the Lithuanian Communist Party must have such a program that would be comprehensible to people that would be acceptable to people. Only then can the party be strong.

[Rupeika] I would like to continue talking to you because the people of Lithuania have been waiting for this talk. However, I see, and I think people will notice while listening, how tired you are. I hope that this tiredness came only today. Well then, very briefly: on the 25th of this month, there is the plenum of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee.

[Brazauskas] Yes there is a plenum on the 25th of this month. Well, we will introduce the materials of this sitting to the members of the central committee as well as the content. We have to do this. There will be other decisions made, too.

[Rupeika] Perhaps there will be some organizational questions?

[Brazauskas] No, we have not planned any organizational questions.

[Rupeika] Did you have to fight for your people?

[Brazauskas] No, I did not. Because there had been discussions on this issue earlier and this time there was no need, the more so that this is not the appropriate time to discuss organizational questions, because the congress is near. And of course, naturally these organizational questions would be discussed and solved at the congress,

because the content of the central committee and the leadership will be elected democratically.

[Rupeika] And at the same time, while talking about the meeting that took place in Moscow, we have to know, we have to be sure that the extraordinary congress of the Lithuanian communist party will be conducted in its own course without somebody trying to twist it one way or another. These attempts will be only from one's study.

[Brazauskas] Of course every river has its own bed as well as the banks. There is no river that would flow from horizon to horizon, overflowing its banks. There are certain drafts of our documents and these are the banks. Where the banks will be is another matter.

[Rupeika] I would like to repeat my first question: Is it good or bad?

[Brazauskas] Well, I can repeat that yesterday's meeting was successful. It is good for Lithuania and I think it is also good for the party.

Lithuanian Leaders Meet Foreign Affairs Officials

90UN0293A Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA
in Russian 1 Nov 89 p 1

[Report by ELTA: "Guests from USSR MFA"]

[Text] On 31 October, USSR Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs V.M. Nikiforov, and Chief of the MFA [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] Department for Union Republics Yu.V. Kuplyakov were in the republic.

The leaders of the USSR MFA held meetings with the Chairman of the Presidium of the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet V. Astrauskas, Second Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Lithuania V. Berezov, and Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the republic P. Ignotas. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Lithuanian SSR V. Mikuchiasukas took part in the conversations.

In the course of the conversations the guests were informed about the social-political situation in the republic, activities of the Communist Party of Lithuania and the government of the republic toward the realization of perestroika.

The issues of including the republic in the working out, implementing and endowing the sovereignty of the republic with real content were discussed extensively.

Guests met with the collective of the MFA of the Lithuanian SSR.

Problems of Lithuanian Conscripts Examined

LD131113889 Vilnius in English to North America
2300 GMT 10 Nov 89

[Text] [First announcer] Both last year and this year people in the Lithuanian capital Vilnius were attracted

by a series of hunger strike actions which took place in one of the central squares. This until quite recently unprecedented form of protest in this country was a means to attract public and consequently government attention to a number of issues—the release of all political prisoners, the withdrawal of the occupational army from Lithuania, and so on. Some of the demands of the hunger strikers have long since been met, others however still seem unrealistic.

[Second announcer] When Lithuania marked the 50th anniversary of the signing of the secret protocol attached to the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact in September the hunger strike in Cathedral Square was called off. A period of relative peace and calm set in and the previous heated political debates that would last well into the night came to an end. The square was now frequented only by numerous tourists, devout believers who came for church services at the cathedral and regular passersby. Everything seemed to have come back to normal.

[First announcer] Yet at the end of October a new plastic covered hut with a wooden cross, Lithuanian flag and numerous placards—the usual regalia of hunger strikers in Lithuania—was put up on exactly the same site where similar actions had taken place.

[Second announcer] This time an elderly woman from a small town in southwest Lithuania declared that she would go on a hunger strike as a sign of protest. More than 10 years ago this woman's son, who was doing his military service in the Soviet Army, was killed due to unknown circumstances and at a peaceful time.

[First announcer] The most painful thing about this tragedy was that this young man was stationed in a military camp located only 300 meters away from his home. Both he and 150 other youths from Lithuania, whose names are carefully inscribed on the hut, fell victim to the so-called non-statutory relations that plague the army. Statistics show that the number of victims from Lithuania who met their deaths under similar circumstances is much higher than those Lithuanian servicemen who were killed in action in Afghanistan.

[Second announcer] The demands made by the woman on the hunger strike in Cathedral Square are not likely to be met in the foreseeable future, since she is determined to put a stop to Lithuanian youths being drafted by the Soviet Army. Her condition is reported to be critical, thus our correspondent failed to interview her. One of the placards stuck on the hut carries the following message: Lithuanian youths cannot be conscripted by the Soviet Army which according to the 1949 Geneva Convention ratified by the Soviet Union in 1954 is an occupational army in Lithuania.

[First announcer] More and more political movements in Lithuania are taking the Geneva Convention, which bans the conscription of youths into the military forces of an occupant state, as the basis of their policies. This

became especially pronounced when the Lithuanian Parliament Commission, set up to analyze the consequences of the 1939 Soviet-Nazi pact, officially announced that Lithuania was illegally incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1940.

[Second announcer] As a result nearly 1,000 Lithuanian men who are either liable to conscription or are reserve officers have refused to have anything to do with the Soviet Army. According to existing Soviet legislation all of them should be court-martialed, since military service in the Soviet Union is compulsory.

[First announcer] So many problems have accumulated in the army that even the top military officials in Moscow can no longer ignore them. Nonstatutory relations is [word indistinct] problem one that faces the Soviet military forces today.

[Second announcer] The Lithuanian public is deeply concerned by what is going on in the army. For most Lithuanian conscripts these conflicts acquire a nationalistic twist which results in endless fights, desertion of the army and even death.

[First announcer] It's no longer a secret to anybody that youths from the Baltic republics are (?tainted) fascists by the army mates from other Soviet republics. This negative tendency has strengthened during the recent years, together with the social political changes taking place in the Baltic states, which have been given biased and often questionable coverage by Soviet mass media.

[Second announcer] A special parliamentary commission has been set up in Lithuania, the only one of its kind in the Soviet Union, to defend the interests of Lithuania's draftees. In a recent meeting between the Lithuanian prime minister and the Soviet defense minister, the latter did not express his outright disapproval nor protested against the commission, which functions in strict accordance with Soviet legislation.

[First announcer] The dialogue between the Lithuanian government and top-level military circles in Moscow has just begun. Meanwhile the Parliamentary Commission, established to defend the interests of Lithuanian draftees, has started investigation of 600 registered violations. So far the Commission has failed to do something about 200 of them, but it [words indistinct] and is determined to continue its struggle.

(Veliya Parilina) is the head of the commission's operational group: We have been successful in those cases where the youths were unlawfully drafted by the army, said (Veliya Parilina). In other words we are correcting the mistakes committed by military enlistment officers who go counter to the existing laws. Soviet legislation (?forced) these certain privileges for draftees who suffer from poor health, who are married, or who have elderly parents to take care of.

[First announcer] The greatest problem that the parliamentary commission faces is linked with deserters. Once

again (Veliya Parilana): During the past few months about 50 army deserters have approached us, said (Veliya Parilana). These youths simply couldn't cope with the moral and physical suffering and torture they are subjected to. We have made it our rule to take care of them. Few military bases are eager to acknowledge the existence of non-statutory relations. However not a single deserter who approached us was court-martialed. On the contrary, those responsible for the goings on were tried, whereas the deserters were transferred to other military bases, says (Veliya Parilana).

[First Announcer] Moscow doesn't even want to even hear about the establishment of national military units, an issue much campaigned for by all the Baltic republics. Available statistics show that the Balts make up 4 percent of the Baltic military navy, while as few as four Lithuanians serve on the ship *Lithuanian Young Communist*. Yet more and more people, at least in Lithuania, agree that the restoration of the Lithuanian state requires dissolution of the Soviet Army's presence on the Lithuanian territory. 2 months ago 1,500,000 signatures were collected under the petition calling for the withdrawal of the Soviet Army from Lithuania.

Informals Criticized Over Draft Boycott

PM2111154589 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 16 Nov 89 Second Edition p 4

[Lieutenant Colonel N. Medvedev article: "Picket Outside the Military Commissariat. Who Is Inciting Young Men To Boycott the Fall Draft in the Baltic Region"]

[Text] I recently met young people in Riga's streets wearing white armbands or bows. They were local pacifists, as they are called here, and they were advocating the introduction by legislative means of alternative (labor) service in the army. At noisy meetings and rallies together with other informals they support the idea of recreating national military formations—essentially their own army—on the territory of the "sovereign state of Latvia."

Passions are also on the boil in the capitals of Lithuania and Estonia, in Kaunas, Shyaulay, Ventspils, and Liyepaya, and in other Baltic cities. The fall draft of young men into the army is at the center of attention. Not a day passes without the headquarters of the Baltic Military District receiving a report of a new attempt to prevent young Letts, Lithuanians, or Estonians from joining the ranks of the motherland's defenders.

"Some people would like to introduce confusion into the minds of young men," USSR People's Deputy Colonel General F. Kuzmin, district commander, said. "Although, and you can see this for yourself, the army draft is so far proceeding without serious hiccups."

...There is a businesslike, humdrum atmosphere at the Latvian republic assembly point. Another team of draftees has just been formed to be sent to the troops. In what mood do the guys depart?

"We are ready for service," Dayris Melngaylis and Andris Bogdanov, draftees from Valmierskiy Rayon, told me. One of them is a graduate of an agricultural vocational and technical college, a machine operator; the other graduated recently from a technical college and is a mechanic by trade.

"My father served in the army, and many men of our village served. Now my turn has come," Andris gazed in a friendly, open way.

"We have to serve," Dayris added solidly. "Difficulties do not frighten me."

Here, at the assembly point, the draftees have already gotten to know each other. The majority of them are from working class and peasant families and have known work ever since childhood. An experienced jurist is on constant duty in the visitors' reception room. On this day I. Fridrikhson, member of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet, was giving advice. He shared the viewpoint of military men: On the whole, the fall draft is proceeding normally.

Nevertheless...I knew that since the spring and summer there had been more frequent cases of refusals to serve in the army in the Baltic region. Several hundred young Letts, Lithuanians, and Estonians had tried to avoid the draft. Things were reaching the point where draft registration slips were being collectively sent to the USSR Ministry of Defense. By the beginning of November, however, there had been an appreciable drop in the number of "refuseniks." There were 7 left in Latvia, 29 in Lithuania, and 2 in Estonia. Military commissariat workers said that this was the result of explanatory work with them. Officers met and talked with literally every such "refusenik" and his parents.

"A curious detail came to light," Colonel V. Teymer, chief of the Latvian Republic Military Commissariat Political Department, said. "Refusals to perform military service were frequently signed actually at rallies. Young people fell for farfetched accusations against the Soviet Army."

Valdis Vyacheslavovich cited an eloquent example. In Liyepaya a group of young men signed an appeal to their coevals. But soon six of them declared that they had "given in to persuasion," and they received summons without the slightest hesitation and were sent to carry out service. An experienced "guiding" hand could be felt behind this and other "actions" organized by informals.

Figures in various public organizations—for example, the pacifist youth movement "For Homeland and Freedom," the Latvian Women's League, and the "Geneva-49" group—do not hide their intentions to boycott the army draft. The reason? They say that in 1940 the Soviet Union "occupied and forcibly annexed the independent Latvian state to its territory," and under the 1949 Geneva Convention "an occupying power cannot force protected persons to serve in its armed forces or auxiliary forces." This is from the "refuseniks'" statements.

The text is identical, duplicated by typographic means or on a photocopier. The authors are concerned neither about historical truth nor about the realities. They ignore, for example, the full title of the convention—on the protection of civilians in wartime. They are clearly seeking to make political capital. It only remains for the draftee to do a very small thing: to write into the text his surname and address and the number of his draft registration slip.

A leaflet in Lettish was disseminated in Riga 20 October, bearing the very eloquent title "How Young Men Should Act Who Have Decided Themselves (?) That Service in the USSR Armed Forces Contradicts Their Religious, Pacifist, or Political Views and Convictions." We read: "Before making an official statement of your refusal to serve addressed to the USSR Ministry of Defense and the appropriate rayon military commissariat (by registered letter marked 'notification' and also containing your military service card), you must first report this step to the general public and also to informal organizations which, according to their programs, engage in protecting human rights—the Latvian People's Front (LPF), 'Helsinki-86,' 'For Homeland and Freedom,' the Latvian National Women's League, the Human Rights Protection Group, the Radical Association of the LPF, the Latvian National Independence Movement, the Latvian Rebirth Party, the Riga branch of the Democratic Union, the Latvian Republican Party, the Environment Protection Club, the Lettish Riflemen's Association..."

This, it turns out, is how many "protectors" the young men in the republic who are "thinking about life" have. And these "protectors" do not sit with arms folded. The not yet strong consciousness of certain young people is literally bombarded with addresses, appeals, and programs containing abusive attacks on the Soviet Army. Military service is frequently given tendentious coverage in the mass media.

Alarming facts. You cannot brush them aside, as some informals try to do. The anti-Army campaign is not winding down. Here are just a few characteristic aspects:

On 21 September the Latvian Women's League and the Environment Protection Club held a rally in Riga's Cathedral Square. It was announced there that draftees' signatures would be collected with a view to securing permission to serve only in the Baltic region.

On 22 September a group of persons in "Helsinki-86" picketed outside the building of the Baltic Military District Political Directorate. They were holding slogans and placards: "The Soviet Army is an army of criminals," "Empire of evil, we will not give up our children to you," and "A Baltic army for the Baltic."

On 17 October the LPF Duma Board sent an open letter to the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium which predicted that "many draftees will inevitably come into conflict with the law" and proposed that it suspend the fall draft by means of a decision "in the name of

humanism" and adopt at its republic session the draft law on alternative service submitted by the Latvian Women's League.

On 18 October the LPF bulletin ATMODA carried a commentary in support of a letter from residents of the city of Riga (signed by 747 people) in which they advocated the creation of territorial troops.

From 14 September through 11 October the youth organization "For Homeland and Freedom" held meetings in the city of Līvepaya in which draftees and their parents participated. A decision was adopted to boycott the latest draft until the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet adopts a law on alternative service.

On 22 October a rally organized by the Lithuanian National Youth Union, the youth department of the Lithuanian Freedom League, and the "Geneva-49" group was held in Vilnius' Nagornyy Park. A group of approximately 300 young people set out from the rally to picket the Leninskiy Rayon Military Commissariat in Vilnius. Abuse was hurled at the army. Twentyone statements refusing service in the "occupation forces" were filled out and submitted.

Pickets are mounted almost weekly outside the Lithuanian republic assembly point. The pickets hold slogans: "Occupiers out!" and "Your son, mother?" (this depicts a red star dripping blood onto a coffin).

In an interview in ZA RODINU, the newspaper of the Baltic Military District, USSR People's Deputy M. Lauristin, one of the leaders of the Estonian People's Front, recently declared: "...A special situation has taken shape in the Baltic region... Looking to the future, I see no ways of security other than the full withdrawal of troops from the Baltic region."

The fall draft of Baltic young men into the army is continuing against this background. Many of them will perform their service in subunits and units of the Baltic Military District. More specifically, one in every four. The command has made this decision, going some way toward meeting the wishes of draftees' parents and relatives. Special cases are borne in mind above all. Indeed: Why send to distant parts, say, a young man who has recently become a father? However, many will have to serve outside the Baltic republics. Ours is a great country, and its borders extend for tens of thousands of kilometers. They must be guarded.

During my years of army service, incidentally, I have repeatedly met in various parts of the country servicemen drafted from the Baltic region. In the taiga garrisons of Maritime Kray, at points high in the Pamir Mountains, in Central Asia... And I have frequently heard commanders' flattering comments about the service of young Letts, Lithuanians, and Estonians. In multinational military collectives young men pass through a school of patriotism, civic maturity, and interethnic education.

True, this is no argument for informals. They insist, for example, on the need to form national military units. Yes, such units did exist and played a positive role at a certain stage. But with the emergence of modern types of weapons and strategic nuclear forces this form of manning the armed forces has become obsolete. And troops are not stationed "as they wish" but where the defense interests of the whole country demand.

"In the present situation it is unrealistic to revive such formations," Major General K. Gaurilyus, reserve, a veteran of the 16th Lithuanian Red Banner Klaypeda Rifle Division, believes. "First, national officer cadres would be required for this. This means it is necessary to set up a network of military schools in each republic. Can we afford this? Second, where are we to get the money to create the material and technical base and for training, taking account of the fact that there are several hundred military specialties alone in a modern motorized rifle division?"

"Let us call things by their proper names, after all," the veteran continued categorically. "Who needs his own army and why, for what purposes?"

A reasonable question. Dilettantism, haste, subjectivism, and national egotism in questions of military building are not only inadmissible but are also fraught with serious consequences and confuse young people.

Unfortunately, the legislators of Lithuania and Latvia have failed to take this into account. Thus on 29 September the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet adopted a resolution which proposes ensuring that, as of 1990, Lithuania's young men perform military service on the republic's territory. And a few days ago, this time in Latvia, changes connected with so-called alternative service were made to the republic's constitution. Both these acts were at odds with the USSR Constitution and union legislation. For the principles of manning the Armed Forces are extraterritoriality, multinationality, and universality of military service. The Congress of USSR People's Deputies advocated the Army's further qualitative development in accordance with them.

...The draft is in progress. Officers and Communists of the Baltic Military District are conducting a dialogue with informals and seeking active forms of contacts with the republics' population. "Open-door days" are held regularly in military units. Military people are going to labor collectives and meeting with workers. The "Mercy" action has begun—servicemen have extended patronage to homes for the elderly and children's homes. On Saturdays members of the District Military Council conduct a dialogue with the population over a "direct line." They do not duck pointed questions. And many of these have built up... But one thing is clear: They cannot be resolved from a position of ultimatums and boycotts.

Estonian Resolution on Union Budget Contribution

LD0612211689 Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian
1800 GMT 6 Dec 89

[Correspondent Gunner Pal report]

[Excerpts] Today's Supreme Soviet session had a very intensive agenda. [passage omitted] Voting settled matters. Work will have to continue until everything planned has been discussed thoroughly.

The laws on the government, pricing, and farmsteading came into being today.

The Supreme Soviet adopted a resolution that disagrees with the oversized—15.9%—payment into the Union budget. The size of this year's tax is considered to be feasible. The difference of opinion will be presented to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies and to the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium in order to have a different stance adopted.

Then the draft immigration law was discussed. Its explanatory section notes the aim of the law is to regulate migration into the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR]. The immigration law endeavors for a settled population to be established, proceeding from the Estonian social and territorial continuance, for immigration to be organized so that people who are closely connected with the Estonian culture settle in the Estonian SSR; and that immigration be regulated so as to insure effective employment. At the same time, it is envisaged that without damaging the interests of the permanent population of the republic, all persons who settle to live in the Estonian SSR on the basis of the given law are to be guaranteed acceptable living conditions. The immigration law will tie up with the Estonian SSR legislation on the home area, cultural autonomy, and local governments, and with the legislation regulating emigration. It proceeds from the international general declaration on human rights. The Supreme Soviet adopted a resolution to the effect that the immigration law will be put out for public discussion and that proposals will be made by 10 January. There were 210 deputies present at the time of the voting. Voting in favor of a public discussion were 206, with none voting against, and 3 abstaining.

Maia Leosk, deputy chairman of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, spoke about army matters. [passage omitted] The draft resolution which has been handed out to the deputies has a sad review written into it. Democratization, humanization, and creating security within the armed forces lag behind the positive changes that have taken place in society [words indistinct]. [passage omitted]

At the moment, the Supreme Soviet on Toompea is discussing this issue. At first, it was agreed that the session would finish its work at 2000 today; but now the Supreme Soviet is of a mind to continue because it is dealing with a very important question here with respect

to which the Supreme Soviet now must adopt a resolution. (?By the way), the problem is of interest to wide masses because it deals with the fate of our young generation.

At the moment, the Supreme Soviet continues its session on Toompea, and our direct relay on channel three will continue, as well.

More on Russian Protest Rally in Tallinn

90UN0381A Tallinn MOLODEZH ESTONII
in Russian 17 Nov 89 pp 1, 4

[Report by MOLODEZH ESTONII correspondent:
"For Equal Rights"]

[Text]"For Equal Rights"—this was the name of the meeting that took place yesterday in Tallinn on the square by the city hall at the initiative of the OSTK [United Labor Collective Council], Interdvizheniye [Intermovement], the republic strike committee, and the alliance of war veterans, the armed forces and internationalist soldiers.

The political situation in the republic has reached a critical stage, said one of those who spoke. The noticeable decline in political tension, another speaker said, with vexation, has been halted by the decisions of the latest session of the Estonian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet, which has been ignoring the opinion of the minority.

In practical terms the subject matter of the meeting revolved about two main issues—the elections to the local soviets and the "Resolution on the Historical-Legal Assessment of the Events That Took Place in Estonia in 1940" adopted on 12 November this year by the Supreme Soviet.

This was the position of candidates for the post of Tallinn city soviet of people's deputies V. Rulev and B. Leyenson, who issued the following statement:

"Some of the provisions of the Law on Elections to the Local Soviets of People's Deputies in the Estonian SSR are at variance with the USSR Constitution and international standards for human rights. But giving due consideration to the fact that on 16 August 1989 the USSR Supreme Soviet demanded the removal of this discrepancy, something on which the united council of labor collective of Estonia and other public movements in the republic also insisted in their appeals to government organs, we hope that the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet should respond appropriately to this and that it would be possible to give agree to the registration of ourselves as candidate deputies of the city soviet of people' deputies.

"However, our hopes have been dashed. We and the voters have been convinced that the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet is steadily pursuing a course of ignoring the Constitution (Fundamental Law) and of flouting human rights, and falsifying the historical past. We

therefore believe that the Law on Elections to the Local Soviets of People's Deputies and other laws of the Estonian SSR that are at variance with the USSR Constitution are not valid, and this is clearly stated in the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium resolution of 10 November 1989.

"Taking the above into account, we do not desire to be parties in the unlawful activity being foisted on the people of the Estonian SSR by irresponsible politicians and are forced to withdraw our nominations as candidate deputies to the Tallinn Soviet of People's Deputies. We call upon the voters not to participate in the unlawful elections."

Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet deputies A. Banasko and V. Malkovskiy explained why they together with their colleagues in the "For Equal Rights" group were forced to walk out of the hall on 12 November at a session of the Supreme Soviet. They believe that the "Resolution on the Historical-Legal Assessment of the Events of 1940" does not fully reflect the situation that took shape in the summer before the war in Estonia and is aimed not at a search for the truth but a change in the political status of the republic. In their opinion this is all being done to one end, namely, to shatter our federative state.

The position of the deputies was supported by A. Gusev, first secretary of the Morskiy party raykom [rayon party committee].

"At the session," he said, "it was not so much an assessment of the events of 1940 that was made but rather far-reaching conclusions were drawn that match the theses of the People's Front's election platform. Attacks on the communist party are intensifying in the republic, attempts are being made to pull down the party, and the slogan 'The Soviets Without Communists' is being put forward. However, it is precisely the party that has found within itself the strength to initiate perestroika, and we communists are obligated to bring this work to a successful conclusion."

USSR People's Deputy V. Yarovou expressed concern that over the past year a number of legislative enactments have been adopted in the republic that cut right across the provisions of the country's Constitution.

And then there is Interdvizheniye, whose position was expressed by member of the Interdvizheniye Coordinating Council Yu. Stefanovskiy, who sees the solution to the political crisis in the formation of an autonomous Russian-speaking minority in the northeast of the republic. The organization of elections to alternative organs of power is also connected with this.

A resolution was adopted at the meeting, whose text is printed verbatim below.

"We have gathered at this meeting to state our determination to fight for equal rights for all inhabitants of the republic.

"We see that the just demands put forward by the labor collectives during the course of the political strike are still being openly ignored.

"It is not only our demands that are being ignored but also the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium resolution, and even the Fundamental Law—the USSR Constitution.

"The claims that the USSR Constitution is outdated are unfounded. The Constitution must be perfected but those provisions that offer all citizens of our country equal rights and protection will never be outdated.

"The Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet is drawing up and adopting laws that intensify discrimination against the non-Estonian part of the population. The Law on Language, the Law on Elections to the Republic Supreme Soviet, the Law on Immigration, and others are such laws.

"On 12 November 1989 the 'Resolution on the Historical-Legal Assessment of the Events That Took Place in Estonia in 1940' was adopted; it distorts the historical truth and does not take into consideration the entire aggregate of facts and events of that time. All attempts by deputies in the "For Equal Rights" group to protect our interests through the parliamentary route were rejected. Therefore, the group of deputies was forced to walk out of the session.

"Those present at the meeting state the following:

"1. We reject the 'Resolution on the Historical-Legal Assessment of the Events That Took Place in Estonia in 1940' adopted at the 13th session of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet as sometimes that is at variance with the truth. The adoption of this resolution in fact places soviet power in Estonia outside the law despite the attempts to interpret it differently.

"2. We support the positions of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet deputies who walked out of the hall on 12 November and refused to participate in the adoption of the resolution on the events of 1940 in Estonia.

"3. We believe that on the basis of the 10 November 1989 USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium resolution the Estonian SSR Law on Election to the Local Soviets of People's Deputies is invalid on the territory of the republic because it is at variance with the USSR Constitution.

"We therefore call for nonparticipation in the 10 December 1989 elections to the local soviets of people's deputies and a boycott of those elections.

"4. We appeal to the labor collectives to develop work to nominate candidates from the labor collectives and to set about the formation of a national-territorial autonomy for the Russian-speaking population in the republic.

"5. Thus resolution will be submitted to the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and the 13th session of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet."

A solution to today's critical situation depends largely on each of us. It is possible to boycott the 10 December elections and it is possible to achieve the election of deputies whom we can trust and who will protect our rights in the local organs of power. It is possible finally to dissociate ourselves and demand autonomy, and it is possible to continue at least a working dialogue about the future of our common home. Let us move together to find the best solution.

And so, what is your opinion?

Riga Mayor Warns Latvian Party of Waning Power

90UN0400A Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA
in Russian 21 Nov 89 pp 1, 3

[Letter to the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau and the CPSU Central Committee Politburo from Alfred Petrovich Rubiks, member of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee]

[Text] The political situation taking shape in the republic testifies that the Latvian Communist Party and its leading authorities are gradually losing their influence in the masses and controlling increasingly less the course of many events in the republic. The action program adopted at the recent Latvian Communist Party Central Committee plenum is vague and insufficiently specific, which is engendering in many cases the confusion of the communists and entire party organizations and failing to serve to stabilize the situation to the full extent. Taking advantage of this situation, various pseudo-perestroika public and social and political organizations and political parties of the LSDRP [Latvian Social Democratic Workers Party] type, which has announced more than 1,000 members and the convening of a constituent congress this fall, which are emerging are stepping up their activity considerably.

The Second Latvian People's Front (NFL) Congress, which was held 7-8 October in Riga, was essentially a demonstration of the birth of a new political party as an alternative to the CPSU.

The report of NFL Chairman D. Ivans (member of the CPSU and USSR people's deputy) at the congress and the supporting reports were in essence and content aimed against the leading role of the CPSU in society, a call for the dismantling of Soviet power and the breakup of the USSR and an attempt to lead public opinion and the Lettish people along the path of a restoration of bourgeois-democratic orders. State television and radio, which throughout the 2 days took up the whole program time with a direct relay of the congress, were put at the congress' disposal.

Not only extremist representatives of various informal movements from other union republics but also numerous representatives of emigre circles of varying persuasion from overseas were present and spoke at the congress.

The NFL leaders have recently been systematically declaring the need for victory at the upcoming elections to the local soviets and the republic Supreme Soviet and the winning thereby of political power by the parliamentary path and removal of the leading role of the CPSU. One wonders: From whom do the gentlemen (this is precisely how NFL members address one another) from the NFL intend taking power? From the Latvian Communist Party? From the soviets? And in the name of what will this be done? The answer to these questions was given clearly in the NFL Program and Rules adopted by the congress. These documents no longer speak of perestroika on the basis of the principles and platform of the CPSU, and the soviets, as the organs of the existing state power, are absent, but power under the leadership of the NFL, the DNNL [Latvian National Independence Movement] and other political party-type formations there is.

Some 24% of the congress delegates were CPSU members. However, none of them even attempted to rebuff the extremist and separatist aspirations and defend the line of the CPSU.

What happened at the LPF congress and much else that is happening in the republic is at odds with the decisions of the 19th party conference and subsequent CPSU Central Committee plenums. This is nothing other than a departure from the ideology of perestroika and many of the principles of socialism and Marxism-Leninism.

I and other members of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee have spoken about this repeatedly in the bureau and at plenums of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee, during the election campaign for the election of USSR people's deputies and in interviews for the press, radio and television. However, the Central Committee Bureau remains deaf to these assessments and warnings of the communists. A class-collaborationist position in respect of the NFL and its leaders is being manifested increasingly.

The Latvian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau knows full well that the members of the CPSU who actively support the LPF and are pursuing its policy, and not the policy and decisions of the CPSU, are becoming the leaders of the party and soviet authorities in a number of rayons and cities. In addition, condemnation of the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee and the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee is being organized in such rayons. The names Lenin, Stuchka, "red," "Soviet" and "communism" are disappearing from the titles of party and soviet newspapers and kolkhozes [collective farms] and sovkhoses [state farms], and the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau is overlooking these facts.

Latvian television and radio and many newspapers and journals are in the hands of the NFL. The Latvian Communist Party Central Committee Party History Institute and Publishing House have fallen under its influence even.

Seeing this absence of ideological principle and organizational inaction of the party, the NFL is gaining momentum and growing bolder. Does not the fact of the election at the last congress of a whole number of communists and USSR people's deputies to the NFL Duma (Bishers, Boyars, Inkens, Kostenetskaya, Lutsans, Vulfson, Ivans) testify to this? These people are well known in the republic as fierce proponents of the ideas of the NFL and hold views different to those formulated in the CPSU Program and Rules and the party platform on the nationality issue. The communists honestly performing their party and official duty, on the other hand, are being subjected to outright persecution and hounding for their political beliefs. NFL leader D. Ivans, for example, had only to groundlessly and crudely accuse me of not being fit for office for the leadership of the Council of Ministers to immediately set up a commission to "look into the style and methods of work of the Riga Gorispolkom [city soviet executive committee]," which was assembled and set in motion in my absence; I was not even notified of its composition and activity. This is a convenient form of taking vengeance on a communist for his high-minded political position.

As a member of the CPSU for 30 years and as a member of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee, I consider impermissible the continued passiveness of the Central Committee Bureau and the leaders of the republic in this political situation. I am addressing this letter to members of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau and the CPSU Central Committee Politburo with the following proposals:

First, an immediate scrupulous party evaluation of the NFL congress and the documents adopted thereat.

Second, determination of the extent of the responsibility of the CPSU members who not only are failing to meet the requirements of the CPSU Program and Rules but are also demagogically, taking cover behind perestroika, engaging in fact in subversive activity in respect of Soviet power and the armed forces and contributing to division in the party, the loosening of the USSR and the complication of interethnic relations.

Third, the return to the party, the state and the soviets of the media, primarily television and radio. The ideology and policy of the CPSU and the Soviet state and the genuine ideas and experience of perestroika, and not the aspirations of the self-styled "defenders" of the people's interests fundamentally having nothing in common with the aims of socialism and perestroika, should be propagated via them.

Fourth, the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau and apparatus must not wait for some guidelines from above but most actively and by political

methods debunk and show the people the utopianism and economic and political bankruptcy of many of the claims and plans of the NFL, the DNNL and the LSDRP and such organizations and counterpose to them the active political position of our party. All the primary party organizations and rayon and city party organizations should by organizational methods be targeted in this direction.

Fifth and finally, it is necessary to return to analysis of the speeches of members of the Central Committee, precisely members of the Central Committee, at recent plenums of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee. They expressed many specific proposals, which have gone unnoticed.

In addressing this letter to you, comrade members of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau, I am counting on you having sufficient scrupulousness and boldness to adopt the necessary measures to rectify the state of affairs. This will be too late after the elections to the local soviets and, particularly, the republic Supreme Soviet. The soviets will be formed on NFL terms, real power will pass from the soviets to the People's Front and the Communist Party will experience a reduction in or lose altogether its capacity for performing the leading and organizing role in society.

Respectfully,
[Signed] A. Rubiks.
12 October 1989.

Latvian Autonomy Draft Law Package Detailed

90UN0374A Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA
in Russian 18 Nov 89 p 3

[LATINFORM account of report of A.K. Chepanis, deputy chairman of the Latvian SSR Council of Ministers, at 11th Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet 13th Session on draft laws]

[Text] The need has arisen in the course of the political transformations and the economic reform for an appreciable alteration of the legal and economic status of the republic's administrative and territorial units.

In accordance with the Latvian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Law on Economic Independence, a package of bills has been prepared whose purpose is to create institutions of public self-management and determine their jurisdiction. It incorporates four draft laws:

- the law on volost [smallest administrative unit in tsarist Russia] (rural) self-management;
- the law on municipal self-management;
- the law on rayon self-management;
- the law on the creation of a system of public self-management.

The commission believes that questions of self-management in Riga, as the capital of the republic,

bearing in mind its economic status and the significance of the management structure, should be decided in a special law.

The drafts determine that self-management is realized by the inhabitants of the corresponding territory with the mediation of the soviet of people's deputies and the citizens' public self-management (locality committees, street committees, apartment house councils and so forth) and also by way of the solution of questions of self-management at local referenda or the use of other forms of democracy, citizens' general meetings, for example.

The proposals incorporated in the laws provide for a division of self-management functions into two levels. At the first, or main, level—volost and municipal self-management. It needs to be borne in mind here that the self-management of municipal communities is realized in accordance with the law on volost self-management, unless the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium has conferred city status on the municipal-type community.

At the second level are rayon self-management and the self-management of republic cities.

In the division of the jurisdiction of self-management between the first and second levels the following principle was observed: volost and municipal self-management provides for the solution of all social and economic questions on the corresponding territory except for those which local self-management cannot deal with properly with its own forces and resources. These questions have to be tackled by the self-management of the second level. In addition, self-management state institutions of the second level are also entrusted with the functions of state control with respect to the activity of self-management of the first level in particular spheres (public order, public hygiene and veterinary supervision, nature conservation and so forth).

The jurisdiction of the self-management of the corresponding levels is determined in general form in Article IV of the draft law. This article determines also that, given an extension of the jurisdiction of self-management in accordance with the decision of higher state authorities or administration, they should simultaneously take care of the reimbursement of the corresponding expenditure.

For the purpose of strengthening the economic independence of self-management it is determined that all self-management institutions have the status of a legal entity, that is, the right to acquire and alienate property, conclude deals both between themselves and with other institutions and organizations, make loans and assume various commitments.

The system of self-management institutions is formed from state self-management institutions and institutions of the citizens' public self-management.

The basis of the state self-management institutions are the soviets of people's deputies, from which the other institutions of state self-management on the corresponding territory—the ispolkom [executive committee] of the soviet of people's deputies and the auditing commission of the soviet of people's deputies—acquire their rights.

The drafts also contain new forms, which are geared to the strengthening of the economic and managerial independence of the soviets.

Article 11 of the laws on volost and municipal self-management and Article 10 of the law on rayon self-management determine that any economic, social and cultural activity affecting the interests of the inhabitants of the corresponding territory is exercised only with the consent of the soviet.

If the soviet disagrees with the realization of a rayon or republic project, the dispute is resolved by the Supreme Soviet. The draft also contains a demand that the higher enterprises coordinate with the soviet their draft plans pertaining to social and economic questions, questions of the production of consumer goods and others. The soviet has a right to suspend activity which is exercised in respect of plans which have not been agreed. I believe that guarantees of such rights of self-management for the soviets on their territory are extremely necessary.

The drafts expand the range of questions in respect of which the soviet may issue rules for whose violation administrative liability is stipulated. In order to enhance the soviet's role as master of the territory it is determined that the rules which it issues, unless contrary to the law, have greater legal force than ministry and department sets of instructions on the same questions.

Proceeding from the principle of limitation of the functions of the representative and executive power of the institutions, the draft attaches great significance to organizational questions in the work of the soviet. It is determined that the volost and city soviet be led by a chairman, and the soviet of a republic city and a rayon, by a chairman and presidium. The presidium incorporates ex officio the chairman of the soviet and deputy and the chairmen of the standing commissions. The presidium is the working organ of the soviet. It organizes the work of the soviet, but does not have the right to adopt decisions on behalf of the soviet when the soviet is not in session. For this reason the draft does not regulate the activity of the presidium in detail. The question of the status of the chairman of the volost and municipal soviet is not regulated in greater detail in the drafts. This right is accorded the soviets themselves.

The jurisdiction of the ispolkom has changed appreciably. The main emphasis here is put on the solution of economic questions on the corresponding territory and management of the soviets' natural, property and financial resources. The ispolkom's task on these matters is implementation of the decisions of the soviet. The ispolkom is responsible for its activity to the soviet.

The draft further does not regulate questions of the structure of the ispolkom and its departments, administrations and other establishments. These questions remain the province of the ispolkom, depending on the size of the economy of the corresponding territory and financial possibilities.

In elaborating the drafts the commission concluded that it would be expedient to revise legislation governing violations and standardize the procedure of the application of administrative punishment in the self-management system. The right to impose penalties should be accorded competent self-management officials since the former practice of the creation to this end under the auspices of the ispolkoms of commissions: administrative, for combating drunkenness and for juvenile affairs did not justify itself and was criticized on the part of the public. The proposed drafts do not regulate questions of the work of these commissions.

For consideration in the work of the soviets and the ispolkoms of the diversity of opinions existing in society the drafts pay great attention to procedural questions of the work of the self-management institutions—the quorum of the sessions and sittings, the voting procedure and so forth. As the economic independence of self-management grows, the soviets will need information on fulfillment of the budget, estimates of income and expenditure and the economic activity of the ispolkom and its establishments. For this purpose the laws stipulate that the soviet create an auditing commission as an independent self-managing institution. The appropriate material-technical facilities are necessary for realization of the wide-ranging rights of self-management. Taking as the basis the LaSSR Law on Economic Independence, the drafts stipulate that the material facilities of self-management are state property transferred to soviet ownership. Soviet property is formed also from this property's income and on the basis of various deals.

Land, water, forests, the earth's interior and other natural resources are under the jurisdiction of self-management within the limits determined by the act. Considering the significance of the resources for the entire national economy, the rights of self-management in the use of these resources should be determined in the special laws being elaborated at the present time (the Land Code, Nature Conservation Law and so forth).

Financial resources of self-management are formed from budget and extra-budget resources of the soviets of people's deputies, reserved payments and bank credit.

The laws determine the basic principles of the formation of budget and other resources.

Questions of the citizens' public self-management are regulated in the bills in a separate section.

It is stipulated here that the inhabitants realize public self-management by creating various public self-management formations (locality councils, street committees, apartment house councils and so forth). These

formations have the status of body corporate and for the accomplishment of their assignments they may have property. The soviets may on a contract basis transfer to their charge resources and property for the accomplishment of particular self-management assignments. The rights and duties of the said formations are determined by their rules and regulations, which are adopted at citizens' meetings and registered in the ispolkom.

It is intended introducing the laws on volost, municipal and rayon self-management gradually in the procedure determined in the draft "Transition to a System of Public Self-Management". This law determines the tasks of the local soviets of people's deputies, ministries and departments and also the Council of Ministers in the transitional period.

We believe that each administrative unit will switch to self-management individually. Prior to this, it is necessary to specify the question of soviet property, deciding which facilities are to be transferred to the soviet from ministry and department jurisdiction, and we need to conclude with higher enterprises and organizations contracts in which it is necessary to determine their duties in deciding on the question of self-management. If necessary, administrative-territorial division also may be revised in the course of this process, partitioning or uniting the volosts.

In the transitional period the soviets may create the appropriate structures of administration in accordance with the self-management laws.

These are the basic principles by which the commission was guided when drawing up the said laws. In the commission's opinion, it would be expedient in further work on perfecting the drafts to cooperate more closely with the commissions which are elaborating other laws ensuing from the Law on Economic Independence (on taxes, the banks, budget rights and so forth).

Ukrainian Elections Proposed for 4 Mar

90UN0288B Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
29 Oct 89 p 4

[Speech by V.P. Shcherbina, deputy chairman of Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium: "On the Elections of Ukrainian SSR People's Deputies and Deputies of Local Soviets"]

[Text] Respected Comrade Deputies!

In accordance with the law "On Amendments and Additions to the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic [UkSSR]" and the election laws passed at this session, elections of people's deputies will be held no later than 4 months before the expiration of the Soviet's term of office.

As we know, the term of the 11th Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet will come to an end in February 1990. The term of local soviets of the 20th convocation will

expire this December. In connection with this, the term will have to be extended until new deputies have been elected to local soviets.

The republic Supreme Soviet Presidium proposes that elections of people's deputies of the Ukrainian SSR and elections of deputies of local soviets of people's deputies in the republic of the 21st convocation be held on Sunday, 4 March 1990.

In accordance with the Law "On Elections of People's Deputies of the Ukrainian SSR," we will have to calculate the number of voters for each electoral body. According to the data of the executive committees [ispolkoms] of oblast soviets and the Kiev and Sevastopol city soviets of people's deputies, there will be around 37 million voters in the republic on 1 January 1990.

The law states that 450 electoral districts should be formed in the Ukrainian SSR. Consequently, there will be an average of 82,200 voters in each electoral district, and this should be used as the norm for the formation of electoral districts in line with the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet decree "On the Scheduling of Elections of People's Deputies of the Ukrainian SSR."

Comrade Deputies! The law stipulates that the republic Supreme Soviet must form a central election commission to hold elections of people's deputies of the Ukrainian SSR.

In a decree published on 16 October this year, the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium requested the ispolkoms of oblast soviets of people's deputies and the Kiev and Sevastopol city soviets to nominate candidates for membership in the central election commission with a view to the opinions of work crews or their councils, neighborhood associations of voters, the republic branches of social organizations, the boards of artists' unions, and the commanding officers of the Red Banner Kiev Military District.

In accordance with this decree, the nominations will be discussed at meetings of work crews and at sessions of their councils and in branches of social organizations and neighborhood associations of voters. A conference with the heads of the artistic unions of the republic was held on this matter in the Supreme Soviet Presidium.

In all, 77 nominations were considered. The proposals were discussed by the executive committees of the oblast and Kiev city soviets at their meetings with representatives of the work crews nominating the candidates, social organizations, and neighborhood associations of voters, and they each endorsed one or two candidates. The appropriate republic agencies also submitted proposals.

On the basis of these recommendations and in line with the specified size of the commission (31 members), a proposal on the composition of the Central Election Commission has been submitted to the current session of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet.

The nominees are workers, kolkhoz members, representatives of party, soviet, trade-union, and Komsomol organs, veterans organizations, and artistic unions, jurists, workers in science, culture, public health, and public education, and servicemen; 24 of them have a higher education, including 4 with law degrees. Therefore, there is every reason to expect the Central Election Commission to exercise its powers competently.

The session has been asked to approve the nomination of Vitaliy Fedorovich Boyko, Ukrainian SSR first deputy minister of Justice, as chairman of the Central Election Commission.

The publication of the appropriate Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet decrees on these matters has been proposed. You have been given copies of the draft decrees.

'Informals' Meeting in Kiev Criticized

90UN0252A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
24 Oct 89 p 3

[Commentary on a meeting in Kiev by M. Derimov:
"What Do They Call Us For?"]

[Text] It is Sunday, October 22, in a square near the Respublikansky Stadium in Kiev. After 1 p.m. many local members of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union [UHU] and of the Ukrainian People's Democratic League [UPDL] gathered there. There also appeared another UHU "advance force" from Lvov Oblast which, according to the police information, numbered about 200 people. In the square one can hear the usual greeting of the Bandera gang: "Glory to the Heroes!"—the very words that 40-50 years ago were used to greet each other by the bandits from the Union of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army [UUN—UIA]. These bandits used to torture the people of the Western Ukraine; and now one cannot help wondering: What kind of "heroes" are being sung glory to? Are they Petlyura and Bandera, Shukhevich and Stetsko? Are they the traitors to their Motherland that killed Yaroslav Galan and many thousands of other innocent people? They are the thugs, those traitors of the Ukrainian people, whom the last "great assembly" [previous two words in Ukrainian] of the Bandera UUN ordered to glorify as "fighter-heroes". So who do the UHU functionaries mean when they keep repeating the Bandera "Sieg Heil!"?

In the square more and more zhovto-blakitny [blue and yellow] banners appear, their metal flagstaves crowned with tridents, more and more instigating slogans which demagogically proclaim the soviets' opposition to the Communist Party and threaten to conduct strikes if some or other demands are not satisfied. At the same time, some people keep up brisk trade in samizdat publications and advertise the "independent" press, which is quite dependent on the anti-Soviet radio station "Svoboda" and foreign-based UUN organizations.

Here is what preceded the event: Officials of the Ukrainian People's Movement for Perestroika [Rukh] were allowed by the Moskovski Rayon Soviet Executive Committee [rayispolkom] of Kiev to conduct a meeting in the square with the view of discussing draft laws on elections and languages. The meeting started with the violation of the permit given by the local authorities: its organizers seemingly disapproved of the official banners of union republics and the red perestroika slogans used to decorate the square for similar occasions. Therefore, at 2 p.m., violating the rayispolkom decision, all the participants of the meeting went over to the stadium entrance. That created a certain disturbance for the stadium visitors and for the usual pedestrian traffic along Krasnoarmeiskaya Street near the subway station.

The meeting was opened by S. Konev, people's deputy of the USSR from Dnepropetrovsk. He informed the listeners who were waving zhovto-blakitny banners that Rukh "renounces chauvinism and nationalism." Then the line was picked up by the moderators: V. Grishchuk, people's deputy from Kiev and M. Goryn, a UHU leader. And the first speaker allowed to take the floor was also from the UHU: a certain V. Linchevsky. He started to explain to us that we were "slaves" who have "neither law, nor democracy."

As they say, forget Linchevsky. What did amaze me was the speech of a well-known poet, D. V. Pavlychko, chairman of the T.G. Shevchenko Society for the Ukrainian Language, who was recently elected a people's deputy of the USSR. He suggested the "dismantling of the imperial Soviet Union and the creation on its foundation of a union of free republics." He rejoiced at seeing the voters of the Ivano-Frankovsk area come out to meet him "with blue and yellow banners and tridents." He also said the following: "What concerns us most is the right of our national symbols to come out into the streets and squares without persecution."

Secretary of the Presidium of the UkSSR N. G. Khomenko, secretary of the Kiev City Party Committee Yu. V. Kilimnik and some other speakers at the meeting offered balanced and constructive opinions on the law drafts presented for discussion, but the nationalistic forces that gathered under the banner of Rukh wanted quite a different "discussion"; they obviously tried to stir up emotions and to provoke an angry confrontation.

In vain moderator V. Grishchuk called several times on the listeners to return to a businesslike discussion of the law drafts. Time and again he had to demand that some people put away the red and black UUN banner. The Bandera flag was put away but then unrolled again for everybody to see, and again V. Grishchuk would ask for it to be put away. It is almost not worth mentioning "trifles" like the black placard displayed by the improvised podium which in red letters proclaimed: "Long Live Independent United..." [preceding phrase in Ukrainian].

A UHU member from the Lvov area, S. Khmara, who is not working anywhere, threatened to start nothing less than a "protest strike" in case the Supreme Soviet of the republic does not pass bills wanted by the UHU. A certain M. Petrosyuk from Vinnitsa spoke against any attempt at an alliance of Rukh supporters with the party. He sneered at the decisions of the recent plenum of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee. And one of the Rukh leaders, S. Golovaty, said that those at the head of Rukh disliked the PRAVDA coverage of a recent Rukh conference and decided to "demand" from the central organ of our party that it "recall" its correspondents from the Ukraine. As we can see, they again display the same kind of intolerance to opinions different from theirs that the Rukh leaders have shown already toward the Ukrainian TV and towards our newspaper.

To stir up emotions they used in full the events in Lvov that took place on October 1.

A representative of the Ukrainian SSR prosecutor, V. B. Vysotsky, presented objective information about those events which had been covered already by the PRAVDA UKRAINY. He also named the instigators of the disturbances and spoke about the investigation that was being conducted. But D. Poezd, who just appeared as chief of the Rukh "security service" [previous two words in Ukrainian] insisted that there had been no grounds for the actions of the Lvov police as there had been no instances of arson or murder. Just think about what that man has said! It appears that one has to wait till arson and murder take place!

Among the speakers was also one of the immediate perpetrators of the Lvov events, a UHU member and a chieftain of the so-called Union of Independent Ukrainian Youth [UIUY], I. Derkach. Of course, he denied any responsibility for what had happened, but, carried away by his grandiloquence, had to admit that the participants of the disturbances tried to finish off one of the cadets.

The head of the Lvov section of the UHU, B. Goryn, spoke at the meeting in the same spirit and also threatened to organize strikes. He rejoiced at the "profusion" of zhovto-blakitny banners at the meeting and called on the citizens of Kiev to keep up the "race" begun by the Lvov nationalist "advance force".

The meeting organized by Rukh last Sunday showed once again that it shelters under its roof a considerable number of destructive, anticommunist and nationalistic forces that are trying to disrupt the perestroika in our republic.

Construction of Belorussian Nuclear Plant Halted

LD0612095189 Moscow World Service in English
0800 GMT 6 Dec 89

[Text] The construction of the Belorussian Atomic Power Plant has been stopped at public demand. Not to

waste the investments in the project, the buildings will be given over to a meat processing plant.

Earlier it was also decided to terminate the construction of another nuclear power plant in the Crimea. The buildings will be used for a vocational school.

The problems of atomic energy came to a head after the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. Dr Andrey Sakharov, for instance, suggests that nuclear power plants be located underground in rock formations to assure their complete safety.

Moldavian Party Urges 'Respect' for Law

PM0612152189 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
6 Dec 89 Second Edition p 2

[ATEM-TASS report: "Will Adopt Active Stance"]

[Text] Kishinev, 5 Dec—A Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee plenum was held here today. It adopted an appeal to the republic electorate.

The appeal calls for the practical implementation of the program objectives regarding the economic, social, and spiritual renewal of the republic on the basis of broad public dialogue, consolidation of forces, tightening of labor discipline, and citizens' respect for the law.

The Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee stated that party organizations will adopt an active stance in the coming elections for republic and local soviet people's deputies based on strengthening ties with the masses and will seek to ensure that the elections effect a breakthrough in the socioeconomic situation in Moldavia and help renew and strengthen the soviets as organs of genuine people's rule.

The plenum was addressed by P.K. Luchinskiy, first secretary of the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee.

Moldavian Party Elects New Ideology Secretary

LD0512233489 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1832 GMT 5 Dec 89

[Text] Kishinev, 5 Dec—TASS correspondent Vladimir Novasadyuk writes:

Yevgeniy Sobor, 47, was today elected the new Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee secretary for ideology at the Central Committee plenum. A philologist by training, he worked for many years in the Komsomol and the party. He was secretary of the Kishinev city party committee and head of the cultural section of the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee. Later, he headed the republican Ministry of Culture.

In an interview that Yevgeniy Sobor gave to a TASS correspondent just after his election, he declared: "The years of perestroika that we have lived through have enabled us to realize once and for all that there will be no

return to ideological immobility, lacquered internationalism, and ostentatious unanimity and accord. Nevertheless, just as we need air, today we all need consolidation and a normal sociopolitical situation. Only on that condition will it be possible to resolve the problems that have accumulated within the republic."

"In our home, which for all of us Moldavia," Sobor said, "I see a socialism that is not Stalinist, not Brezhnev-style, not developed, but a socialism that is founded on universal moral values and national traditions."

The Central Committee secretary is thinking of starting his first steps in his new post by devising a precise concept of the restructuring of ideological work in the republic. In Yevgeniy Sobor's view, it has proved possible in recent times to somewhat lower the tension in the republic. It is necessary to go further, but confidently, boldly and purposefully, the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee secretary considers.

Moldavian Party Head Luchinskiy Interviewed

90UN0373A Kishinev SOVETSKEYA MOLDAVIYA
in Russian 17 Nov 89 p 1

[Interview with P.K. Luchinskiy, first secretary of Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee, recorded by S. Gamova: "Just One Way—Dialogue"]

[Text] The Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee plenum is over. Petr Kirillovich Luchinskiy was elected first secretary of the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee.

The current situation, and the increased interest in the event explained by this, of communists, working people and whole population of the republic practically dictated the questions which our correspondent put to the man who has come to head the republic's party organization.

[Gamova] Petr Kirillovich, your name has been spoken quite often in the republic recently. Your election as first secretary of the Central Committee is not a sensation, more a predictable event. It is perfectly understandable that certain hopes are being linked with your name. In this connection the following question: does the election of a new first secretary mean a change of course for the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee? Whence comes one more question: what can one man do, in your view, and can he do anything if he is alone?

[Luchinskiy] When we speak of a change of course, we generally touch on questions of overall policy. The course is well known and is the former one. And the talk is about how to implement it, how to embark on its implementation. To speak about the course generally as the course of perestroika, it cannot be said that the Central Committee was earlier lagging behind it and that its position was dissimilar to the changes which are now occurring in the country. For this reason the answer is unequivocal: the course is one of perestroika, the dynamic development of society and a consolidation of

forces for overcoming the shortcomings and difficulties and the tension which exists. This is the correct course, and we will abide by it.

But, I believe, you are asking not this but how this will be done and by whom.

First of all, by whom? Here the answer is clear—the party. It cannot confine itself to having merely declared and having initiated perestroika, it must support it in the process of implementation. Naturally, people expect this and are displaying unhappiness at the fact that these processes are not developing quickly enough. For this reason what is needed in the party primarily is renewal. Renewal in people and in forms, methods and approaches. Let us take, for example, one area—dialogue.

If we wish to create a democratic society, and we do, we must conduct a dialogue with everyone, regardless of people's world outlook and allegiance. The more so when the talk is about groups of people—industrial, artistic and public organizations and so forth. They are all exponents of real interests. We must move toward dialogue. For what? For finding ways of satisfying these interests and requirements, ways of the development of society and the solution of its vital problems.

What can one man do? First, we would note that a man can, generally, do much, if, of course, he tries and is interested in the results of what he does. But when we speak about public affairs and man's place in society, we cannot conceive of him unconnected to this society, in isolation from people. If, however, we are talking about a leader, it is impossible to imagine that he could do something alone. Only together with people. He should, of course, have ideas, with which he is obliged to enthuse those around him, and must be capable of persuading people to change their minds if he sees a wrong position, but he must necessarily have ties to his work comrades, the outfit and society.

[Gamova] The social and political situation in the republic is today the sorest point and most disturbing and most discussed topic. What is an indispensable condition of its stabilization, what, in your opinion, is the main thing now, what needs to be done first for this?

[Luchinskiy] The first thing, it seems to me, is that those responsible in the republic for the state of affairs need to sit down at the same table. In this case I do not separate the party from other public formations. I refer to the unions, the Komsomol [Leninist Communist Youth League] and the artistic and informal organizations. This is the first thing. Sit down at a common table and determine what ways exist and should form: the basis of our work. Subsequently we need to specify the timeframe in which this might be done. And on this basis strive for tranquillity, in the sense, what is more, of creating a normal situation for the solution of the questions which are urgent.

[Gamova] The situation is complex. The communists should play their part in its stabilization. What qualities, in your opinion, should the party official possess today, when the party is learning to work under the new conditions?

[Luchinskiy] Many qualities could be listed. I do not wish to do so or, also, repeat known truths here. I wish to say just one thing: capable, bold people with their own opinion who know how to persuade others should be working in the party now. The main thing is being able to prove all this: one's rightness and the soundness of the party's course, by one's actions. Were each party official to involve himself actively in the realization of specific work, there would be natural selection since it would be seen immediately who is able to do what. Organizers recognized by people would remain. There is no other lever. How can we determine whether an official is authoritative or not if he remains in his office and does not involve himself in active business? He should go among people every day. And not simply go among them but go among them with suggestions and take charge of work on the realization of what he has suggested. People will then understand and approve.

[Gamova] That is, people should be given an opportunity to assess the party official by his deeds?

[Luchinskiy] Only by his deeds, by his ability to tackle actual questions, regardless of their specific points. The questions may be the most varied, but important to people. Capabilities will be checked against the ability to tackle the most acute problems.

[Gamova] And the final, unofficial question, so to speak: how do you feel on your native soil?

[Luchinskiy] It is hard to say. I have not yet had time to check my feelings since everything has happened suddenly, rapidly, it may be said. I had gone to Moscow on other business, in fact.

So I need to look around further to really get a feel for the fact that I am on the soil where I grew up. But, generally, for a start, I feel normal.

Moldavian Social Organizations Registered

90UN0258A Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA
in Russian 27 Oct 89 p 3

[Texts of the Moldavian SSR Council of Ministers resolutions on registering public organizations: "Public Associations Registered"]

[Text] In accordance with the 25 August 1989 Moldavian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet Presidium Ukase "On Interim Procedure for the Registration of Public Associations of Citizens in the Moldavian SSR" the Moldavian SSR Council of Ministers resolves as follows:

1. To register the charter of the People's Front of Moldavia as confirmed at the 1st Congress of the People's Front of Moldavia on 20 May 1989 in Kishinev city, taking under advisement the statement of the People's Front of Moldavia leadership on its agreement with the remarks and proposals on paragraphs 1, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 13, 15, 23, 39 and 42 and Section IV of the Charter expressed during the course of the review of the matter of its registration and on introducing corresponding changes in the Charter under established procedure.

2. The Moldavian SSR Council of Ministers notes that at sanctioned and unsanctioned meetings of the People's Front of Moldavia individual participants have permitted actions incompatible with legal and moral standards, which result in destabilization of the situation in the republic. children of tender years are taking part in these measures and the leadership of the People's Front of Moldavia is taking no steps to stop this.

Registration of the Charter does not mean that approval is being given for the unlawful actions that have occurred at meetings of the People's Front of Moldavia.

[Signed] I. Kalin, chairman of the Moldavian SSR Council of Ministers.

A. Demchenko, administrator of the Moldavian SSR Council of Ministers.

In accordance with the 25 August 1989 Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Ukase "On Interim Procedure for the Registration of Public Associations of Citizens in the Moldavian SSR" the Moldavian SSR Council of Ministers resolves as follows:

1. To register the Charter of the "Unitatya-Yedinstvo" international movement for the defense of perestroika confirmed at the 1st Congress of the international movement on 8 July 1989 in Kishinev city, taking under advisement the statement of the international movement leadership on its agreement with the remarks and proposals on paragraphs 1, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 18, 21, 23, 27, 28, 31, 32 and 37 of the Charter as expressed during the course of the review of the matter of its registration, and on introducing corresponding changes in the Charter under established procedure.

2. The Moldavian SSR Council of Ministers notes that at meetings held by the "Unitatya-Yedinstvo" international movement in defense of perestroika individual ill-considered statements have been made capable of destabilizing the situation in the republic, and the leadership of the movement has not promptly taken the necessary steps to stop such statements.

Registration of the Charter does not mean that approval is being given for the measures conducted by the international movement.

[Signed] I. Kalin, chairman of the Moldavian SSR Council of Ministers.

A. Demchenko, administrator of the Moldavian SSR Council of Ministers.

In accordance with the 25 August 1989 Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium ukase "On Interim Procedure for the Registration of Public Associations of Citizens in the Moldavian SSR" the Moldavian SSR Council of Ministers resolves as follows:

To register the Charter of the "Gagauz Khalky" people's movement as confirmed at the 1st Congress of the "Gagauz Khalky" people's movement on 21 May 1989, taking under advisement the statement of the "Gagauz Khalky" people's movement on its agreement with the remarks and proposals on paragraphs 1 and 3 of Section I, 1 and 4 of Section 2 [as published], paragraphs 4 and 5 of Section III, paragraph 3 of section VIII, and line [abzats] 2 of Section 2 of the Charter as expressed during the course of the review of the matter of its registration, and on introducing corresponding changes in the Charter under established procedure.

[signed] I. Kalin, chairman of the Moldavian SSR Council of Ministers.

A. Demchenko, administrator of the Moldavian SSR Council of Ministers.

In accordance with the 25 August 1989 mold Supreme Soviet Presidium Ukase "On Interim Procedure for the Registration of Public Associations of Citizens in the Moldavian SSR" the Moldavian SSR Council of Ministers resolves as follows:

To register the Charter of the "Vozrozhdeniye" Bulgarian Social and Cultural Friendly Society as confirmed at the 2 July 1989 general meeting of the members of the society, taking under advisement the statement of the society leadership on agreement with the remarks and proposals on paragraphs 1 and 6 of Section I, paragraphs 2, 3, 5, and 8 of Section II, paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 4 of Section III, paragraphs 1, 3, and 6 of Section IV, and paragraphs 1 and 2 of Section V, as expressed during the course of the review of the matter of its registration, and on introducing corresponding changes in the Charter under established procedure.

[Signed] I. Kalin, chairman of the Moldavian SSR Council of Ministers.

A. Demchenko, administrator of the Moldavian SSR Council of Ministers.

Vorotnikov Attends RSFSR Election Review

PM0612165189 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 6 Dec 89 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "At the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) Supreme Soviet Presidium"]

[Text] Moscow—A conference of secretaries of autonomous republic Supreme Soviet presidiums, kray and oblast soviet executive committees, and RSFSR autonomous oblast and autonomous okrug soviets of peoples deputies and chairmen of central electoral commissions for elections of autonomous republic people's deputies

was held at the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium. Questions pertaining to the progress of the election campaign of RSFSR, autonomous republic, and local soviet people's deputies and the tasks of Soviet organs in this work were discussed.

T.G. Ivanova, deputy chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, noted in her report that the elections to the republic and local soviets of state power are a substantial component of the second stage of the political reform. The further progress of perestroika in our society will largely depend on their results. It is the soviet organs' task to help electoral commissions in their work to ensure the successful implementation of this important political measure.

During the elections 1,068 RSFSR people's deputies, around 3,000 autonomous republic Supreme Soviet deputies, and almost 790,000 people's deputies of all local soviet components will be elected. The conference stressed the need to create in labor collectives and social organizations and at voters' meetings an atmosphere conducive to the nomination to the soviets of the most worthy and convinced champions of perestroika and renewal of Soviet society, who enjoy the greatest prestige and trust among citizens.

V.I. Kazakov, chairman of the Central Electoral Commission for RSFSR people's deputies' elections, reported on the commission's work.

V.A. Abolentsev, RSFSR minister of justice, dwelt on questions of improving the work of RSFSR people's courts in the light of the demands of the new Law "On Legal Proceedings in the USSR." V.P. Trushin, RSFSR minister of internal affairs, reported on the state of law and order in the Russian Federation.

The conference was attended by V.I. Vorotnikov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

RSFSR Congress Discusses Fight Against Crime

PM0612162189 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 3 Dec 89 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "Stepping Up Fight Against Crime"]

[Text] A regional conference of leading workers of soviet and law enforcement organs held by decision of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Council of Ministers took place in Rostov-na-Donu. Chairmen of autonomous republics' Councils of Ministers and kray and oblast soviet executive committees, leaders of internal affairs, prosecutor's office, and justice organs, and court chairmen from 20 RSFSR autonomous republics, krays, and oblasts took part in its work.

The conference discussed the practical implementation of the directives of the First Congress of USSR People's Deputies to resolutely step up the fight against crime. Urgent measures to step up the struggle against the most dangerous and widespread forms of criminal phenomena

were examined: organized crime, bribe-taking and speculation, and attacks on citizens' lives, dignity, and property.

The conference participants outlined ways to increase the effectiveness of the people's militia, other public formations, and labor collectives, and exchanged experience of work to prevent and cut short in a timely manner mass illegal actions by criminal and other anti-social elements and to unite the efforts of soviet and law enforcement organs in work to really strengthen legality and law and order.

Problems of strengthening the cadre composition and the technical equipment of the law enforcement organs were also discussed.

The following took part in the conference: A.A. Khomyakov, deputy chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers; V.A. Abolentsev, RSFSR minister of justice; V.P. Trushin, RSFSR minister of internal affairs; V.M. Lebedev, chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Court; N.S. Trubin, RSFSR first deputy prosecutor; and senior officials of the CPSU Central Committee and the RSFSR Council of Ministers.

Armenian Foreign Minister Interviewed

NC0612224889 Yerevan KHORHRDAYIN HAYASTAN
in Armenian 21 Nov 89 P 4

[Interview with Anatoliy Mkrtchyan, foreign affairs minister of the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic, by Tigran Khachatryan; place and date not given]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] [Khachatryan] The reasons for the great interest among us in the Armenian Foreign Ministry are understandable. Naturally, the readers would like some information about the nature of work and basic trends of your ministry.

[Mkrtchyan] [Passage omitted] At present, the Armenian Foreign Ministry concentrates its political work on the comprehensive study of the diplomatic aspects of the countries in our region, neighboring countries to begin with. Great attention is also devoted to those countries where our republic has its own specific interests. Among these are primarily those countries which harbor Armenian communities. [passage omitted]

One of the most important aspects of the ministry's political work has been and is the study of the political aspects of the international examinations and hearings concerning Armenia and Armenian people or pertaining to the interests of the Armenians. Thus, whenever the possibilities of the consideration of such issues at international organizations arise, our ministry prepares the necessary materials and sends them to the USSR Foreign Affairs Ministry for possible use. [passage omitted] At present, the possibilities of establishing trade, cultural, and other ties with neighboring countries and others in the region are being studied. Certain steps

have already been taken, but I would not like to draw premature conclusions about these.

[Khachatryan] Allow me to interject. What would you say about the establishment of similar relations with Iran and Turkey?

[Mkrtchyan] The establishment of mutually advantageous trade and cooperation as well as the establishment of cultural and economic ties with Iran would undoubtedly spring from our republic's economic and political interests. We have already informed Iran of our intention and readiness by putting forth certain proposals.

Our stance towards Turkey is conditioned by relations compatible with international norms existing between the two neighboring countries. Naturally, the Armenian people have not forgotten and have not forgiven the events that happened at the turn of the century in the Ottoman Empire. This is evinced by the well-known resolution adopted recently by the Supreme Soviet of the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic. Nevertheless, I think that we must examine the issue of establishing mutually beneficial trade relations with Turkey. For example, cross-border trade and the development of transportation ties will be to the benefit of our republic.

While speaking about the prospects of Armenia's trade relations, I would particularly like to mention that considerable importance must also be accorded to the potential of the diaspora in that matter. [passage omitted]

The issue of having Armenian diplomatic representation in certain foreign countries has gained currency. Our ministry's proposals in this direction gained acceptance at the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee and were then submitted to the union bodies. It is time for the Armenian Foreign Ministry to have permanent representation in Soviet embassies in those countries where the Armenian republic has permanent, specific, and established interests. These are our neighboring countries as well as those countries where Armenian communities exist. [passage omitted]

[Khachatryan] For many years you worked in the United Nations, the most authoritative international body. Today, the question of the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic becoming a member of international organizations has attracted enormous interest in the republic. What is your position on this issue? Could Armenia become a member of the United Nations?

[Mkrtchyan] As the republic's foreign affairs minister I would be happy if Armenia were a full member of the United Nations. Unfortunately, the question of entering that organization presupposes a revision of the UN Charter. [passage omitted]

However, that does not mean that Armenian diplomats cannot participate in the work of international organizations. We have submitted proposals to the USSR Foreign Affairs Ministry on the need to introduce radical improvements in this regard. [passage omitted]

Aganbegyan on Efforts To Revive Armenian Economy

NC061222789 Yerevan International Service
in Armenian 2130 GMT 5 Dec 89

[Text] A roundtable meeting was held at the Armenian trade and industry center with the participation of a group of Soviet experts headed by Academician Abel Aganbegyan. The conferees made various proposals which might help Armenia develop foreign trade relations. In the view of Academician Aganbegyan, Armenia needs to attract large amounts of capital in order to revive the earthquake-stricken economy and to solve other problems of the republic. In this regard Armenia has an advantage, which is the diaspora, through which foreign capital could be attracted.

The idea of turning Armenia into a free economic zone was also discussed. This idea is gradually gaining acceptance. A report has been submitted to the USSR State Foreign Trade Committee stressing the necessity of allowing Armenia to adopt a special foreign trade system. Aganbegyan indicated that the attitude toward this suggestion is favorable.

At the initiative of Soviet and American scientists, a multi-party international consultative meeting devoted to the revival of Armenia will be held in Paris in December on the occasion of the first anniversary of the earthquake. The 7 December meeting will be entirely devoted to foreign economic ties between the West and Armenia. The experts are proposing to reduce tariff rates, extend the timetables for the establishment of joint enterprises in Armenia, and establish an international bank and an international (?credit) fund in Armenia. We must also develop tourism, thus attracting foreign capital, Academician Aganbegyan asserted.

Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet Holds Session

1990 Plan, Budget

LD0612181989 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1630 GMT 6 Dec 89

[Text] Questions of the plan and budget for 1990 and of the coming elections to the republic's local soviets were on the agenda of a routine session of the Supreme Soviet of the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] which continued today [6 December].

A report on bills concerning amendments and addenda to the Constitution of the republic and on elections of people's deputies of Armenian SSR and local soviets was delivered by Voskanyan, chairman of the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

During debate on the plan and budget for 1990, special attention was given to elimination of the aftermath of the earthquake and financial backing for the whole program for the coming year in order to make up for what was lost in the initial period of work.

There was committed talk on [word indistinct] of all-round links with the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast. Speaking at the session was Arutyunyan, first secretary of the Communist Party of Armenia Central Committee.

In connection with the events devoted to the anniversary of the day of the earthquake and the coming USSR Congress of People's Deputies, a decision was made to end the session after completion of the congress.

Another report from Yerevan: On the eve of the grave disaster that overtook the republic, a memorial plaque to the memory of the victims of the earthquake was unveiled in Armenia today. The solemn mourning ceremony was attended by leaders of the republic, USSR people's deputies, participants in the routine session of the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet, and numerous guests who had come to mark the tragic date.

Resolution on Reunification

NC0712105189 Yerevan ARMENPRES International
Service in Armenian 1215 GMT 4 Dec 89

[The decision of the Supreme Soviet of the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] and the National Council of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO] on the reunification of Armenian SSR and NKAO—ARMENPRES headline]

[Text] Proceeding from the universal principles of national self-determination and acceding to the lawful aspiration for reunification of the two forcibly separated segments of the Armenian people, the Supreme Soviet of the Armenian SSR and the National Council of the NKAO resolve that:

1. The Supreme Soviet of the Armenian SSR hereby recognizes the fact of NKAO's self-determination as affirmed by the decisions of the 20 February 1988 and 12 July 1988 sessions of the NKAO's oblast soviet as well as by the 16 August 1989 congress of the plenipotentiary representatives of the oblast's population and the 19 October session of the National Council.
2. The Supreme Soviet of the Armenian SSR recognizes the congress of the plenipotentiary representatives of the NKAO and the National Council it has elected as the sole legal authority functioning in the oblast at present.
3. The Supreme Soviet of the Armenian SSR and the National Council of the NKAO declare the reunification of the Armenian SSR and the NKAO. The rights of Armenian SSR citizenship extends to the population of the NKAO.
4. The Supreme Soviet of the Armenian SSR and the National Council of NKAO hereby create a joint commission, with its operational apparatus, to formulate practical steps for the realization of the reunification of the Armenian SSR and NKAO.

5. The Supreme Soviet of the Armenian SSSR and the National Council of the NKAO assume the obligation to represent the national interests of the Armenian population in northern Artsakh [NKAO], Shaumyan rayon, and Getashen district.

6. The presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Armenian SSR, the Council of Ministers of the Armenian SSR, and the presidium of the National Council of the NKAO are instructed to execute this decision.

Resolution on USSR NKAO Decision

NC0712110589 Yerevan ARMENPRES International Service in Armenian 1215 GMT 4 Dec 89

[The resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] and the National Council of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO] concerning the 28 November decision of the USSR Supreme Soviet on "measures to normalize the situation in the NKAO."—ARMENPRES headline]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] The Supreme Soviet of the Armenian SSR and the National Council of the NKAO hereby resolve:

1. To qualify, in accordance with the norms of the international law and constitutional stipulations, as a new act of forcible annexation the enforced return of the NKAO—contrary to the will of the overwhelming majority of its population—to the jurisdiction of the Azerbaijan SSR and the forcible retention of the oblast within Azerbaijan SSR, as is envisaged by the USSR Supreme Soviet decision.

2. That the rejection of the right to self-determination of the NKAO population—a forcibly detached part of the Armenian people—is a disregard of the right of self-determination for the entire Armenian people, and grossly violates the principle of the voluntary union of the USSR people in the Soviet federation, directly infringes upon the underlying principles of the USSR Constitution, undermines the USSR's international obligations, including its obligations to the UN Charter and the final act and concluding document of the Vienna conference on European security and cooperation which bind the states to bring their laws, legislation, and policy in line with their obligations under international law and in line with the principle of equality of nations and their right to determine their own destiny, domestic, and foreign policy as they see fit.

3. To declare the USSR Supreme Soviet decision—as a decision incompatible with the principle of self-determination, the condition under which the Armenian people entered the USSR structure, the constitutions of the USSR and of Armenia, and with the international obligations of the subjects of the USSR and of the Soviet federation—as invalid and having no statutory consequence for the Armenian SSR and the NKAO.

4. To protest the violation of the right of self-determination of the Armenian people and of its forcibly

detached part—the population of NKAO—before the USSR Supreme Soviet, the supreme soviets of all the union republics, the parliaments of the countries members to the UN, including the countries party to the conference on European security and cooperation, and the Europarlament.

5. To instruct the Armenian SSR Foreign Affairs Ministry to inform the Armenian section of the society for friendship and cultural ties with foreign countries, the committee for cultural relations with the diaspora Armenians, ARMENPRES, and all the Armenian communities abroad about the decision adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet and to call on them to farther consolidate their ranks around mother Armenia in defense of the violated rights of the Armenian people.

6. To declare as inoperative all the decisions—where they do not correspond to the rights and interests of the Armenian people—of the USSR Supreme Soviet adopted after the walk-out of the USSR people's deputies of the Armenian SSR and NKAO from the hall of the USSR Supreme Soviet session.

[signed] G. Voskanyan, chairman of the presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Armenian SSR;

[signed] N. Stepanyan, secretary of the presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Armenian SSR;

V. Grigoryan, chairman of the NKAO National Council Yerevan, 1 December 1989.

Armenian Academy of Sciences on NKAO Decision

NC0312121689 Yerevan International Service in Armenian 1630 GMT 2 Dec 89

[From the press review]

[Text] The press has devoted many pages to reactions to the USSR decision on measures to normalize the situation in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO].

At a session on 29 November, the Presidium of the Armenian SSR Academy of Sciences stated that this decision does not solve the issue of the NKAO's future and hands over the solution of the problem to the colonizer, Azerbaijan. Naturally this decision further exacerbates the tension in interethnic relations. For this reason, the Armenian SSR Academy of Sciences strongly condemns this decision.

Azerbaijan Challenges Armenian Decision on NKAO

NC0612200889 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1700 GMT 6 Dec 89

[Text] The decision adopted by the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet Presidium in connection with the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet's decision on uniting the Armenian SSR and the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO] is as follows:

On 1 December 1989, the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet, together with the NKAO's National Council,

adopted an anticonstitutional decision aimed at unifying the Armenian SSR and the NKAO. An effort was made once again to usurp the Azerbaijan SSR's territory through this decision.

The step taken by the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet, which is illegal and which conflicts with the USSR Constitution, the Azerbaijan SSR Constitution, the relations between the union republics, and the norms of international law, has come at a time when an opportunity has been created by the USSR Supreme Soviet's decision on 28 November 1989 to normalize the situation in the region.

It is common knowledge that this decision recommended that the Armenian SSR and Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviets move to take all the measures required to normalize relations between the two peoples, restore confidence and cooperation, and organize normal economic and cultural relations.

Obviously, the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet's decision does not have any legal strength.

The Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet adopts the following decision:

The decision adopted by the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet on 1 December 1989 to unite the Armenian SSR and NKAO is regarded as an impermissible interference in the Sovereign Azerbaijan SSR's affairs and a measure aimed at encroaching on the Azerbaijan SSR's territorial integrity, which does not contribute toward the effort made to stabilize the situation in the region and restore normal conditions.

[Signed] El'mira Kafarova, chairwoman of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium;

[Signed] Kaziyeva, secretary of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

Official Denies 'Halt' of Goods to Azerbaijan

NC0312125289 *Baku Domestic Service in Azeri*
0440 GMT 3 Dec 89

[From the Republican Press Review]

[Text] Informed sources say that shops in Baku will soon be empty because of transportation (?problems). The reason for this is the decision adopted by the USSR Ministry of Railways to halt the dispatch of goods, including foodstuffs, to the entire railways network and Azerbaijan.

According to [name indistinct], USSR deputy minister of railways, it is incorrect to say that the dispatch of goods to the republic has been halted. Instead, this situation is the result of strikes along the tracks. More than 400 trains have been stranded thus far.

The statement by the USSR deputy minister of railways as well as statements by leading officials of the republic's ministries and main administrations appear in a report

published in the papers under the heading "Whom Do We Harm and What Do the Republic's People Expect?"

New Turkmen Prime Minister Elected

LD0212095389 *Moscow World Service in English*
0800 GMT 2 Dec 89

[Text] A Soviet Turkmen republic in Central Asia has for the first time elected a new prime minister on an alternative basis.

The winner is 53-year-old Khan Akhmedov, former deputy premier of Turkmenia. Eight candidates were contesting the post. Akhmedov's program of radical reforms in the social sphere and financial measures to improve the republic's economy found the greatest voter support.

Criminal Investigation Into Pipeline Explosion

LD0612213189 *Moscow TASS in English* 1928 GMT
6 Dec 89

[Text] Moscow December 6 TASS—A criminal investigation is under way involving an explosion of the gas pipeline Zapadnaya Sibir-Uralo-Povolzhye (Western Siberia-Urals-Volga reaches) in the territory of the Bashkir Autonomous Republic. The explosion caused the derailment of two passenger trains and resulted in a heavy death toll.

The State Commission of the USSR Council of Ministers for emergencies reported today that the Office of the Public Prosecutor of the USSR Established that as many as 1,224 people died or injured during the derailment and ensuing fire. All the dead or injured were identified. The injured and witnesses of the disaster were questioned, and most of the injured underwent a medical-forensic examination.

Investigators also established that there were no violations of safety rules by railway workers.

According to the evidence, the pressure in the pipeline was within the permissible level. The study of the pipeline's operation from 1985 to 1989 is being concluded.

Investigators continue to check the quality of the pipeline construction by conducting research and questioning the builders of the pipeline.

The course of the investigation is constantly supervised.

New Arkhangelsk Obkom First Secretary Elected

PM2711145989 *Moscow PRAVDA in Russian*
24 Nov 89 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "Twenty Nominations"]

[Text] Arkhangelsk, 23 Nov—An Arkhangelsk Oblast Party Committee [Obkom] plenum has been held which examined an organizational question. The plenum

released P.M. Telepnev from his post as first secretary of the CPSU Obkom at his request in connection with his retirement on pension. There were more than 20 nominations for the post of obkom first secretary which were examined beforehand at rayon and city party organizations and at a session of the party obkom bureau.

Three candidates were entered on the list for a secret ballot at the party obkom plenum. By a majority of the votes Yu.A. Guskov, USSR first deputy minister of the timber industry and formerly second secretary of the Arkhangelsk CPSU Obkom, was elected party obkom first secretary.

V.T. Suslin, deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee Party Building and Cadre Work Department, took part in the plenum's work.

Labor Collectives Conference Underway in Kemerovo

LD151113789 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
0100 GMT 15 Nov 89

[Text] The first conference of labor collectives of the oblast began in Kemerovo. Tens of problems face the workers of the Kuzbass. Discipline in production is falling sharply. Interrelations, especially at coal enterprises, between specialists, management leaders and workers have become strained. Social issues are being resolved extremely slowly. The prestige of many professions has been lost. A wave of crime is literally overwhelming the streets, towns and settlements. In short, the people in the harsh Siberian area, as before, do not have normal living conditions. And the main issue facing the conference's participants is how to raise the level of work and accountability of the labor collectives to implement the socio-economic programs. The delegates elected at assemblies of collectives and joint extended sittings of strike committees and trade union committees will be faced with finding the answer.

Democratic Association Formed in Chelyabinsk

LD3010201189 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1016 GMT 30 Oct 89

[Text] Chelyabinsk, 30 Oct (TASS)—TASS correspondent Yevgeniy Tkachenko reports:

An Interregional Association of Democratic Organizations of the USSR was proclaimed at a constituent conference last Sunday in Chelyabinsk (southern Urals). Taking part were several hundred delegates and guests from 12 union republics representing 92 informal movements and organizations, which incorporate over 300,000 people.

The constituent conference adopted a manifesto and ratified principles of the activity of the Interregional Association of Democratic Organizations, the main one being the attainment of goals by way of peaceful and nonviolent means. Among the association's main tasks are the elaboration of and assistance in the implementation of specific programs for taking the country out of a crisis, active participation in the forthcoming elections

to local organs of power, fostering the election of deputies who reflect the will of the people, and support for the interregional group of people's deputies of USSR people's deputies.

Among the principles of the construction of an open society put forward by the association are division of power into legislative, executive, and judicial branches and the transformation of the entire system on the basis of the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, international pacts on human rights, and the Vienna agreements on international security and cooperation. Full support was expressed for measures to prevent an ecological catastrophe, and to return churches to believers. Also, the need was stressed for the democratization of Armenia. During the democratic transformations in the country, the manifesto notes, priority should be given to creative and educational work, not to confrontation and destruction. An organizational committee was set up to coordinate actions of the Interregional Association of Democratic Organizations, and to prepare its next conference, which is to be held in 3 months' time.

The conference organizers prevented some journalists from entering the conference hall, in particular a PRAVDA correspondent, under the pretext that "the press organ of the CPSU Central Committee does not cover the activities of organizations like this in a way their leaders would like." Commenting on this, PRAVDA points out today that "this sort of step does not match the principles of democracy, pluralism, and freedom of speech about which the leaders of the newly-concocted organization raise so much noise."

Further Report

PM0211153389 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 2 Nov 89 Second Edition p 4

[Own correspondent A. Usoltsev dispatch: "More Patience"]

[Text] Chelyabinsk—It was a very motley audience that gathered for the constituent conference of the Interregional Association of Democratic Organizations (MADO) which was held in Chelyabinsk in late October—representatives of more than 70 public organizations of various hues from 42 of the country's cities. The list of the titles of the organizations accredited at the conference alone is quite dazzling: It includes the "Movement for Perestroika" from Grodno, alongside the "Trudoden" [Workday] sociopolitical club from Khabarovsk, the "independent" trade union "Spravedlivost" [Justice] from Leningrad, the "Democratic Party" from Kopeysk, the Glasnost Fund from Arkhangelsk, and the Union of Constitutional Democrats from Moscow.... The list of the MADO founding members includes more than 15 "people's fronts" alone. And each of the social formations has its own views, different from the others, as to what is happening, and its

own goals and tasks. So what brought them together in the conference hall of the "Chelyabinskgripromez" Design Institute?

What is the view of the conference participants themselves on this account? Opinions differed widely—from advocating assistance to the party in the cause of perestroika, to the creation of an alternative political organization to the CPSU. However, in an effort to avoid swinging from one extreme to another, it is probably best to turn to the documents adopted in Chelyabinsk a few days ago. The preamble to the "Principles of the Activity of the Interregional Association of Democratic Organizations" reads: "The halfhearted, inconsistent nature of the reforms that are being implemented has resulted in a sharp deterioration in the situation in the country. The emergency situation may lead to emergency measures. Therefore there is an urgent need for a new level of coordination in the actions of the country's democratic forces."

So, the founders of MADO are afraid of an offensive on the part of reaction since, in their opinion, "guarantees of the irreversibility of democratic processes... are lacking."

What can be said in this context? The analysis which has been carried out by the party has revealed the main sources of our troubles: They stem from the totalitarian state system engendered by Stalinism, and its overblown bureaucratic state apparatus. It is difficult to dismantle this "ferroconcrete" structure, but the processes of renewal are under way, even if they are not proceeding as swiftly as we would like. The state apparatus is undergoing considerable change, and with the implementation of the objectives of the political reform after democratic elections of soviets at all levels, its functions will change completely. Meanwhile the words "apparatchik," which is almost synonymous with "enemy," and "partocracy" are constantly in use in the political slogans of the "radicals" and are bandied about at rallies. It seems that the desire to find an arch-adversary close by is very much alive, and if this proves impossible—simply to create his image in the imagination! But we have been through all this before! There have been all kinds of movements, struggles for power, and reprisals against "enemies of the people" in our history which has seen so much suffering. And if we find new enemies, what will we do with them? Are we, again, to return to dictatorship methods?

It is impossible not to notice that people who describe themselves as democrats are themselves frequently guilty of using undemocratic methods. For instance, members of the conference organizational committee decided in a narrow circle who should be admitted to the conference hall and who should be kept out. So, for instance, A. Baronenko, a school headmaster from Kopeysk where he heads a voters' club, was not given a mandate. Were they afraid that the Communist-historian would make a speech with an undesirable bias? And how is the refusal to grant accreditation to the PRAVDA correspondent at the conference to be interpreted?

The social movements' concern for the fate of perestroika is understandable. Its failure would spell a tragedy for our country. But why, on what grounds are they seeking to remove the party, which is undergoing renewal, from the rebirth of society? It is being blamed today for the absence of tangible results and for the deterioration of the economic situation. However, only a political adventurist would expect immediate success. Today even from the sidelines sober voices are calling for more patience—impatience has betrayed us so many times before! Why repeat the mistakes of the past again? Any unprejudiced person is aware of how heavy the burden of deformations and miscalculations that is crushing society in the vise of the prevailing crisis is. What is needed in order to emerge from it with the smallest possible losses is not confrontation, nor a search for the "enemy," but the consolidation of all progressive forces. It would be absurd to exclude Communists from their ranks.

Yet attempts of this kind persist. This also applies to the MADO constituent conference in Chelyabinsk. The original draft of the "manifesto" prepared by representatives of the Leningrad People's Front read: "The claim that 'perestroika was initiated by the party' is not true." However, the authors of the draft met with considerable opposition. S. Malamud from Chelyabinsk said, for instance: "The attempt to point a finger at the party must be removed from the preamble." This attack on the party was not included in the final text of the document.

After the conference I had an opportunity to talk to Prof V. Belkin, department head at the Urals Department of the USSR Academy of Sciences Economics Institute.

"I am convinced," he said, "that holding the MADO constituent conference in Chelyabinsk, a workers' city in the Urals where people, unspoiled by either climatic conditions or social amenities, are businesslike and impervious to flareups of political emotions, has contributed to the removal of much ideological chaff from the documents which have been adopted here."

I must frankly say that listening to the conference delegates and reading through their documents I was struck more than once by the amazing familiarity of many ideas. Here is a quotation from the "manifesto" for instance: "MADO favors the diversity and equality of all forms of ownership." However, is this perhaps a brainchild of the "informals"? Was this not proclaimed at the March plenum? Is this not the subject of debate at the USSR Supreme Soviet session, where the law on ownership is being discussed? Or take the provision of the "manifesto" to the effect that MADO advocates the principles of building an open democratic society "based on the priority of universal human values." Does this differ greatly from the following idea, for instance: "This society is open to the surrounding world, to cooperation in the interests of building new international relations based on free choice, equality, security, and universal human values"? Yet the latter was stated by M.S. Gorbachev during the conference at the CPSU Central

Committee 18 July this year during discussion of ways to achieve a qualitatively new state of socialism. So the upshot is that the movements are setting themselves in principle the same aims as those proclaimed by the party earlier. Why, then, hide the author under a bushel?

Pluralism of opinions teaches us to be tolerant toward other people's opinions, and therefore I will not dwell on the extreme statements which rang out in different forms in the speeches of certain of the conference participants. They are not a major issue, in my opinion, because no matter how broad the spectrum of opinions on the future of our country was, MADO has declared that it adheres to the principles of the socialist orientation. Conference participants included CPSU members who belong to unofficial organizations. When appeals rang out to transform the association of democrats into a political force opposed to the Communists, the Communists present reacted in different ways. While some maintained a cowed silence, others, protesting, rushed toward the microphone, and yet others called for the cooperation of all social movements, to be headed by the Communist Party.

In short, the usual stumblings in the maze of democratization were in evidence here too.

Ryzhkov at Discussion of Baykal-Amur Railway

*LD0212224889 Moscow TASS in English 2053 GMT
2 Dec 89*

[Text] Moscow December 2 TASS—A regular meeting of the Presidium of the Soviet Council of Ministers has discussed the commissioning of the Baykal-Amur railway and its further use.

The meeting noted that builders and railway workers provided the complete commissioning of the railway in November 1989. Over 5,000 kilometers of railway have been laid, about 30 kilometers of tunnels were drilled and more than 4,000 bridges, viaducts and other engineering structures have been built under severe climatic, natural and geological conditions.

A total of 45 towns and settlements with a total residential area of over one million square meters, including shops, public catering facilities, schools, kindergartens, hospitals and other social and cultural facilities have been constructed.

As the railway was commissioned, the Soviet Union made a second shorter way to the Pacific Ocean and received an access to rich mineral resources of Siberia and the Soviet Far East, including unique deposits of coal, iron and copper ore, apatites and asbestos. At the same time the meeting noted that social and cultural development of the majority of towns and working settlements along the railway lagged behind the industrial construction and do not now meet the population's demands.

The Soviet Government assigned the Russian Federation Council of Ministers, the USSR Railway Ministry and the USSR Ministry of Transport Construction to accelerate the building of social and cultural facilities.

On behalf of the Soviet Government, Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov expressed gratitude to all participants in the Baykal-Amur railway construction.

Medvedev on Kauchuk Meeting

*LD0311051789 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1600 GMT 2 Nov 89*

[Text] A meeting took place today between the collective of Moscow's Kauchuk association and USSR People's Deputy Vadim Andreyevich Medvedev, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo. A committed conversation took place on the course of perestroika in our country and on the business of the enterprise. Listen to a report by our correspondent, Sergey Omilchenko:

[Begin recording] [Omelchenko] Moscow's Kauchuk Association is one of the oldest enterprises in Moscow, and in the industrial rubber products industry as a whole. Its products are used in the automobile, aviation, and construction industries, and in agriculture. However, since the very beginning of its existence, since the last century, there has been not a single reconstruction here. Only the administrative building and storerooms have been built. Since 1962 they have not built their own accommodation, and over the past 2 years the workers here have received not a single apartment.

Old walls, old equipment that has exhausted its reserves, obsolete technology, and a mass of problems and trouble that unfortunately exist at many of the country's enterprises to some degree. Now routes for reconstruction and the improvement of life and labor here at the works have been outlined. This was touched on in the conversation between the association's collective and Vadim Andreyevich Medvedev. Questions poured forth, as if from a cornucopia. Here I am, following the end of the meeting, conversing with Vadim Andreyevich:

[Medvedev] Usually, meetings of this kind are held at giant enterprises or at some kinds of scientific production associations that are demonstrating the highest achievements of world technology. Here, everything is the reverse. This is a very old enterprise. I think that this is the peculiarity of this meeting, and it says something about how many problems we still need to resolve in the course of perestroika. They keep surfacing and they demand resolution. I must say that the mood of the people here is correct, in the sense that they see all of this, understand it, and make high demands, both of themselves and of those who manage them and set the economic norms for their work. They are seeking a way out of the situation. I think that it is correct that the way out is also being sought on the path of the transition to contemporary methods of management; the collective is intending to lease the enterprise. This is a very responsible step, and I would just like to hope that the collective

will prepare for it very soundly, so that it will be not simply a change of the signboards, but that an act of really drawing people into the management of production and of attaining a high level of material incentive on the basis of collective contracting. So this inspires optimism. Here not just hoping for some one-time, revolutionary change is needed, but order also needs to be upheld at this venerable old works, which it is not yet possible to take out of operation because its products simply are extremely necessary for our national economy. The meeting with the collective—which passed in a demanding, but I think, good, businesslike, and benevolent setting—gave me pleasure.

[Omelchenko] You have had very many meetings this year, and all the same, this meeting probably brought something new and personal for you, both as a deputy and as a Politburo member.

[Medvedev] Yes, of course. The moment is such that there is a very high temperature in political life, excitement in public life, and such an extremely abrupt turn in the resolution of practical affairs in the political sphere and in economics. For this reason, each meeting is valuable, of course, because it allows one to feel how all of these changes, how all of these events are reflected in the consciousness of the people.

The fact that even though productivity has increased during the past year by a good percentage, but all the same salaries have risen to an even greater extent, causes alarm bells to ring. The country's economy cannot develop in this way. I think that this year may be some sort of an exception which is connected with the transition to the new procedure for increasing labour remuneration, but if this tendency continues further, then a serious conclusion must be drawn.

[Omelchenko] As I understand from this meeting, the main thing is that everyone needs to work actively, everyone from the worker to the leader.

[Medvedev] That is precisely it. That is it. Everyone has to work, to relate actively to the business, and of course, while not letting their direct material interests out of sight, all the same also to think about our common business, our common good. [end recording]

People's Control Committee Meets 7 Dec

LD0712101989 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
0900 GMT 7 Dec 89

[Text] The unsatisfactory provision of track machinery for the railroad system by the USSR Ministry of Heavy, Power, and Transport Machine Building is at the center of attention at today's meeting of the USSR People's Control Committee. Its participants are also discussing issues concerning the illegal actions of senior officials which have led to the squandering of state property.

Problems of New Legislation Viewed

PM0612163189 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
5 Dec 89 Second Edition p 3

[Article by Doctor of Juridical Sciences A. Sobchak, USSR people's deputy and chief of department at Leningrad State University, datelined Leningrad and published under the rubric "Debating Platform": "The Path to Rule of Law"]

[Text] M.S. Gorbachev's report to the First Congress of USSR People's Deputies contained a call for collective investigation of the prevailing situation, approaching its appraisal from truthful, realistic, and demanding positions. This is exactly the approach that is necessary when examining questions concerning the shaping of the new political system and the creation of a rule-of-law state.

The political situation in the country today is characterized by social and ethnic contradictions, as well as the contradiction between the party's role as initiator, inspirer, and generator of perestroika and the lagging of perestroika processes within the CPSU itself.

Over the past 12-18 months the broad people's masses have started taking an active part in political activity. The helplessness and incompetence of many deskbound party functionaries, who were appointed to their positions behind closed doors, were immediately spotlighted. This type of cadre appointment was conditioned not only by the party's organizational structure, which caused a certain separation of a sizeable proportion of the apparatus from rank-and-file Communists and ultimately from the people, but also by the party's unique position in our society, whereby it seems to be outside the law and above the law.

The situation is extremely complex and, I would say, alarming. If it were to prevail much longer, this would be fraught with major unpleasantness for the party itself and for society as a whole. It is necessary to get to the roots of this situation. It draws strength from the fact that party officials frequently feel that they are the ultimate bearers of truth and justice. Furthermore, many of them are absolutely convinced that they are above the laws which, often enough, are in any case weak, contradictory, and ineffective. I am convinced that, when the supremacy of the law is really extended to party activity, the process of democratization within it will advance much more quickly.

The party and the rule of law, party leadership of society and the law... Until recently, such a formulation of the question could not even be discussed. And yet, it is this juxtaposition that contains what is almost the main cause of many of our society's deformations, from moral to economic ones. Thinking about it, it was the conditions whereby party organs at times acted as if laws did not exist at all that were almost the main cause of Stalinshchina, voluntarism, stagnation, and other lamentable events in our life. It is true that the CPSU Statutes say that the party acts within the framework of the law,

But this framework is so vague and so undefined that it is hardly worth talking about it now.

This phenomenon came to light in the conditions of glasnost and brought about a decline of the prestige of the authorities, the state, and the party prestige. Meanwhile, not a single public or political organization, not a single official or private person can exist in a normal democratic civil society whose juridical expression is the idea of a rule-of-law state if they are not subject to the effect of the law or if they stand outside or above it.

In our country, however, everything frequently is the other way round. That is why today, alas, people have a strong distrust of the potential of normal rule-of-law methods like, for example, obtaining restitution of justice by appealing to the court. So where should people appeal? It may sound paradoxical, but there is only one recourse left—the party organs.

Can you sense the dramatic nature of the present day? On the one hand we have the weakness and inadequacy of state means for citizens' protection. On the other hand we have the party organs, an apparatus which, by virtue of its special position, seems to rise above the inadequacy of the state. That is why ordinary people's hopes rest with it, with this apparatus. And citizens literally swamp party committees with letters, applications, and complaints frequently dealing with trivial matters. The multitude of party officials, instead of dealing with their proper work, are forced to write replies to complaints, set up commissions to investigate them, and so on. Consequently, the party apparatus also functions badly and is distracted from its main task—"policy-making." And complaints are investigated any old how. The result is that people's dissatisfaction is growing. Yes, an acute collision!

Is there a way out of it? Here it is necessary to distinguish and, as the saying goes, "Render unto God the things that are God's, and render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's." In other words, to implement the supremacy of the law not in words but in deed. Whenever—and I emphasize, whenever—citizens' or collectives' legitimate rights are infringed, they must have an opportunity to have them restored exclusively through the court. In this process, all other organs must be prohibited from any parallel investigation of the same complaints and applications, except for organs performing control functions: The Party Control Commission, the People's Control Committee, and others. In order to remedy the situation in society and restore trust in the organs of power, it is also necessary to make officials of any rank legally liable for deliberate breaches of the law, official lies, or forgeries. Even if such liability goes no further than dismissal from work and a ban on holding any office in the state and party apparatus for up to 5 years.

A fundamentally new approach is also necessary toward legislative work. In order to live according to law, the law

must at least exist. Yet today, in the 5th year of perestroika, we are mainly functioning under departmental provisions and instructions which set countless prohibitions and restrictions. The vast number of joint resolutions adopted by the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers until recently has produced a kind of inflation. They have ceased having an effect. We have lost sight of the difference between a law as a juridical act and as a political declaration. Vagueness, lack of precision, and an abundance of appeals and promises—that is the content of normative acts today. And this diminishes their effectiveness.

The real rejection of this practice would bring about a demarcation of the functions of state and party organs or, as it is nowadays fashionable to say, a separation of the state from the party.

Another question. At present the USSR Council of Ministers has, to all intents and purposes, claimed for itself the function of legislator. Its normative acts account for over 90 percent of the code of laws. But this is a code of resolutions, not of laws! In essence, legislation on all questions of society's life is now being created afresh. The solution of this task can be ensured only by the permanently functioning USSR Supreme Soviet and not by the Congress of People's Deputies, which meets only periodically.

It must be admitted that obvious progress has been achieved along this avenue. The prevailing practice in the preparation and publication of draft laws is being reviewed. Instead of agreement behind closed doors and occasional incompetent interference by party and state apparatus officials, draft laws are prepared by USSR Supreme Soviet committees and commissions on the basis of alternative options. It is necessary to make their broad public discussion and appraisal by state experts a permanent practice. I am convinced that this is what will happen. Practice is constantly reminding us of this.

Let us recall how the Law on the State Enterprise was adopted in the past. The overwhelming majority of specialists foresaw its lack of viability during the discussion of the published draft. Moreover, an alternative draft, approved by famous economists and jurists, was prepared and submitted. But it was not even seriously examined. The outcome is well known—the old Law on the State Enterprise simply failed to come into effect and there was no economic recovery.

Why was this? The law proclaimed the rejection of directive planning. When adopting the law, however, deputies of the Supreme Soviet at that time somehow "overlooked" the fact that 1 year earlier they had ratified another law, on the basic guidelines for the country's economic and social development during the 12th 5-Year Plan period, which was based on the diametrically opposite principle: Directive setting of 5-year plan targets. A serious contradiction developed, not in theory but in practice. We can see its results on the store shelves.

All this must be a lesson to those who were involved in the elaboration and adoption of the Law on the State Enterprise. I hope that members of the present USSR Supreme Soviet will act responsibly and will not allow the new Law on the Socialist Enterprise to end up as the latest literary work on a juridical topic.

The USSR Supreme Soviet is now engaged in major legislative work. When discussing the package of laws on ownership, land, leasing and lease relations, socialist enterprise, and others, as submitted by the USSR Council of Ministers, deputies must be aware that they hold the country's destiny and its future in their hands. We are living through an extremely acute historical moment, a moment of crisis, and unless we display sufficient wisdom, perspicacity, and consideration, neither the people nor history will ever forgive us.

At the same time, it is already time to think about the "groundwork" for work by the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies. Legislative reform and judicial-legal reform cannot be put off, and they must begin with the adoption of a new USSR Constitution.

Its preparation will take quite a long time, and time waits for no man! Right now, the new electoral laws in union republics and the laws on leasing, ownership, land, and the socialist enterprise which have been adopted by the country's Supreme Soviet either at first reading or finally demand serious amendments to the USSR Constitution.

Nor is it possible to put off the constitutional consolidation of the CPSU's platform on the nationalities question, adopted by our party Central Committee's September plenum. This is why we place so many hopes on the Second Congress of People's Deputies which should move us a substantial way along the path of shaping a rule-of-law state, where every citizen's rights are commensurate and equal with the state's rights, thus acquiring reliable and effective protection.

By adopting the laws on citizens' rights (on citizenship, on citizens' travel in and out of the country, on social organizations, on freedom of conscience, and on freedom of the press) and on the improvement of society's economic structure (on ownership, on land, on the socialist enterprise, on uniform taxation, and others), we shall be steadily, step by step erecting the edifice of a rule-of-law state.

Passivity Seen as Election to Soviets Approaches

*PM2011133789 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
15 Nov 89 Morning Edition p 1*

[Article by V. Shchepotkin, IZVESTIYA deputy editor for soviets' development: "Let Us Not Have Cause To Regret Our Passivity. Elections to Republican Supreme Soviets and Local Soviets"]

[Text] The elections to union and autonomous republic supreme soviets and to local soviets can rightly be called the second stage in the political reform of our society.

The first stage was the formation of the supreme organs of state power, the Congress of USSR People's Deputies and the country's Supreme Soviet, and the legislative activity they have embarked on—this stage is to some extent over. And although there is still a long way to go before it is finally completed, and further shakeups and overhauls are very likely, in general terms the supreme power of the perestroika period is already operating, devising laws, and deepening the "revolution from above" day by day.

But no "revolution from above" will attain its goals unless it is supported by a "revolution from below." The second-stage elections are that support, and without it the process of radical transformations in the country could simply seize up. After all, no matter how much the sun shines, poorly prepared and ill-tended land will produce more weeds than cereals. The republic Supreme Soviets are the organs of people's power which will have to tackle, through actions, not words, nearly all the main questions of our life, from political to everyday. And no other power will be as close to people's daily needs as the power, shaped by us, of the local soviets, based, in contrast to the former bodies, on new laws.

And how are they beginning to take shape, the future "second-rank" soviets? What has been heard and seen on the distant and close approaches to the elections? Indeed, this time there is no common date for the elections. For example, the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic and the Ukraine are preparing to vote in March, while Latvia will vote as early as December.

It has to be said that the picture is very varied at the moment. In some places, voters have been looking from the outset for ways to actively influence the course of the election. For example, in Rostov-na-Donu there was a mass rally of citizens. On the initiative of USSR People's Deputy V. Kolesnikov, it was attended by inhabitants of Oktyabrskiy Rayon, members of informal movements, workers and employees of local enterprises, academics, and party and soviet workers. A variety of opinions was expressed at it, a TASS correspondent reports. Some people wanted to accompany the elections with the slogans "Down With Everything," but the majority offered constructive opinions. Their position was well expressed by Rostov Agricultural Machine Building Institute lecturer N. Kotov, who stressed that the loud-mouths' days are over and the chief criterion for future elected representatives must be the desire for concrete action.

The association of voters in Novorossiysk made itself felt in a different, but also active, way. IZVESTIYA correspondent A. Dergachev reports that the first experimental issue of the newspaper PEREVAL has come out here.

"It will come out every other Saturday, instead of one issue of the city newspaper NOVOROSSIYSKIY RAB-OCHIY," City Party Committee First Secretary N. Khvorostyanskiy said. "It will contain an uninhibited

discussion of election matters and city issues. There will be conflicting viewpoints from informals, cooperative workers, and representatives of the People's Front and party organizations...."

The writers of the paper's first issue include USSR People's Deputy V. Kasyan, Father Georgiy, priest in charge at the Church of the Holy Assumption in Novorossiysk, N. Moskaleva, first secretary of Primorskiy Rayon Party Committee, and others.

But, unfortunately, in some places we have already seen the beginnings of efforts to begin the election campaign in accordance with the old stereotypes. Here is a report from IZVESTIYA correspondent A. Sabirov.

"Without doubt, it is a sign of the times: The public will not accept the role of dispassionate observer. It is actively involved in the election campaign. But look what happened in Tataria, for example. Hardly had the Law on Elections been adopted at the autonomous republic's Supreme Soviet session than a matter of minutes later at the same sitting there was a majority vote for a resolution on forming the Central Electoral Commission for the Election of Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic People's Deputies. People were bewildered: Had anyone been able to put forward candidates for the commission? Which labor collectives, and when? Where, and at which local residents' meetings? The questions were left unanswered. It was as clear as day that the list had been prepared in advance, although 'taking into account the proposals of local soviet executive committees and public organizations' republican organs.' But many people were not satisfied with this approach, which they regard as too narrow and rather hasty."

The fact that in some places people are trying not to notice election activity is worrying, of course. But far more alarming is the lack of activity among the voters themselves. Here is a report from East Kazakhstan Oblast by IZVESTIYA correspondent V. Mirolevich.

"It is a matter of days before the deadline for the nomination of local soviet candidate deputies. Reports by election commissions, newspaper items, and broadcasts by East Kazakhstan radio and television are like warning notices: By 14 November nominations had been made in only 3,660 of the 4,154 electoral okrugs. And in only 369 of them has more than one candidate been nominated for the seat. In the okrugs with alternative candidates there are practically no leaders. Whereas in the other okrugs they are the sole contenders.

"So, is office to be the guarantee of a seat, as before?

"Executive committees and the active public, united around the temporary citizens' committee to prepare for and hold the elections, are equally distressed by the passivity of the voters in East Kazakhstan Oblast.

"People underestimate the role of the soviets, which, with the adoption of the Law on Local Self-Management,

will be the true masters of their own territories,' USSR People's Deputy N. Petrusenko believes.

"But there are a few days to go yet. And they will show what is expected in East Kazakhstan: real elections or the old 'voting.'"

Equally worrying is a report from Karaganda by O. Stefashin.

"A total of 2,711 electoral okrugs have been created in Karaganda Oblast. By 10 November the nomination process had taken place in only 1,664.

"Some 150 okrugs have been set up for elections to the oblast soviet. There have been meetings in 126. One person has been nominated in each of 41 okrugs. The alternative candidate situation is even worse in rayon okrugs. For instance, 503 people have become candidate deputies of rural rayon soviets. And 297 of them are unopposed.

"Here is the picture in Tselinograd Oblast," O. Stefashin adds. "Of the 156 candidates nominated for the oblast soviet, 58 are unopposed. They are mainly oblast- or rayon-level leaders or economic managers. As of 9 November over 60 top leaders had already been nominated for the oblast soviet. So far there are only 55 representatives of the working class and peasantry. There are 8 people representing public organizations. And only 20 women."

These figures are cited not in order to revive the atmosphere of quotas. They indicate something else: Our continuing indifference toward our own future. Indeed, current reports from certain regions remind me of the news of early January this year, when the campaign to elect USSR people's deputies was starting. The formation of okrug electoral commissions also passed unnoticed by many labor collectives and people sat or stood through candidate nomination meetings with their usual indifference. Then they came to their senses: What are we doing? Through our own indifference, to whom are we giving the right to decide our destiny?

Much was then put right. There were new nominations and repeat elections. But in some places people are still regretting their political inertness. So let us not have cause to regret our political passivity again. That is, today and tomorrow, for the whole 5 years for which we will be electing the deputies.

PRAVDA Publishes Complaints Procedure Law

PM1711144589 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
12 Nov 89 Second Edition pp 1, 3

["USSR Law on the Procedure of Complaint to the Court Against the Unlawful Actions of Organs of State Management and Officials Who Infringe Citizens' Rights"]

[Text] USSR citizens possess the full range of socioeconomic, political, and individual rights and freedoms

proclaimed in and guaranteed by the USSR Constitution and the constitutions of the union and autonomous republics and other laws. Respect for the individual and national dignity and the protection of the rights and freedoms of citizens are the obligation of all state organs, public organizations, and officials.

The law of the USSR and the union republics provides the right of citizens to appeal to the court for the protection of their individual, property, family, labor, housing, and other rights and freedoms.

The present Law defines the procedure of complaint to the court against the unlawful actions of organs of state management as well as of officials who infringe citizens' rights.

Article 1. Right of Complaint to the Court

A citizen is entitled to complain to the court if he believes that his rights have been infringed by the unlawful actions of an organ of state management or an official.

Article 2. Actions of Organs of State Management and Officials Susceptible To Judicial Complaint

The actions of organs of state management and officials susceptible to judicial complaint are those collective or individual actions which result in:

the citizen's being unlawfully deprived of the opportunity to fully or partially enjoy a right granted to him by law or other normative act;

the unlawful imposition of another obligation on the citizen.

Article 3. The Extent of the Present Law's Operation

The actions of organs of state management and officials cannot be the subject of complaint to the court under the present Law if a different complaints procedure is stipulated by the laws of the USSR and the union republics.

Acts of a normative character by organs of state management and officials are not susceptible to judicial complaint under the present Law.

Article 4. Submission of a Complaint

In accordance with the present Law a complaint may be submitted to a court after an appeal has been lodged against the actions of an organ of state management or official to a superior organ or official. The latter are obliged to examine it and report the result of that examination to the citizen within 1 month.

A complaint may be submitted to the court by a citizen whose rights have been violated or by his representative and also at the citizen's request by the appropriately empowered representative of a social organization or labor collective.

The complaint is made to a rayon (city) people's court situated in the district of the organ of state management or the area where the official whose actions are subject to complaint works.

The cost of submitting a complaint is borne by the state in the prescribed manner.

Article 5. Time Limit for Submitting a Complaint to the Court

A complaint may be submitted to the court within 1 month calculated from the day that the citizen receives notification of the rejection by a superior organ or official of that complaint or from the final day of the 1-month period after the submission of the complaint to the superior organ or official if the complainant has not received a reply to his complaint.

The court may reinstate the period for the submission of complaints once it has lapsed if there is a valid reason for so doing.

Article 6. Examination of a Complaint

The examination of a complaint by the court and the execution of the court's decision are governed by the rules of civil proceedings.

A complaint is examined by a court within 10 days with the participation of the citizen who submitted the complaint and the leader of the organ of state management or the official whose actions are subject to complaint or by their representatives.

The citizen who has submitted the complaint has the right to instruct a representative to defend his interests.

Failure to appear in court without a good reason by a citizen who has submitted a complaint or the leader of an organ of state management or official whose actions are subject to complaint or their representatives shall be no impediment to the examination of the complaint although the court may require attendance on the part of the citizen who has submitted the complaint and the leader of the organ of state management or the official in question.

Representatives of social organizations and labor collectives as well as officials of superior organs or their representatives may participate in a court examination.

The court must study the materials of superior officials or organs which recognized the actions under complaint as lawful and may also listen to the explanations of other people and study the necessary documents and other evidence.

Article 7. Court Decision on a Complaint

The court produces a decision based on the results of the examination of the complaint.

If the court deems the actions under complaint to be unlawful and an infringement of the citizen's rights it

shall uphold the complaint and oblige the relevant organ of state management or official to correct the violation.

If the court establishes that the actions subject to complaint were committed in accordance with the law and within the competence of the organ of state management or official it shall reject the complaint.

The court's decision on the complaint or elimination of the violations of the law or other normative act shall be sent to the leader of the organ of state management or official whose actions were the subject of the complaint or to a superior organ or official.

The implementation of the court's decision on the complaint must be reported to the court and the complainant no later than 1 month from the day of receipt of the court's decision. If the decision is not carried out, the court shall take measures provided by the existing legislation.

Article 8. Intermediate Order of the Court

If during the examination of a complaint the court concludes that the prescribed procedure for examining citizens' proposals, statements, and complaints has been violated or that there has been bureaucratic delay, the suppression of criticism, or persecution for criticism as well as other violations of the law the court shall give an intermediate order which it shall send to the superior official or organ. The official or organ in question must inform the court within 1 month of the measures taken on the intermediate order.

If during the examination of a complaint the court finds elements of crime in the actions of an official or other person, it shall inform the prosecutor of this or institute criminal proceedings.

Article 9. Appealing and Lodging a Protest Against a Court Decision

A court's decision on a complaint may be subject to appeal or protest under the rules of civil procedure.

Article 10. The Apportionment of Costs Involved in the Examination of a Complaint

Costs involved in the examination of a complaint may be imposed by the court on the citizen if the court rejects his complaint or on the organ of state management or the official if it establishes that the actions of that organ or official are unlawful.

M. Gorbachev, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Moscow, Kremlin, 2 November 1989.

Discretionary Leave Provisions Explained

PM0711154189 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 5 Nov 89 Second Edition p 3

[TASS report: "On Extra Leave"]

[Text] In connection with requests received from ministries, departments, and labor collectives, the USSR State

Committee for Labor and Social Problems and the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions [AUCCTU] Secretariat have approved the explanatory document "On Granting Additional Paid Leave in Accordance with Article 5 of the Fundamentals of USSR and Union Republic Labor Legislation."

Enterprises, associations, and organizations which have transferred to the new economic management conditions, this document states, have the right to independently adopt decisions—in line with Article 5 of the Fundamentals of USSR and Union Republic Labor Legislation—on granting working people extra paid leave not envisaged by existing legislation. For good work results, for example, or to women bringing up young children, and so forth.

The terms of and procedure for granting this leave, and also the length of leave, are to be determined by the administration of the enterprise, association, or organization concerned, together with the labor collective council and trade union committee. Any decision to grant extra leave must be ratified in a collective contract.

The outlays for this purpose (in line with USSR Council of Ministers Resolution No 372 of 4 May 1989 "On Additional Measures To Ensure the Normative Correlation Between Growth in Labor Productivity and in Wages and Regulate Payments from Economic Incentive Funds") will be derived from the material incentive fund (unified labor remuneration fund).

With regard to the duration of basic and extra annual leave provided for by labor legislation (for work in unhealthy working conditions; for people engaged in certain sectors of the national economy and with a long work record at the same enterprise or organization; for working people with an abnormal working day; for people working in regions of the far north and equivalent localities; and also study leave and so forth), it will continue to be regulated on a centralized basis until the USSR Law on Leave is adopted.

Biryukova Addresses Consumer Societies Federation

LD0312165789 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 3 Dec 89

[Text] This weekend an inaugural conference was held in Moscow at which a Federation of USSR Consumer Societies was created. As we have already reported, on its 1st day of work, Comrade Biryukova, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers bureau on social development, spoke to representatives of more than 60 of the country's regions—republics, krais, oblasts, and towns. She made public the USSR Council of Ministers' greetings to those taking part in the inaugural conference.

CPSU Local Auditing Commission Officials Confer

*PM2111091589 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
19 Nov 89 First Edition p 2*

[TASS report: "Conference Held"]

[Text] A conference of the chairmen of control and auditing commissions from a number of kray and oblast party organizations and the Moscow and Kiev City Party Organizations was held 17 November. Senior workers from the CPSU Central Committee, the CPSU Central Committee Party Control Committee, and the CPSU Central Auditing Commission took part in the work of the conference. They exchanged opinions on the problems associated with accumulating experience of the work of united party control bodies in accordance with the directives of the 19th All-Union Party Conference and with the preparation of the requisite material on this question in time for the 28th CPSU Congress.

Sociologist Ponders Leningrad Rally's Meaning

*PM3011100589 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 28 Nov 89 p 1*

["Dialogue" between own correspondent Sergey Razin and Leonid Keselman, leader of the Soviet Sociological Association Center for the Study and Forecasting of Social Processes, under the rubric "On the Current Moment": "There Are Opinions! Dialogue of Two Leningrad Communists on a Rally To Which We Are Still Unaccustomed"—first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] The first citywide party rally held recently in Leningrad attracted wide public attention after a video recording of it was shown on television. The assessments of that event have been ambivalent and, at times, directly contrary. Sergey Razin, our own correspondent in Leningrad, talks with Leonid Keselman, leader of the Center for the Study and Forecasting of Social Processes under the Soviet Sociological Association.

[Razin] First of all, I do not wish to paint the rally any one color. The people of Leningrad created a precedent—party workers, right up to secretaries of the oblast party committee [obkom], came to the square for a direct dialogue with ordinary communists. Such a thing could not even have been imagined even 2-3 years ago. One more stereotype of the stagnation period—discussing very important problems behind closed doors, within a narrow circle—has been smashed.

At that rally I saw for myself once again how alarmed people are, how seriously concerned they are at the situation in the party and the country. "Perestroyka is not a hole that has to be deepened! It is an instrument of struggle for our future!" V. Fedotov, a stevedore, said at the rally. And it has to be said that many sensible thoughts were aired in the speeches. I am deeply sympathetic, for example, to the idea of direct elections of delegates, directly from primary organizations, to party forums at all levels—from the rayon committee to the Central Committee. If we realize this idea, elected party

organs will soon be renewed and will undoubtedly reflect the interests of ordinary Communists to a greater degree.

[Keselman] I too welcome this rally! It is very good that the population has learned firsthand, as it were, the attitude of Boris Veniaminovich Gidasov, first secretary of the party obkom and city committee [gorkom], to key problems of the country's development. Excellent! The party leaders stated their position openly and publicly. The fact, for example, that I personally do not agree with the stated position on all counts is another matter. Everyone can express his opinion now.

You will recall which slogans and statements dominated the rally: "Make a political assessment of the Law on Ownership!" "The mass media under worker control!" "Central Committee! Where is your assessment of the changing political situation in the country?" "The Politburo must report on its actions!" and "Communist of the Supreme Soviet! What color is your party card?" All these placards together and the very atmosphere in which the rally took place make me, as a Communist, think seriously. The trouble is that both the placards and the statements can be interpreted and understood in two ways: Who will see to this and how? And what, in the final analysis, does the resolution unanimously adopted at the rally urge us to do? "We categorically oppose the restoration of bourgeois ways!" Of course we do, but does this phrase not conceal a retardation in the rebirth of our long-suffering economy? One and the same thought was persistently aired in many speeches: to blame only cooperative members for all the troubles, for the empty counters, to blame only speculative cooperative members and the moneybags of the shadow economy for all our sins. You can clearly detect behind these populist slogans a desire to preserve the administrative system of power over the economy and to prevent the people from becoming masters on the land and in plants and factories.

What is the meaning of "information terror on the part of certain publications"? Of course, terror is inadmissible, but what if this is an ill-concealed attempt against glasnost?

What is the meaning of "stopping extremist elements which strain for power"? If someone is capable of convincing the population, if someone is capable of reflecting their interests better than those comrades who are concerned about opposition from those "straining for power," then what is the matter? Argue, discuss! What is valuable now is not the strength of bans but the strength of words and conviction.

[Razin] Nevertheless, although I agree with you on many points, I believe that such a viewpoint on perestroyka also has a right to exist. Particularly as more than 10,000 Leningraders gathered in the square on that evening. One detail is curious: Not far from me there stood a veteran who had come with a bunch of scarlet carnations... And if we disagree with particular speakers over something, we must argue with them, try to change their

mind, uphold our own viewpoint, and not seek in each of them an "enemy of perestroika." Let's learn to listen and understand each other!

[Keselman] I do not object! I vote with both hands for tolerance, free discussion, and national reconciliation. And I am in favor of publishing in the central press the resolution which I have just criticized. But I am categorically opposed to this resolution and this position being presented to the whole country in my name, in the name of all Leningrad Communists. Those 10,000-15,000 people and even the veteran whom you mentioned are still not the entire Leningrad Party Organization. And here, in my view, we should not be hasty with statements to the whole country. Let's first discuss things here in Leningrad, in the light of our own priority tasks.

[Razin] There is also the following opinion of the very organization of the rally. "A tremendous spectacle!"—this was what Vladimir Ulyanov, secretary of Vsevolozhsk All-Union Lenin Communist Youth League [Komsomol] Gorkom, said to me.

[Keselman] The party rally took place right after the combined plenum of the CPSU obkom and gorkom and was a kind of finale to it. Millions of television viewers were able to compare these two forums and the platforms and speeches aired at them.

Over the past 6 months our center has conducted approximately 20 studies, which make it possible to judge quite accurately the range of Leningraders' political positions. The reliability of our forecasts is indicated, in particular, by the fact that during the spring election campaign we predicted the voting results in 14 okrugs. Subsequently we have ascertained the attitude of Leningraders to the most acute situations and events in the country's political life: For example, to the events in the Baltic region, to the activity of the Supreme Soviet, to the idea of production electoral okrugs, and so forth. And this is what we ascertained: The political awareness of ordinary Communists and nonparty people virtually does not differ. In this sense "the people and the party are united." On the other hand, two opposing poles have become apparent in views on the present changes and on the country's future within social and professional groups. One viewpoint in discussions is more frequently agreed with by the intelligentsia in the humanities and in engineering and technology, and the other by management apparatus workers. Here highly skilled workers gravitate toward the intelligentsia, toward a radical democratic position, while unskilled workers are closer to the second viewpoint.

In the spring, for example, two-thirds of Leningrad Communists and nonparty people demanded the holding of an extraordinary oblast party conference, whereas a quite different opinion prevailed among management apparatus workers.

In the light of this, it is very important now to wait for the reaction of as many Leningraders as possible to this rally. I am sure that very many Leningrad Communists

will express their attitude toward the rally. And then it will be possible to make some assessments and draw serious conclusions. This rally gives everyone great food for thought. We must not see it just one way, still less create the following picture: Now all is clear to us, and precisely this is the truth. Incidentally, the question not only of an extraordinary party congress but also of holding an extraordinary oblast party conference is now being raised in all its magnitude.

[Razin] I think it is a pity that members of the Komsomol obkom were not allowed to speak (I will not mention the informals). They have something to say to Communists. It seems to me that we party members must broaden the social base of perestroika and seek more and more new allies, winning people's hearts by means of common interests. We can extricate the country from the impasse only if we all pull together, only if everyone is drawn into the political process, if people feel their own personal interest and endeavor to work for the common good. But something interesting happens here: Informals speak at their own rally and will not let others come to the microphone, Komsomol members discuss with themselves, and now here....

[Keselman] In my opinion, no one must play on the populist sentiments of a section of the population. I can believe that some woman pensioner, on seeing crisp banknotes in the hands of a cooperative member, will sincerely believe that precisely that scoundrel is to blame for all misfortunes. But politicians understand perfectly the true cause of our present difficulties. And when they support, or at any rate do not express a different viewpoint, and appear to agree with the idea that there are two black malicious forces—the bigwigs of the shadow economy and the leaders at the center—I believe that such a stance on the part of serious politicians is insincere. Although there has been abundant criticism of the center, it has been somehow nonspecific, general, and toothless. Criticism for criticism's sake—this, it is said, shows how bold we are, for we lash out at whom we want.

But I believe that at such rallies we must also speak of responsibility for broken roads, for the frequent breakdowns in heating networks, for communal apartments, for failures to commission housing, and for many, many other unresolved problems. It is very convenient to shift all complaints and all blame onto the center. And we repeatedly encounter this in the course of perestroika. But it is becoming increasingly hard to enhance our prestige in the eyes of local residents by means of these populist ruses.

[Razin] I would like to support Yuriy Burchakov, first secretary of the Komsomol Obkom. Addressing the combined party plenum, he honestly and openly expressed the position of the primary party organization of the Komsomol Obkom. He declared that the plenum's proposed program for deepening perestroika is by no means a program and satisfies the expectations of Leningraders in far from everything, and so this document must be adopted not in the name of all Leningrad

Communists but only in the name of the party obkom and gorkom. Alternative platforms are needed, and they have been drawn up in a number of major party organizations—in Leningrad University and the Polytechnical Institute—but for some reason they have never been made public.

What can you say about the attitude of Leningraders toward the program discussed at the joint party plenum?

[Keselman] It is simply impossible to answer this question now, because the program has still not been published in its final form, and we do not know which changes have been taken into account and which have not.

Let's emphasize once again the danger of like-mindedness—in any form, informal and formal, public and nonpublic. We need debate, including at rallies. But there should not be a temptation to prepare identical slogans and placards everywhere. It should be possible to argue without fear with the position and the arguments at a rally at any level. [Keselman ends]

...People's deputies in Leningrad have applied to hold a rally. Another one.

Public Prosecutor's Office Discusses Work

LD1611221989 Moscow TASS in English 2011 GMT
16 Nov 89

[Text] Moscow November 16 TASS—The Collegium of the Office of Public Prosecutor of the USSR, presided over by Prosecutor-General Aleksandr Sukharev, today discussed the work of the central apparatus of the Office of Public Prosecutor of the USSR to consider citizens' requests and complaints referred by USSR people's deputies. It was noted that over 3,000 requests and complaints were referred by USSR people's deputies to the central apparatus of the Office of Public Prosecutor over the past five months.

Officials of the Public Prosecutor's Office and other high officials hold working meetings with people's deputies on the problems raised by deputies and voters.

Most of requests have been discussed within the period of time stipulated by law, and the decisions made have been voted correct. At the same time the collegium pointed to considerable shortcomings in this work.

The USSR prosecutor-general issued an order which stipulates a more streamlined procedure for the investigation of requests and complaints referred by people's deputies to the Office of Public Prosecutor, as well as the mechanism to ensure that they are resolved correctly.

The collegium also discussed a bill drawn up by the Office of Public Prosecutor on the procedure of investigating complaints in bodies of state authority, at enterprises, in institutions and organizations. It is intended to refer the bill to appropriate committees of the Soviet parliament.

Creation of National Guard Discussed

90UN0377B Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 48, 29 Nov 89 p 10

[Article by Colonel of Internal Service V.A. Yeleonskiy, doctor of law, chairman of the Department of Criminal Law, Ryazan MVD Higher Institution: "National Guard—Not Internal Troops"]

[Text] In my opinion we see established today the sociopolitical prerequisites for radical change in the legal status, tasks, and functions of the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] internal troops. Insofar as these troops come from the USSR Armed Forces, preserving the former designation for that portion which, according to current legislation, participates in the protection of public order—is nonsense. We must clearly and unambiguously determine that, under conditions when we are establishing our socialist law-governed state, no troops are involved in the protection of public order. In this regard I consider it advisable to discuss the matter of creating—out of the internal troops whose mission presently includes protection of public order—a USSR National Guard.

In executing the functions of protecting public order, presently entrusted to internal troops, the USSR National Guard must be a completely independent unit whose legal status is determined by special law of the USSR Supreme Soviet. In particular, this law should state that the personnel composition of the National Guard is constituted on strictly voluntary principles, but entails the release of draft-age citizens from service in the USSR Armed Forces. The possibility that it might be deemed necessary to conclude special contracts with national guard candidates is not ruled out. This worthy position in society must be filled by USSR national guardsmen possessing the highest moral, physical, and professional qualities.

Economic

Finance Minister Pavlov Discusses Tax Reform

AU0412171889 Vienna DER STANDARD
in German 29 Nov 89 p 16

[Interview with USSR Finance Minister Valentin Sergeyevich Pavlov by Marianne Sajdik in Moscow: "USSR Finance Minister Pavlov: New Tax System to Play Key Role in the Economic Reform"; date not given]

[Text] DER STANDARD: There are currently plans to introduce a new tax system in the USSR. What are its main features?

Pavlov: The government submitted to the Supreme Soviet a draft law on a USSR tax system. The tax reform plays a key role in the reform of the whole of the economy. Its main features are:

—the introduction of a system of tax benefits;

- a transition from various forms of budget payments by enterprises to a uniform profit tax;
- the abandoning of individual tax assessment for enterprises;
- the maintenance of special forms of taxation for cooperatives, collective farms, and joint ventures.

Finally, another form of income tax for the citizens is also planned, in order to ensure social justice in the redistribution of income.

DER STANDARD: Will the percentage of the foreigners' taxation also be raised?

Pavlov: Yes, this may concern a certain proportion of the foreigners who work in the USSR or derive income from the USSR. However, foreigners are not discriminated against in comparison to Soviet citizens. The general principle of Soviet legislation, according to which foreigners pay taxes in the USSR just like Soviet citizens, remains unchanged.

The tax increase is connected with the introduction of a progressive income tax system. However, it should not be forgotten that the USSR concluded special tax agreements with many countries which provide for several tax benefits in certain situations.

DER STANDARD: In the Soviet Finance Ministry all joint ventures established in the USSR are registered. Are you satisfied with the development of cooperation in this sector?

Pavlov: The previous experiences with joint ventures in the USSR do not give us any cause to assume that the new form of cooperation is developing most effectively for the Soviet Union.

For example, the share of joint ventures in the sector of material production is insignificant. There is a large number of small- and medium-sized enterprises with an original capital of less than R50,000. Cases in which the foreign partners do not meet their obligations and especially protract the payment of their shares into the startup funds are frequent.

Unfortunately, there are also cases of unscrupulous management—the balance-sheets of approximately a dozen joint ventures were not confirmed by the audit company. However, in my opinion there are generally good prospects for joint ventures in the USSR. But a considerate, purposeful approach to cooperation is essential.

DER STANDARD: What does the Soviet Finance Ministry intend to do to make the ruble convertible in the near future?

Pavlov: The problem of the convertibility of the ruble has to be solved in the course of the perestroika of our economic mechanism. The question itself has only been raised by perestroika and was not even theoretically discussed before.

The convertibility of a currency is a category and an instrument of market economy, while not all market economies necessarily have a convertible currency. Talking of the convertibility of the ruble, one has to start from the need to establish such an economic system in the USSR.

Thus, I simply have to state that now there are no objective economic conditions for introducing the convertibility of the ruble in the USSR. All the more so as, in the course of perestroika, structural disproportions begin to show which rule out the convertibility of the ruble until they have been eliminated.

The Soviet Finance Ministry's task is to improve the country's financial situation—reducing the budget deficit, stabilizing the circulation of money, bringing inflation under control, achieving equilibrium in the balance of payments, and perfecting the exchange rate system. The introduction of the convertibility of the ruble is, above all, a general economic task. It will progress step by step, in accordance with the development of the economic reform.

Prunskene on Lithuanian-USSR Economic Ties

*90UN0385A Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA
in Russian 8 Nov 89 p 3*

[Statement by USSR People's Deputy Kazimera Prunskene "On Property Relations Between the Lithuanian SSR and the USSR"]

[Text] Dear deputies! The issue which I am going to inform you about is, perhaps, not new.

Property is the foundation of human freedom and the independence of peoples and states. A people or a state which have no land of their own and, therefore, their own territory, which do not own national assets are not sovereign and cannot even be called so.

On 18 May of this year, a session of the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania adopted amendments to Article 11 of the Constitution of the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] and the Law on Economic Independence. They proclaim the exclusive right of Lithuania to own its land and natural resources, as well as the state assets located in the republic. This is a firm and unambiguous statement by the residents of Lithuania which has been codified. However, in and of itself it does not prevent conflicts which arise on account of the relations with USSR property. Other, stronger contenders for our land and assets come forward (though under our law and under the international law they are illegal). This is the entire Soviet people in the name of which the USSR Government speaks. These are not the provisions of the Brezhnev Constitution or other obsolete regulations but the newly worded articles of laws.

At present, the Law on Property in the USSR is under discussion in the USSR Supreme Soviet. The first reading of the draft law was held on 16 and 17 October

of this year. An overwhelming majority of the deputies stated a position similar to ours on recognizing the right of the republics, including autonomous, to the land and its mineral and other natural resources both in the course of the preliminary discussion in commissions and committees and at the session of the Supreme Soviet. Nonetheless, this very version of the article acknowledging this right disappeared from the draft law which is being prepared for a public discussion following its first reading. The draft being prepared unambiguously proclaims the joint ownership of land and natural resources by the republics and the union. In the initial version of the draft, alternative wordings of these articles existed whereas at present, as I have already said, an unambiguous provision remains.

The draft states that in the course of unification of Soviet peoples in the federation, their lands and other natural units form a unified territory which provides the foundation for the sovereignty of the USSR. Despite the right of republics to own and use the land being recognized here, the Union also enjoys a similar right insofar as the needs of the Union warrant including, of course, the defense and security of the country and management of many strategic industries. Who is going to be the genuine master of the land and its wealth? Certainly, the one who is stronger. The detrimental consequences of this will have to be experienced by those who live on this land.

Land is not just an ordinary piece of property. People's Deputy Kugultinov spoke about this poetically, calling land the mother. In his words, the exiled peoples lament their land not as property, but as soul. Such feelings also bind to Lithuania our exiles, as well as emigres abroad. I believe that I will not deviate from the position of the inhabitants of Lithuania, as well as the opinion of the Supreme Soviet deputies stated at the recently held meeting at the CPSU Central Committee, if I say that the land, its natural resources, as well as state assets located in the territory of Lithuania belong to the residents of Lithuania. The land unites the past, present, and future generations. One generation, say, ours, has no right to transfer this land for joint use with other peoples. This would be an irreparable loss for the coming generations.

With regard to the claims by the Union to our land the issue of the possibility of Lithuania staying further within the USSR under the conditions dictated by the laws mentioned becomes acute. Considering this possibility does not amount to emotions or extremism as they sometimes try to portray it. This is the legislative right to self-determination which the USSR Constitution guarantees to us. In this case, how are the statements on the territorial integrity of the union, on the unified national economic complex, and on the unavoidability of centralized management which are no less emotional to be explained?

In stating our attitude toward the draft prepared for a public discussion we, perhaps, cannot restrict ourselves to merely explaining the ownership of the land and natural resources. Similar questions come up with regard

to other assets of the state. I believe that it is also not news to you that at issue is the transfer of enterprises reporting to the union in the territory of Lithuania to the sphere of state regulation of the republic while turning these enterprises into those not affiliated with a ministry or independent. The course of the dialogue is complicated. Thus, at the previous meeting which I have already mentioned there were individuals, mainly from the management sphere, who maintained that in this case the republic will have to buy out the assets of these enterprises.

Let us imagine the following situation: All 15 union republics become economically independent—let us say, some to the point of seceding from the USSR—and all of them have to buy out the assets. The question arises: Who should they pay the quota of the buyout money to, to whose account should the money be transferred? It is understandable that this is an economic absurdity. Those who bring up this idea probably do not think about its content. If we have to counter such arguments we have our own quite balanced judgments. Firstly, this is the buyout of assets of our enterprises by annual contributions to the Union from the profits of enterprises reporting to the Union. At present, we are compiling a bill, unpleasant both for us and for those to whom it is addressed, beginning with the deprivation of gold and currency in 1940 and confiscation of various assets for the benefit of the Union. We have counted about 14 such points.

If we are to talk about the relationship of the republics with the Union, this issue follows from more general notions, i.e., the status of a republic as a sovereign state and the Union as a union of sovereign states rather than a unitary state. Proceeding from this, we—I mean the working group of the Commission for the Economic Reform of the Council of Ministers—have prepared an alternative draft Law on Property in the USSR. Unlike the union law referred to, this law regulates exactly the subject and object of all-union property and relations between the republics in using all-union property, i.e., the joint property of all republics. Such property does not embrace the state assets of all republics but is aimed at ensuring the functions which are in line with the essence of the union of sovereign republics.

As far as I know, we received such a draft yesterday. I had to comment on it in the Committee for the Issues of the Economic Reform of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Incidentally, many deputies vigorously working in this committee, both lawyers and economists, have received this law quite favorably. The well-known lawyer Sobchak, the economist Tikhonov, and others are among them. These ideas are no longer new and, as I have been noticing, they surface at times in the speeches of deputies from other republics, for example, when the Law on Ownership in the USSR was discussed at the meeting of the session. To my mind, this law needs to be submitted on behalf of the Supreme Soviet of the republic; it should carry great political weight. I know that a majority of deputies from other Baltic republics, Latvia and Estonia,

who have familiarized themselves with the draft take a favorable view of it. We will gain the endorsement if we submit it on behalf of the deputy group of the Balts.

In summation, I would like to read the draft announcement addressed to the USSR Supreme Soviet which we have prepared in conjunction with this. The content of the announcement is as follows:

"Executing the will of the residents of Lithuania, the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet declares that articles of the USSR Law on Ownership in the USSR discussed at the second Session of the Supreme Soviet which involve the relations of ownership between the republics and the USSR are unacceptable for Lithuania. They fundamentally contravene Article 11 of the Constitution of the Lithuanian SSR and the Law on the Foundations of Economic Independence of the Lithuanian SSR adopted at the 11th Session of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet on 18 May of this year.

"The present laws of the Lithuanian SSR assert that its land, mineral wealth, inland and territorial waters, forests, and other natural assets are the exclusive property of the Lithuanian SSR which provides an economic foundation for the sovereignty of the republic. The variants of the articles of the draft proposed by the USSR Government cause justified concern. In the event of their adoption, the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet would be forced to suspend the application of the USSR Law on Ownership in the USSR in the Lithuanian SSR proceeding from Article 70 of the Lithuanian SSR Constitution. With a view to avoiding extreme decisions, the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet proposes that the Law on Ownership in the USSR codify the right of the republics to own land, other natural resources, and state assets located in their territory. We consider it feasible for the USSR Supreme Soviet to pass a law regulating all-union property only which would set forth the subjects and objects of this property and the interrepublic relations of ownership only. We propose to discuss in the USSR Supreme Soviet the draft Law on Ownership in the USSR prepared by the Lithuanian SSR as one of the variants."

In response to a written question on whether the alternative draft union Law on Ownership has been discussed in the commissions and the presidium, I may say that we are not adopting this law; this is not the jurisdiction of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet. The draft sets forth the position which has been reflected in this announcement and our laws, and it is outlined here in the language of legislation. We are not proposing at present to discuss and adopt this draft. At issue is merely adopting this position. This would lay the foundation for submitting the draft law for a discussion in the committees and commissions, in the USSR Supreme Soviet as one of the possible variants prepared by individual scientists and organizations. We are proposing our own variant (provided that you support it). This, however, does not mean that it will be put on the agenda in the Supreme Soviet, to say nothing of being adopted.

I deliberately do not insist that the draft of this law involving ownership relations be provided to you hastily in order not to confuse things and to make clear what is at issue.

I explain once again in detail: I have been talking about the alternative draft Law on Ownership in the USSR. "The Law of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Ownership in the USSR" has been handed out to you. What is the difference? It is in the fact that this Russian variant of the draft USSR Law envisaged the joint property of all republics which is at the disposal of the supreme organs of power of the USSR. This is what the discussion was about. The document which you received today has not yet been discussed by the presidium. This is the draft law prepared by the Commission for the Economic Reform which regulates the relations of ownership in Lithuania. The other draft law does not at all interfere in the situation at the republic level. Each republic has an opportunity to adjust the relations of ownership to its specific potential. We believe that this should not be done at the level of the union. Each republic will adopt the law which will be in keeping with its conditions. For example, the relations of land ownership will be of one kind in Lithuania, and, perhaps, of a different kind in Central Asia or Russia. There should be no attempts to do this at the union level.

The present draft should be submitted for a public discussion, published in the press, and discussed. If it is approved in principle today and an editorial commission is formed we will be able to adopt this law at the next session. It is necessary to adopt it.

Lithuanian Supreme Soviet on Property Law

90UN0385B Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA
in Russian 11 Nov 89 p 1

[Announcement by the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian SSR]

[Text] Complying with the will of the residents of Lithuania, the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet declares that the articles of the draft USSR Law on Ownership in the USSR discussed at the second Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet which involve the relations of ownership between the republics and the USSR are unacceptable for Lithuania. In essence, they contravene Article 11 of the Constitution (Main Law) of the Lithuanian SSR and the Law on the Foundations of Economic Independence of the Lithuanian SSR adopted at the 11th Session of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet on 18 May 1989.

These laws of the Lithuanian SSR envisage that its land, mineral wealth, inland and territorial waters, forests, and other natural assets are the exclusive property of the Lithuanian SSR which provides an economic foundation for the sovereignty of the republic.

The variants of the articles of the draft proposed by the USSR Government cause justified concern among the

population of Lithuania. In the event of their adoption, the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet would be forced to suspend the application of the USSR Law on Ownership in the USSR in the Lithuanian SSR proceeding from Article 70 of the Lithuanian SSR Constitution.

With a view to avoiding extreme decisions, the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet proposes that the Law on Ownership in the USSR codify the right of the republics to own land, other natural resources, and state assets located in their territory.

We consider it feasible for the USSR Supreme Soviet to pass a law regulating all-union property only which would set forth the subjects and objects of this property and the interrepublic relations of ownership. We propose to consider in the USSR Supreme Soviet the attached draft Law on Ownership in the USSR prepared by the Lithuanian SSR as one of the possible variants.

[Signed] Chairman of the Presidium of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet V. Astrauskas

Secretary of the Presidium of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet L. Sabutis

Vilnius, 4 November 1989

Social Spending R21 Billion Above 5-Year Plan

LD0512120289 Moscow World Service in English
0900 GMT 5 Dec 89

[Text] In the first 4 years of the current Soviet 5-year period, 21 billion rubles have been spent on social programs over and above the initial plan. Our correspondent has been told this at the State Planning Committee. Additional allocations were channelled to the health service and education, to better welfare services for the low income groups. Redistribution of the budget is being done under the new economic policy sharply turned to meet the urgent needs of the population.

Ryzhkov Confident About Budget Deficit Reduction

LD0712142189 Moscow World Service in English
1200 GMT 7 Dec 89

[Text] The Soviet Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov has voiced confidence that the state budget deficit can be reduced to norm over the next 3 years. Interviewed by the Moscow weekly SOBESEDNIK, he said another priority was to push up the output of consumer goods and balance the consumer market. The country, he added, should reform its wholesale and retail prices since the present prices failed to stimulate production.

Scientific

TASS Reports 'Kvant-2' Docking With 'Mir' Station

Details Given

LD0612141189 Moscow TASS in English 1350 GMT
6 Dec 89

[Text] Moscow December 6 TASS—By TASS correspondent Rena Kuznetsova:

The module Kvant-2 docked with the Mir manned station today at 15 hours 21 minutes Moscow time [1221 GMT]. The supply module was put into orbit on November 26 by a Proton carrier-rocket.

The vehicle was badly needed by cosmonauts Aleksandr Viktorenko and Aleksandr Serebrov who have already spent three months on board the Mir station. It brought the crew life-sustaining and research equipment which will allow them to expand the research programme.

The module is provided with an air lock through which the cosmonauts will be able to step out into open space and with everything necessary for their work there, including an Icarus "space bicycle" on which the cosmonauts will be able to move independently in outer space. It has also brought them water, fuel and food supplies.

The supply module's launch had to be postponed twice, first in April due to delays in its construction. A decision was taken to leave the space station unmanned for several months to save money and to prepare more thoroughly for a new phase of operation.

The launch date was altered again in mid-September because some faulty elements were found during ground tests in the Kurs system ensuring the module's correct orbiting and closing in with the station. Careful factory checks and tests were carried out before it was decided that the repaired automatic docking system was ready for use.

There were difficulties this time too. It was learned after the launch that one of Kvant's solar panels was jammed. The fault was successfully corrected, however. The module could not be docked on December 2 and the operation was rescheduled for today.

Further Details

LD0612174689 Moscow TASS in English 1731 GMT
6 Dec 89

[Text] Moscow December 6 TASS—The special-purpose module Kvant-2 docked with the manned orbital complex Mir at 15:22 Moscow time today [1222 GMT FBIS].

The mutual search, rendezvous, mooring and docking of the two spacecraft were conducted in an automatic mode.

The processes were monitored by Mission Control Centre, the command and measurement complex and cosmonauts Aleksandr Viktorenko and Aleksandr Serebrov, working on board the Mir station.

The module Kvant-2 docked with the orbital station from the transfer unit side.

The total mass of the manned complex comprising Mir, Kvant, Kvant-2 and Soyuz TM-8 is 63 tonnes, its length is 40 meters.

Due to a number of problems that emerged during the module's flight to the Mir station, experts of leading research and design institutions were also employed in order to work out possible options.

After analysing and modelling the situation on computers and conducting tests on ground-based facilities, the specialists determined the best modes in which to conduct the dynamic operation that ensured the link-up of the spacecraft.

Next Friday, the module will be moved to its assigned position, one of the side docking points on the basic unit.

Docking Process, 'Kvant-2' Module Described

LD0612140789

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1215 GMT on 6 December carries a live relay from the Flight Control Center in Baykanur by special correspondents Vladimir Bezyayev and Leonid Lazarevich on the "Kvant-2" module docking with the "Mir" space station.

The module and station are 200 meters apart, they note, and are flying over the Mediterranean toward Italy, having just passed the Strait of Gibraltar.

The correspondents ask ex-Cosmonaut Aleksandr Pavlovich Aleksandrov to describe what is happening. They note that the atmosphere at the center is calmer than it was during the failed docking on 2 December. Television pictures of the module appear on a screen at this point, reported the correspondents. Aleksandrov points out that the module and space station possess immense memories which allow them to carry out the necessary computations for orbit and docking. He says that "each machine and each control subcenter in our Control Center work with its own machine, and each machine is given its own assignments. However, when the machines begin to combine these assignments with one another it turns out that they are working in slightly different languages. Then, when people agree on how they must work, the machines accordingly carry out the assignment in its entirety. On that day, however, the intelligent machine, the module, decided that since the parameters did not coincide it was necessary to simply halt the process."

At 1218 GMT the module is 10 meters from the station. Aleksandrov notes that the cosmonauts Serebrov and

Viktorenko are keeping the space station's coordinates stable, while the module is moving in automatic mode. Under extreme circumstances, he adds, the crew would be able to switch off this automatic mode and halt the movement.

The crew then has to stabilize the space station at this point as it is affected by some oscillation. In order to allow time for this to take place, the reporters interrupted their relay and hand back to the studio.

The relay resumes at 1224 GMT, and the correspondents announce that the docking has just taken place. Former Cosmonaut Aleksandrov describes the module, noting that it is carrying a vehicle with which the cosmonauts will be able to move freely in space that its decompression chamber is located along its central axis, unlike other modules; that the cosmonaut's will find it less spacious than the station because it is divided into three compartments. A second mechanical connection will be created between the two vessels by means of hooks (kryuki), which will create a complete hermetic seal. Before the module is redocked to the side docking complex, the module's condition will have to be checked. After it is ascertained that the module is functioning normally it will be redocked.

Official Notes Chernobyl Cleanup Program

90UN0307A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA
in Russian 31 Oct 89 p 1

[Interview with I.N. Smolyar: "'We Must Not Oversimplify the Catastrophe', Says I.N. Smolyar, chairman of the BSSR Supreme Soviet Standing Commission on Questions of the Elimination of the Effects of the Accident at the Chernobyl AES"]

[Text] [Smolyar] The completed version of the State program for eliminating the effects in the republic of the Chernobyl accident that was adopted by the twelfth session of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet also reflected the point of view of Belorussian scientists on the concept of safe habitation, and took into consideration the wishes of the population living in the contaminated territory. Before, evacuating people unconditionally was talked about only where the total individual life-dose of radiation was 35 bars or more, but now we are talking about places where the force of the radiation is equal to or greater than 40 curies per square kilometer, and where it is impossible to obtain clean local food-stuffs. The new program offers the right to choose a place of residency to the population that lives in territories contaminated by 15 to 40 curies, as well. If a family decides to leave, it will be paid a certain compensation, and it can count on being provided with living quarters in the territory of Belorussia, at analogous populated points, it is true. For those who remain, health care privileges are provided.

In accordance with the medical norms for nutrition, the program makes provisions for supplying people with clean food-stuffs in places where it is determined that

contamination is between 1-5 curies per square kilometer, as well. I can also say that five new sections have appeared in the program: On the organization of fuel and public catering, everyday services, transportation and communication, and on improving the material bases of these services. A calculation has been made of the work force that will be required.

[SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA] In completing the program, obviously you had to come in contact with departmental points of view; what are they like?

[Smolyar] They are varied. After all, the present program already costs not ten, but R16.8 billion.

In Moscow, during the discussions of the draft program at meetings of the extraordinary commission under the chairmanship of V.Kh. Doguzhiyev, representatives of the USSR State Committee on Labor and USSR Gosplan attempted to vote down a series of concrete measures. Even now, many believe that the republic should take upon itself all of the expenses connected with eliminating the effects of the accident, that no funds should be allotted from the union budget. What can one say to that? We must not oversimplify the catastrophe. In my opinion, we must look for support in the USSR Supreme Soviet, from the people's deputies that represent the republic there.

In September an announcement addressed to M.S. Gorbachev appeared, from 92 of the country's scientists who work in the field of radiation medicine. It was signed by certain representatives of the science from Belorussia, as well: A.M. Skryabin, V.A. Matyukhin, S.K. Filakova, G.I. Lazyuk. As before, the group insists that the criterion for making responsible decisions should be an individual radiation life-dose of 35 bars. In other words, a new attempt has been launched to turn public opinion around.

[SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA] Ivan Nikolayevich, now, as far as I know, the level of contamination both of the land and of food-stuffs is evaluated according to radioactive cesium. But there is another group of heavy elements that is no less dangerous. Is the program, as I understand it, capable of taking into account the new information?

[Smolyar] Any other way is impossible. A complex evaluation of the radioactive contamination of, for example, Khoyniki, or of the urban settlement Komarin, is fundamentally different from the initial one. For this reason, the point on the right of the Belorussian CP Central Committee and the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers Commission on the Elimination of the Effects of the Accident at the Chernobyl AES has been introduced into section 1, on the basis of an agreement between Belgidromet [Belorussian Institute of Hydrometeorology], the Belorussian Ministry of Health, Belorussian Agroprom, and the Belorussian Academy of Sciences to make resolutions on the introduction of changes in the list of points dealing with the evacuation only of those possessing the appropriate privileges. Privileges

will be allotted starting from January 1, 1990, regardless of the periods used for the evaluation of contamination.

There are also suggestions which the commission did not consider necessary to include in the draft program. For example, that the right to the provision of living quarters for evacuated families be preserved even when they leave the borders of the republic. This requires a decision by the country's government.

The commission also did not accept the suggestion that the right to evacuation be extended to those who live in a zone contaminated by 5-15 curies per square kilometer: It is impossible to resettle everyone.

However, at the session a document was adopted in its entirety that will permit us even today to take concrete measures toward solving the various problems that arise for people living in the contaminated territory.

Even so, there is a lot of work ahead for the union organs, so that all of the resources included in the conception of the problem can be distributed. I think that the session was correct in addressing the USSR People's Deputies with the request that they make the necessary emphases when the program is under examination in the USSR Supreme Soviet. The Chernobyl accident, from which the inhabitants of our republic have suffered so seriously, was not their fault. The implementation of the program for eliminating the effects in Belorussia of the accident at the Chernobyl AES depends to a great extent on a deep understanding of our tragedy and the corresponding decisions of the country's highest organ of authority.

Military

Yazov Discusses Perestroika in Army, Navy

LD0712101889 Moscow TASS in International Service in Russian 0900 GMT 7 Dec 89

[Text] Moscow, 7 Dec (TASS)—"Our armed forces are the offspring of the people, they are essential as a most important political institution which tackles tasks that are vitally important for the country," Army-general Dmitriy Yazov, USSR minister of defense, has stated. He delivered a speech at the first all-service officers' assembly which opened in the capital today. More than 1,500 officers from all the military districts, groups of forces, and fleets gathered at their forum to discuss the progress of the restructuring under way in the armed forces, and to determine the place and designation of the officers' corps in deepening restructuring processes.

Gen Yazov said that the invigoration of all work in educating officers in a spirit of patriotism and internationalism and devotion to military duty, the formation of clear and precise ideas in them of honor and dignity, and an aspiration unswervingly to follow these ideas in everyday service and life, is a most important task of the present day.

The all-service officers' assembly, in the view of Yazov, must become an important landmark in the process of democratizing military life, which is developing in the common channel of the renewal of Soviet society. The minister considers that the holding of an officers' assembly is a regeneration of one of the most interesting, fruitful military traditions, which will help give rise to a feeling of pride in the officer's vocation and care for the honor and dignity of the officer in people who have chose the defense of the homeland as their profession.

Analyzing the state of affairs in the officers' corps, Gen Yazov cited certain negative phenomena which occur in the army and navy. The most alarming of these, in his view, is the aspiration of young officers to resign from the armed forces. "This is caused primarily by social and domestic unsettlement of many officers and their families," said Dmitriy Yazov. The defense minister urged commanders of all ranks to begin seeking ways to a rapid solution of this problem.

'Fashion' for Denigrating Armed Forces Hit

PM0712110389 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 28 Nov 89 First Edition p 1

[Letter from USSR Armed Forces Veteran A. Zhikin under the general heading "Army: Insiders' Views": "One-Sided Pluralism"]

[Text] I was watching the "Topical Interview" program featuring Marshal of the Soviet Union S.F. Akhromeyev on Channel 1 recently and it made me sick. The young people arranged the conversation in such a way that it seemed as if the marshal and our entire army were on trial. The tone of the questions was clearly haughty toward the interviewee, and his answers were greeted with distrust and even malicious grins.

Undermining the Soviet Army's prestige has become almost the fashion in some mass media organs recently. The negative aspects of its activity are exaggerated whereas the positive side, the fact that the army is doing its job of protecting the motherland, helping people in distress, as at Chernobyl, and providing a good schooling for young people, is mentioned little and reluctantly, when they aren't trying to avoid mentioning it at all. Pluralism, you say? A somewhat strange, one-sided pluralism, it seems.

OGONEK Cover Evokes Protests From Military

PM0512151989 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 28 Nov 89 First Edition p 1

[Letter from retired Colonel B. Pokrovskiy under the general heading "Army: Insiders' Views": "Wicked Work"—last paragraph is editorial comment]

[Text] The cover of OGONEK No. 41 features a photomontage by V. Sumovskiy. It depicts a colonel who—judging by his medals and ribbons—was a Great Patriotic War participant, against the background of a red banner. He is holding J. Stalin's book *On the Soviet*

Union's Great Patriotic War. The colonel's face is not visible: It is covered by the letters "Stalin Is With Them!" That is what the masterpiece looks like. The photomontage relates to the item entitled "We Are Stalinists"—on Tofik Shakhverdiyev's film "Is Stalin With Us?"—published in the same issue. But, whereas the item is about the fact that we are all strongly conditioned to live in the old way and that new approaches and new thinking are finding it hard to make progress, the cover photograph is far more definite: It is only you war veterans who cling to the past and are unable to give up your great generalissimo; you are throwing a wrench into the works of perestroika.

This montage cannot be called anything other than a photographic provocation and a blatant insult to veterans. Its slanderous aim is obvious. There is only one thing I don't understand: Why is the editorial office of this respected publication thereby trying to sow discord between different generations of Soviet people?

Signed on behalf of the hundreds of war veterans united by the Veterans Council of a double-order-winning unit by retired Colonel B. Pokrovskiy, chairman of the council

Indignant letters about this photomontage have also been sent in by cinematographer A. Skudar, retired Major General A. Ganenko, war and labor veteran V. Voinov, the Osipov family, retired Colonel P. Ovcharenko, and others.

Trade Union Views Past Work, Ponders Future

PM0612162989 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 6 Dec 89 First Edition p 1

["Our Correspondent" report: "Concern for People at the Forefront"]

[Text] The USSR Ministry of Defense trade union organization has held its 29th report and election conference. A report on the work of the trade union organization's joint committee between 1 November 1986 and 2 December 1989 was delivered by Committee Chairman L.B. Lobacheva. A report on the auditing commission's work was also heard.

Attention in the report and delegate speeches focused mainly on current problems associated with the protection of workers' and employees' legitimate rights and the improvement of conditions for work, daily life, and leisure and of medical and cultural services. It was noted that elected trade union organs do not always penetrate deeply the essence of processes associated with the new forms of economic and financial activity by enterprises and units, and this at times leads to infringement of working people's interests. Permission is at times groundlessly given for overtime and holiday work. The activeness of trade union organizations has recently declined as regards the strengthening of production, labor, and executive discipline and the struggle against drunkenness and alcoholism.

In the course of its work, the conference elaborated a program for practical activity to further deepen perestroika in trade union work and to prepare for the 28th CPSU Congress, the 19th USSR Trade Unions Congress, and the elections of Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic people's deputies and local soviets. Trade union organizations are called on to intensify their influence on the solution of economic, social, and educational problems and the enhancement of workers' and employees' labor and political activeness. An important position in the program is assigned to concern for improving workers' and employees' housing conditions, raising the wages of low-paid categories of working people, and improving the trade in goods that are in short supply.

The conference resolved to support the proposal to create a trade union of Soviet Army and Navy workers and employees.

The conference participants were addressed by Army General V.M. Arkhipov, USSR deputy defense minister and chief of the Armed Forces Rear Services.

The conference elected a new joint committee of the USSR Ministry of Defense trade union organization. The voting resulted in the reelection of L.B. Lobacheva as chairman.

Correction to 24 Nov Chervov Interview

[Editorial Report] The following correction pertains to the item entitled "Chervov Interviewed on Defense Sufficiency" published on page 118 of the 5 December DAILY REPORT:

Colonel General Chervov is incorrectly identified in paragraph one as the ...chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff... his correct title is chief of a directorate of the Armed Forces General Staff.